AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC - EUROPEAN-UNION

Country report

Mali

Mali, which used to be the centre of great appears hemmed in by its frontiers, colonisation having culminated in the break-up of the old 'French Sudan'. Following the marxist regime of Modibo Keita (the 'founder' of the nation) and the dictatorship of Mousse Traoré, Mali has discovered democracy. It is still one of the world's poorest countries but recent macro-economic trends are highly encouraging and there is a new dynamism. It seems that the ending of the Tuareg conflict has provoked a surge of optimism- even among ordinary citizens whose wallets have yet to feel the effects of an improving national economy.

Country report

Western Samoa

Pacific island nations have a reputation for idyllic scenery and rich cultural traditions. Western Samoa has both of these assets in abundance, but it also faces many development challenges. With a population of just 165 000, the country has a limited local market, and it is a very long way from potential overseas customers. It is also susceptible to destructive tropical storms. Despite these constraints, there have been some promising signs of economic progress in recent years.

Dossier

Investing in people

To say that investing in people makes economic sense is to state the obvious. But to what extent are the implications of this statement fully understood in the developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, in these days of constantly shifting development theories? We look at this subject in our Dossier.

The Courier

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union

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South Pacific Forum: 'responding to the needs of the Member States'

Although an accountant by training, leremiah Tabai has never had the opportunity to practise his profession, having pursued a successful political career instead since 1974. In 1978, he was annointed head of government in Kiribati and a year later he became his country's first President, when it achieved independence. He held this position for 12 years. In 1991, he took up the top post in one of the South Pacific's key regional bodies, the Forum Secretariat, which is based in Suva, Fiji. During a recent Courier visit to the region, we had the opportunity to interview the Secretary General. Our discussion was wide-ranging, covering issues such as the Forum Secretariat's role, the economic challenges facing the South Pacific, and the development of regional links with Australia, New Zealand and Asia. We began by asking Mr Tabai to outline the objectives of the organisation that he heads.

- Like many other organisations in the region, the Forum was established essentially to try and assist the development process of the Member States. At the time it was set up, there was already an organisation in existence - the South Pacific Commission - which dates back to 1947. But there was a feeling that we needed an organisation that was not just restricted to economic issues; that could talk about other matters with a bearing on the development of the region.

In the early years, when the organisation was called the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), the focus was heavily on trying to assist the trade and economic development of the member countries. Later, the name was changed to the Forum Secretariat and its role evolved.

� In what way ?

-It has evolved in seeking to respond to the needs of the Member States. It started as a very small bureau essentially dealing, as I said, with trade and economic issues. Subsequently, it moved into areas like energy, civil aviation, maritime questions and telecommunications. It also became more involved in political issues. We have a division which deals specifically with these.

1995 was a very important year in the history of the Forum. We had a review of the organisation, looking at ways we could perform better and taking account of the changes in the region and the world at large. The fundamental recommendation in the report which came out of that review was that the Secretariat should focus mainly in future on poliy-related issues, in the areas of trade and investment, economics and international relations. This report was discussed and endorsed at the last Forum in Madang, Papua New Guinea.

� Does this mean, in practice, a withdrawal from project activity ?

-It may. The essential focus of the work will be providing policy advice to countries. Having said this, there should still be some project work. For instance, we will be engaged in a programme to provide assistance for importers, particularly in the small island countries. The idea is to help people- who may not be familiar with all the legal requirements-to learn how to get into the business. This will involve running a workshop and inviting people with expertise to pass on their knowledge. So even though the focus will be on policy issues, there will still be room for project-type activities where needed -so long as these fit in with the policy priorities.

� You mentioned the fact that the Forum now deals with political questions. Although the issue may now be seen as 'water under the bridge' to what extent was the Forum Secretariat involved in the diplomatic disagreement over French nuclear testing ?

- We were very much involved from the beginning. In 1991, when the French testing was not underground but atmospheric, the region, at a Forum meeting, came out strongly in opposition to the tests. Right up to our last meeting in Madang, the subject was always a major item on the agenda, and we left France in no doubt as to the resolve of our region.

When the new President took the decision to resume testing after a gap of several years, I was in the group from the South Pacific that went to France to express our views to French ministers, face-to-face. Our team was led by the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who was President of the Forum. And when the tests began again, the Chairman took a decision suspending the dialogue and partner status of France with the Forum. So, as you see, we have been heavily involved in the issue.

� What resources does the Forum have at its disposal and where does the money come from ?

- An important source of funds is our members' contributions. These tend to be used to cover the operational costs of the organisation. Then of course, there are the funds made available by our donors. The main ones are obviously Australia and New Zealand but there are many other countries and international organisations who provide assistance. The EU, of course, is an important partner. There was also a private donor who funded our conference centre.

� How many people are employed in the Secretariat ?

-Around 80, all based here in Suva. Most of these are support staff.

� What is the current state of relations between the Forum Secretariat and the main donors ?

-I would say our relations are good. We have an extensive mechanism for consultation with the donors. Every two years, we invite them here for a dialogue. We talk about the key issues and discuss ways in which they can assist us. There is also usually a dialogue associated with the Forum (ministerial) meetings. In September this year, after the Forum meeting, we will have more discussions with our main partners such as the EU, Canada, France, Japan and the UK. I should mention too the close links we have with international organisations like the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the IMF.

I think it is fair to say that the Forum Secretariat is seen as a particularly important organisation in the region. That is why donors are quite keen to be seen assisting us in what we do.

� What are the key development issues facing the South Pacific nations ?

- Development is quite a difficult process for our region. There are various international reports (particularly from the World Bank) - that describe how we have fared over the last few years. If you compare our performance with the Caribbean countries, for example, you find that we have not done nearly so well.

We face a number of problems. First, there is the fact that we are so small. Small communities find it much more difficult than large ones to achieve development. You need to have the market and the critical mass to do all the things that are needed and we lack these. A second, related point is that our countries are very isolated from the rest of the world. It is true that here in Fiji, there are quite good connections, but if you go to Tuvalu, Kiribati or Niue, you will soon discover how difficult it is to get out. And if you are so isolated in terms of communication, how can you hope to increase your exports ? How can you airfreight your fish to Japan when there is no aircraft available-or the one that is available is not fast enough to ensure that the product is still fresh when it arrives?

On this question, one of the things we are increasingly realising is the need to do more in terms of human resource development. We all recognise that, without an educated population and workforce, it is very hard to achieve the development that we are aiming for. To be fair, if you compare the literacy rates here with those of many other countries, say in Africa, they are not at all bad. Our literacy levels are quite high. But I think we have a long way to go in acquiring problem-solving skills of the type needed to compete internationally. We are now talking with the EU about how we can utilise funding from the second protocol of Lomé IV. And I suspect that human resource development will remain high on the agenda.

� Is that view shared by the European side ?

-I think so. l have a feeling that they will support it because it is so obvious. If you develop human skills, you are better placed when it comes to problem-solving.

Going back to the key development issues, another point is the lack of natural resources. This is less of a difficulty for countries like Fiji or Papua New Guinea, but it certainly affects the small island states. It hardly needs saying that if you don't have the resources in the first place, it is much harder to develop.

Finally, I think there is a question of how the Pacific region can get a better return on the resources it does have. This theme of 'managing our resources' was discussed by the Forum in Brisbane two years ago. Fisheries is probably the most important area here. The question is how we can earn more from this than we are currently doing- and there is no easy answer. Likewise in the forestry sector. We have to ensure that logging is done on a sustainable basis. But we must also recognise that leaders of the Pacific nations are under pressure. On the one hand, they are trying to take a lona-term view. but they are also striving to tackle the immediate problems. In an ideal world, our region would obtain a far better return on our resources, and that is something that we have to work on.

Having said all this, I don't think one should be too pessimistic. This region is still a very good place to live in. That is clearly reflected in the number of visitors we get. The 'South Seas' still have a special connotation that draws people here.

� You effectively have two 'genera/' regional organisations, with overlapping memberships, covering the South Pacific -the Forum, and the South Pacifc Commission (SPC). Do you think there is room for bath ? Do you complement each other or is there a rivalry ?

-We have more than two regional organisations. We also have SPREP (South Pacifc Regional Environment Programme), the FFA (Forum Fisheries Agency)....

� Yes, but these are specialist bodies with distinct sectoral responsibilities.

-Yes, that's true. In answer to your question, my view is that we have no problem with things as they stand. I was very involved in the debate some years back on the question of what we called an SRO - a single regional organisation. There was a strong push to try and achieve an SRO. The subject was debated for a few years and, in the end, it was possible to resolve the question.

� You mean it was resolved by the idea being abandoned ?

-I suppose it depends on the way you look at it. The outcome was a decision to leave the regional organisations as they are but with the establishment of a mechanism to ensure they work together more effectively. This mechanism is called SPOCC-the South Pacific Organisations Coordinating Committee. It is a meeting of heads of regional organisations which happens at least once a year. We talk about the issues that are common to our mandate and work out ways of doing things better. SPOCC has been operating for six or seven years now and I think it works fairly well. There is, after all, no conflict in our underlying objectives. So my answer here is no, I don't see any problem. I don't see any rivalry between us. It is a question of seeing how we can work together to achieve the goals that we share.

� In the European Union, the fundamental goal, set out in the Treaty, is to move towards 'ever-closer union' We have been doing this in fits and starts over the past 35 years. Do you see the Forum perhaps taking on a similar role here-as the focus for economic, and perhaps ultimately, political integration in the South Pacifc ?

- I think it is too early to speculate. We already have a number of sub-groups in the region like the MSG, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, whose members are the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji (admitted last year). Further north, we have the Micronesian grouping which brings together Nauru, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands and Kiribati. These groups meet outside the Forum framework and they essentially have a common aim which is to work more closely together. I think they feel it is easier to do it at this level because they are closer to each other and have more in common.

As for the Forum Secretariat, you can never tell what may come in the future. On balance, however, I think at the moment that integration is a long way off. Having said this, you do sometimes hear people putting the idea forward. There is, for example, something called the CER system, which stands for 'closer economic relations' between Australia and New Zealand. There have been suggestions that it might be possible to enlarge this grouping.

Looking at closer economic cooperation, and the general dismantling of trade barriers, we also need to recognise the growing importance of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) for the region. We are trying strengthen our links with the APEC countries and in October, we will be establishing a trade office in Japan.

� You mean a Forum Secretariat office ?

-Yes, in Tokyo. We are also talking with the Chinese and will probably end up with an office in Beijing. This is all part of our attempt to integrate ourselves with the Asean region.

Interview by Simon Homer

Mission statement of the Forum Secretariat

The mission of the Forum Secretariat is to enhance the economic and social well being of the people of the South Pacific, in support of the efforts of the national governments. The Secretariat has particular responsibility to facilitate, develop and maintain cooperation and consultation between member governments.

The Secretariat must pursue its mission in accordance with the directives of the Forum and within its mandated areas of operation. it undertakes political and economic activities, regional in nature and complementary to the activities of the member governments. Its role requires it to act as the secretariat to the Forum and to disseminate the Forum's views, to coordinate activities with other regional institutions in particular through the SPOCC process, and to represent the Forum's interests intemationally, as required.

Investment symposium

The MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) symposium was held in Montreal from 22-24 May. It brought together some 40 African mining ministers, most of the important donor agencies and representatives of around 25 mining companies. MIGA, which is a specialised agency of the World Bank, promotes the flow of private investment to developing countries. It provides insurance against political risks and assists member countries in attracting foreign investment.

The purpose of the symposium was to attract investors from all over the world in order to exploit the rich mining possibilities offered by many African states. Several of the countries that attended went to considerable effort to present themselves well, and it was evident that some are quickly learning what it takes to attract foreign investors.

The climate for mining investment in most African states has improved tremendously over the last two to three years. Most countries have introduced new mining codes, clearly defining the rights and obligations of foreign investors. State-owned companies are also being privatised, taxation has been made more reasonable and institutions in the mining sector, such as geological surveys, are becoming more efficient.

All this has led to a big increase in exploration for new deposits and a substantial increase in investment. At present, the activity is particularly heavy in West Africa, where many countries have very good gold potential. The European Community is contributing to this development in several ways. The biggest success so far has been the exploration campaign in Mali, funded under that country's Lomé National Indicative Programme (NIP), which led to the discovery of the Sadiola gold deposit. A world-class gold mine will be built here, bringing substantial benefits to the country.

The World Bank has also supported many African countries in their efforts to reform the legal and administrative framework for the mining industry. An important element, however, in attracting mining companies is the availability of good geological data. This is a very expensive activity, which does not bring immediate returns, if at all. So it is not appropriate to finance this through bank loans. The NlPs and SYSMIN Fund, on the other hand, are instruments that are well-suited to this kind of work. The Community has already financed a series of airborne geophysical surveys in Botswana and Namibia -to mention just two examples-and a new Sysmin project is currently being prepared for Burkina Faso.

The Commission Unit responsible for Mining Cooperation and Sysmin (VIIIl.B.5) was represented at the symposium. Its main purpose for being there was to present the functioning of Sysmin and the Community's cooperation in the field of mining to ACP ministers, mining companies and other donor agencies.

Current state of the mining sector

The mining sector is currently very active. Exploration in West Africa doubled between 1993 and 1995 and new mines are being opened all the time. A lot of this new activity is to be found in the gold sector. This is mainly due to the development of cheaper production methods combined with a much more positive investment climate in many African countries. A gold mine takes less time to reach the production stage than, for example, a copper mine, with the former being far less dependent on good infrastructure. Outside the gold sector, activity is much more subdued. While base-metal prices are at a reasonable level, the pay-back period is much longer and the lack of suitable infrastructure kills many projects.

For many countries, mining is a key area in the growth of the private sector. State-ownad mines are being privatised and the new mines that are being opened have little or no state participation. Foreign investors are bringing in the most up-to-date mining technologies and business methods, and they are faced with the need to train local people in technical and business skills. Supporting the mining sector is clearly an efficient way of supporting private sector development.

SYSMIN's future role

Given that most metals are currently fetching quite high prices, it is probable that relatively few ACP countries will be eligible for SYSMIN assistance over the next two to three years. The viability of most existing mines is not thought to be under threat and they should continue to be profitable. Thus, countries that are heavily dependent on mining should not experience severe losses in export income, which in turn means that relatively few SYSMIN requests are expected during the period of Lomé IV's second financial protocol. At the same time, the financial allocation for SYSMIN has been increased from ECU 48Om to ECU 575m.

When trying to attract new mining investors, it is essential for a country to have good geological information. Private companies are normally unwilling to undertake much general prospect ion, such as airborne geophysical surveys, because it is very expensive and, if they do, it is usually limited to very small areas.

At present, companies are tending to restrict their activities to areas for which general information is already available. These points were raised by several of the mining companies that attended the symposium.

But the present mining boom is not going to last for ever. Metal prices are volatile and, with the next downturn in the business cycle, a decline in metal prices will surely follow. So it is essential to prepare the basis for future mining activities by collecting general data. Given that a significant part of the SYSMIN allocation may remain unused because of a lack of requests, it would be worthwhile to consider whether a part could be reallocated to prepare general geological data for mining activities in the next century.

F. B.-H.

by Hans van de Veen

Can the EU-ACP relationship be used to strengthen the dialogue between Europe and the main victims of climate change ? And can the Lomé Convention be one of the tools to promote climate protection measures, as well as the implementation of the Climate

Treaty? These questions will be considered in depth at a hearing on climate derange scheduled for the next ACP-EU Joint Assembly, to be held in the last week of September 1996.

Periods of heavy rain have always been part of normal life in Fiji. But the latest rains were different, says counsellor Taina Tudau of the Fiji Embassy in Brussels. 'They were much more extreme than what we were used to, and caused heavy damage. Normally it took several days of heavy rain before the floods came up. This time, the water flooded the islands almost immediately the rain began to fall.' Mrs Tudau sees two main causes for the recent flooding. First, there is heavy deforestation on the islands, causing widespread erosion. But she is sure there was another reason for the recent damage: 'In the Pacific we know the local climate is changing. We see that the sea is rising. We are experiencing more extreme weather events. There can be no doubt that global warming is already going on.'

Fiji is a prominent member of the Alliance of Small Island States (Aosis), the group of 36 nations which feel particularly threatened by global warming. At the first Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Berlin in March 1995, Aosis called for industrialised nations to reduce their C02 emissions by 20% by 2005 (based on 1990 levels). At the end of the conference, the 150 national delegations agreed to begin negotiations on targets for industrialised nations to cut emissions in the early years of the next century.

So intentions may be good, but in practice not much has been done yet. The EU, for its part, risks losing credibility if firm action is not taken soon. According to a recent Commission White Paper on energy policy, the use of energy within the Union will increase by 1% a year up to 2020. Failing 'any strong policy interventions', the paper says, emissions of carbon dioxide are likely to show a 'substantial increase' during this period. Says Fiji-counsellor Tudau: 'As small island states we know what's at stake, but there seems to be no feeling of urgency in the rest of the world. We really wonder how long it will take before there is a definite move towards reduction of greenhouse gases.'

EU-ACP cooperation

At the Berlin conference, the ACP countries-led by Aosis but with support from most of the African states -took a constructive and moderate position in the G77. The position adopted by the EU could also be described as moderate, certainly compared to that of other OECD countries. Several observers have pointed to the fact that these two moderate approaches by important blocks within the Climate Convention negotiations offer possibilities for some form of cooperation.

'No doubt the EU represents the most progressive group of countries

within the OECD, although its position is far from sufficient', says Sible Schone, a representative of the World Wide Fund for Nature. 'Besides that, the EU has a special relationship with a large group of developing countries. Quite obviously it will be significant to get a dialogue started between the EU and the ACPs on the subject of climate change.' Currently, there is no such dialogue. 'At the moment we are not in a dialogue with ACP countries on climate change', says Bertil Heerink of the European Commission's Environment Directorate-General who is a member of the EU delegation to the climate negotiations. 'I'm convinced this will happen some day, but first we have to agree on our own goals and measures. I am sure developing countries want us to give priority to this too.'

The special ACP subcommittee to deal with tropical timber, the environment and fisheries, formed after the signing of the revised Lomé IV, only recently started its work. With respect to the global warming issue, it is waiting for the Joint Assembly hearing, according to ambassador Michael King of Barbados, who is a committee member. 'The specific interests of the different regions have to be articulated there, and then some kind of sustained effort has to be initiated.'

The unit for Sustainable Development and Natural Resources in the Development Directorate-General of the Commission (DG VIII) not at present dealing with the subject of climate change. Says Head of Unit, Amos Tincani: 'We have worked on biodiversity and desertification, and we want to do more on the specific environmental problems of small island states. But we have done nothing similar on climate change. This is partly because it is so much a global problem, but the main reason is we simply lack the people and the time to go into it.'

Assembly hearing

At its meeting in Windhoek in March this year, the Joint Assembly adopted a resolution which had been proposed by representatives of 13 small island states. This urged the EU to take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. More specifically, the Commission is being asked to update its climate change strategy for the period post-2000 and to achieve significant reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases over the coming decade and thereafter. The resolution riches on to call for extra assistance to ACP countries in the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Ocean to help them improve their disaster preparedness. The Commission is also urged to accelerate the transfer of appropriate technologies and practices, to enable ACP states to develop coastal zone management strategies and to rehabilitate and protect areas stricken by drought and desertification as well as by hurricanes and floods.

Two representatives of the European Parliament, Maartje van Putter (PES) and Peter Liege (EPP), have been active on the situation of the small island states and climate change for several years. According to Mrs Van Putten, the main effect of the coming Assembly hearing should be to put extra pressure on the Commission to take its responsibility seriously. 'Talking about climate change,' she says, 'one should never forget who is to blame and who, therefore, must take decisive action. A European tax on energy or carbon dioxide would be an important first step, but no more than that.'

Besides influencing the Commission's energy policy, Mrs Van Putten hopes the Assembly hearing will raise public awareness on the climate problem in those ACP countries which are not in the 'small island' category. 'If you are talking about rising sea levels, the African states with low-lying coastal zones face the same problems as the small island countries,' she points out. 'And they also face the problem of desertification and declining food production.'

Integrating the climate dimension

In a recent briefing paperto the Commission, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) concluded that, hitherto, the aid community (including the EU) had not incorporated measures on global warming into their strategic thinking on sustainable development. 'Indeed, the possibility of climate change has been considered of minor importance in comparison to other environmental concerns.' This is hardly surprising, says the London-based institute, as the climate issue has only recently been placed on the international agenda. Moreover, the long-term threat of global warming raises some difficult questions regarding priorities in circumstances where resources are limited. In other words: who wants to spend scarce funds on problems the full effects of which will probably not be felt for another 25 to 50 years? The best way forward, suggests the IIED, is to tackle the apparent conflict between shortterm development priorities and longterm climate protection, by 'integrating the climate dimension' rather than considering climate change as an issue in isolation.

Technology transfer could be a central point, according to WWF's Sible Schone. 'Developing countries see technology transfer as a central theme in the Climate Convention, but the industrialised countries don't give enough weight to these There are a lot of paragraphs about technology transfer in the Convention as well as in Lomé. Now it's time to fill in these commitments.'

Strangely, there are hardly any Lomé projects currently under way in the field of energy efficiency. It is strange because experts have pointed to the large potential in developing countries for cost-effective energy improvement and energy conservation. Improved management could save at least 25% of the energy now being consumed. Quick realisation of this potential would significantly contribute to alleviating environmental ànd development problems.

Henri Martin, energy specialist in DG VIII, agrees a lot more could be done in this field, but he points out: 'We are dependent on requests. If you look at the wording of the Convention, everything has already been said. There are chapters on energy and technology transfer. The problem is that we don't get enough signals back from the ACP countries that these items are a priority for them. I'm afraid sustainable energy or energy efficiency is not high on the agenda of most countries.' Taina Tudau disagrees strongly: 'Our experience is that the projects that could make a difference and contribute to sustainable development, protection of the environment and local sustainable energy production, are found to be too small. It is the donor that sets the conditions for the projects, not us, the small island states.'

New funding?

Can the EU build a credible policy linking climate and development cooperation, without reserving extra money? Not surprisingly, there is disagreement on this question. In Brussels, officials are inclined to point to possibilities that are already there but not being used. Amos Tincani, for instance, observes that 'there are budgets for this kind of problem under Lomé. We have provisions specially targeted for the islands'. He mentions regional budgets in particular: 'A lot can be started at the regional level which then trickles down to the national level. But after producing fine resolutions, everybody seems to forget the work still needs to be done. The idea is: 'oh yes, we can do it, provided it is with fresh money'. We say: a lot more can be done with existing budgets and instruments.'

Maartje van Putten, from the Parliament, says the discussion should not be 'dominated by southern demands for additional money'. She agrees that ACP countries could make better use of existing funds and possibilities, such as, for instance, the funds for intra ACP cooperation. But counsellor Tudau points to the fact that the Climate Convention urges industrialised countries to support the response of developing countries to climate problems through 'new and additional' money, besides the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and expertise.

There is a financial mechanism built into the Climate Convention, which is administered by the Global Environmental Facility, to cover additional costs of appropriate measures. But much more could be done by the aid community, including the EU, according to Mrs Tudau. 'Most European countries will not succeed in stabilising, let alone reducing, their emissions. In reaction to this, as ACP countries we should say: European Union, you are not fulfilling your obligations. You have to try harder and you have to set extra money aside to compensate for the damage this is doing to us.

H.v.d.V.

There were no real surprises or unexpected developments at the ACP-EU Council meeting which took place in Apia, Western Samoa, on 27 and 28 June, 1996. The session was preceded by an ACP Council, which saw the adoption of three important decisions. The first of these was the appointment of a new ACP Secretary-6eneral, Mr Ng'andu P. Magande of Zambia. The post had been vacant for some time, following deadlock within the ACP Group over a successor to Berhane Ghebray (see issue 155 of The Courier, p.6). The ministers also agreed to hold a summit of ACP heads of government in Libreville, Gabon, during the second half of 1997. This meeting is expected to focus heavily on the future of ACPEU relations once the present Lomé Convention has expired.

In the substantive area, the ACP Council adopted a resolution deploring the suspension of cooperation with Equatorial Guinea. Ministers urged the European Union to make use of the procedure in Article 366a of the revised Lomé Convention, and to set in train the consultation procedure envisaged in this provision.

This issue was raised again by the ACP side at the subsequent ACP-EU Council. This meeting, which was presided over by Mrs Toya (Italian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) and Mr Syamujaye (Zambia's Trade Minister) had a relatively light agenda. There was a discussion about the Commission proposal for a directive on the use of vegetable fats, other than cocoa fat, in chocolate (see issue 158 of The Courier, p.35). Somalia also featured in the debate, with representatives agreeing on the need to find ways of allowing this country to benefit from Lomé Convention provisions. The civil conflict in Somalia, and the absence of an effective central administration have prevented the deployment of regular development aid for many years, although significant amounts of emergency assistance have been and are still being provided.

In addition, the ACP-EU Council approved two reports drawn up by the development finance cooperation subcommittee and commodities sub-committee respectively. Representatives were able to reach a compromise on two outstanding points of contention in the resolution on development finance relating to tenders and the dissemination of the user's guide.

Note was taken of the number of countries that have so far lodged instruments of ratification for the revisad Lomé Convention (Mauritius agreement). At the time of the Apia meeting, only nine countries had ratified: seven on the ACP side (Barbados, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius and Solomon Islands) and two EU Member States (Denmark and Sweden). Appeals were made for the contracting parties to speed up their ratification procedures so that the Eighth European Development Fund can come on stream as speedily as possible.

The next ACP-EU Council meeting will take place in Luxembourg on 24 and 25 April 1997.

The government of Western Samoa deserves a special mention for the warmth of their hospitality and the efficient way in which they organised the Council meeting. Delegates from all sides were keen to express their appreciation of the host country's efforts, which ensured the smooth running of the various meetings and gave the visitors a real taste of this Pacific country's unique culture. ed. S.H.

New ACP Secretary-General

Ng`andu Peter Magande, is no stranger to the challenge of development at the grassroots. The new Secretary-General of the ACP Group, who was born in 1947, began his working career as a provincial development officer, planning and supervising projects in the Southern Province of his native Zambia. He is an economics graduate of the University of Zambia and also holds a master's degree in agricultural economics from Makerere university, Uganda.

From working in the field, he moved into government administration, rising to the position of Permanent Secretary-a post which he held in a number of ministries. Since the mid-1980s, he has had key jobs in a number of Zambian enterprises (including Managing Director of the Zambia National Commercial Bank) His most recent work has been on a project to develop private sector participation in agricultural input and produce marketing.

by Elisabeth Pape

Kenya has enjoyed rare political stability since independence in 1963. It is one of the most famous holiday destinations in Africa, with abundant wildlife, fine beaches and stunning scenery. But despite having the most advanced economy in East Africa, it is still one of the world's poorest countries. Over 11 million Kenyans live below the poverty line. But better times may be ahead. The Government has embarked on an ambitious reform programme which promises to lay the foundations for strong growth.

The early 1990s marked the worst time in Kenyan history, in economic development terms. Real GDP growth dropped from 4.3% in 1990 to 2.1% in 1991 and was almost zero in 1992 and 1993. This poor performance was due to drought, structural rigidities, lack of monetary discipline, non-enforcement of banking regulations, and reduced donor assistance. While Kenya was used to receiving substantial foreign aid inflows, the present decade began with growing tensions between Government and donors. In the new post-Cold War atmosphere, the latter wanted to see political and economic reforms, and in November 1991 they decided to halt guick-disbursing aid.

Multi-party elections in December 1992 did not immediately restore relations with the donors, in particular as they were accompanied by a lack of fiscal and monetary discipline whose effects threatened economic ruin. Monetary expansion was fuelled, among other things, by discretionary exemptions to Banking Act provisions, which enabled over-borrowing by certain 'political' banks from the Central Bank. In early 1993, things came to a head. Foreign currency reserves were down to just a few weeks of imports, the banking system was on the verge of collapse, and consumer prices had shot up. Against this background, the Government went for a comprehensive, IMF-supported structural adjustment programme.

A number of far-reaching reforms were implemented with unprecedented speed. Exchange restrictions were removed, import licensing was ended, import procedures were made easier and tariffs were reduced. The export license requirement was also lifted and price controls were abolished. In March 1993, the Central Bank (CBK) began to tighten monetary policy. By issuing large amounts of treasury bills, it soaked up most of the excess liquidity which had been injected the previous year. There was also stricter bank supervision and a number of weak financial institutions were closed.

Structural reforms

The Government began structural reforms aimed at reducing its own role in the economy in favour of the private sector. The privatisation programme, begun in 1991, was accelerated. By the end of 1995, the authorities had divested more than half of the 211 non-strategic parastatals-though critics complained the process often lacked transparency. The Government also substantially reduced its fiscal deficit through, above all, an improved revenue policy. The deficit fell from 11.4% of GDP in 1992/93 to 2.5% in 1994/95. The number of civil servants was reduced, mainly through voluntary early retirement, so that, by the end of 1995, the service had been trimmed by more than 30 000 (10% of the payroll).

In 1995, the reform programme lost momentum as proponents of the old and the new systems locked horns. Vested interests stood in the way of more radical reforms. Temporary import bans on maize and sugar were reimposed, key parastatal reforms were delayed and expensive but economically dubious projects were approved outside normal budgetary procedures. These included an international airport in Eldoret, a presidential jet and an identity card project. These further delayed the resumption of balance of payments support by the Bretton Woods Institutions and contributed to the frustration of efforts to improve relations with donors.

The economic crisis peaked in early 1993 and the shilling was sharply devalued. The official rate went from about KSh 36 to the dollar at the end of 1992 to KSh 60 in April 1993. On the market, the currency was being traded at a premium of more than 30% and that continued until July-i.e. about two months after the removal of exchange restrictions. The market premium then started to decline and the two rates converged in mid-October when the shilling stood at 69 to the dollar.

The high interest rate on treasury bills under the liberalised foreign exchange regime was the main reason behind strong currency inflows which began in October 1993. Other factors, whose exact impact is difficult to gauge, included capital flight from neighbouring crisis-torn countries, the international money laundering one normally finds in places with newly liberalised foreign exchange regimes, and a surplus in the current account position. The shilling then started to rise, despite the CBK's massive currency purchases which led to a build up of reserves to the equivalent of six months of imports. The appreciation continued up to October 1994: indeed, at one point, the shilling reached a high of 35 to the dollar.

That was the turning point. Strong import demand, fuelled in particular by a surge in oil imports in the wake of petroleum market liberalisation, and an outflow of portfolio investments due to lower interest rates, weakened the currency. By mid-1995, after two sharp falls, it reached a rate of 56 to the dollar. Since then, it has been relatively stable.

Economic recovery

Real GDP grew by 3% in 1994 and an estimated 5% in 1995. Good weather certainly helped, but the economy also benefited from the Government's reforms. Agriculture, the mainstay, grew by 2.8% in 1994 and by more than 5% in 1995. This compares with negative growth rates in 1992-93, when the sector was hard hit by bad weather. Elsewhere, the trends were more mixed. Many producers for the local market were affected by trade liberalisation and, in 1994, by the strong shilling. The former created a highly competitive environment almost overnight-after years of cosy protectionism. For cloth manufacturers, the liberalisation of imports of second-hand clothing further aggravated the problem. In 1994, the clothing sector's output dropped 35%. Tourism, the main foreign exchange earner, fared quite well in volume terms in 1994 despite the strong shilling. But while turnover may have gone up, it is likely that many operators did not earn enough extra to cover their increased local currency costs. In 1995, visitor arrivals fell by 20% to the lowest figure since 1988. In consequence, tourism earnings fell by a quarter.

As intended, liberalisation led to higher trade volumes. In 1994, exports ( + 16%) rose by more than imports ( + 13%) in value terms, but the position was reversed in 1995 when the latter jumped by 35% while the former were 14% lower. One good sign was that the highest import growth was in industrial supplies and machinery (60% up) but the fact that the deficit almost doubled to reach record levels was obviously a cause for concern.

A major revolution has also taken place in trade flows. In 1994, for the first time, Uganda overtook the UK as the biggest importer of Kenyan goods. In the same year, the value of Kenya's exports to African countries moved ahead of its combined exports to Europe and North America.

During 1994, the Nairobi Stock Exchange proved to be one of the worid's best-performing stock markets, the value of shares rising by 80%.1995 was disappointing, however. Although foreigners were allowed to invest for the first time, the index nonetheless fell by 25%.

Fighting inflation has been the CBK's main objective since 1993 and a tight monetary policy has brought the problem under control. Inflation dropped from 46% in 1993 to 29% in 1994 and to below 2% in 1995. Recently, however, an upward trend has bean observed. This follows a money supply increase far in excess of the expansion of economic activity, and is mainly due to a substitution of treasury bills for borrowing from the Central Bank since the end of 1994. If inflation is to remain within the 5% target for 1996-which already seemed highly unlikely by the middle of the year - the trend needs to be speedily reversed.

Initially, the main way of mopping up excess liquidity was through the sale of treasury bills. When the sales began in March 1993, there was a huge liquidity overhang and high interest rates had to be offered to take money out of the market quickly. The rate earned on 90-day bills-which became the lead interest rate in the economy- rose from 17% to 80% between March and July 1993. It then declined steadily, reaching 18% at the end of 1994. This prompted an outflow of short-term capital, leading to currency depreciation and lower foreign reserves. Since mid 1995, treasury bill rates have been back above 20% and this seems to have stabilised the foreign exchange situation. It is generally believed that the high prevailing real interest rates are a major obstacle to investment and economic growth.

Interest on domestic debt is still a big item in the state budget, although, the situation is much improved, thanks to the reduction in the stock of treasury bills and lower interest rates. In fiscal year 1993/94, interest payments on domestic debt alone swallowed one third of total gavernnnent expenditure.

The agriculture sector employs 70% of the total labour force and generates more than a quarter of Kenya's GDP. Much of industry is linked to agricultural processing, and tea, coffee and horticultural products are Kenya's major foreign exchange earners after tourism. The marketing of key farm products is dominated by large parastatals and cooperatives which are often run like parastatals. Most marketing organisations have been hard hit by the liberalisation, which brought both inefficiency and corruption to light. Tea growers have complained about improprieties at the Kenya Tea Development Authority. Imported sugar flooded the local market, often without paying import duties, leaving the mills with huge stocks. This, in turn, created severe cash flow problems. Most sugar farmers have not been paid for months. Kenya Cooperative Creameries was not able to pay farmers for milk deliveries for up to half a year, and could only start servicing the arrears when the Government came to its rescue with KSh 800 million in January 1996.

Formidable challenges

Kenya's labour force, around 12.5 million in 1996, is growing at more than 4% a year. This means that at least half a million people enter the job market annually. The challenge of absorbing the new workers is formidable. Studies show that any strategy to deal with this must be based on three pillars: smallholder agriculture (to absorb most of the growth in the rural labour force), continuing substantial job creation in the informal sector, and high real GDP growth (+8% per year is needed to ensure that the modem sector absorbs a significant number of workers).

Informal sector employment has risen rapidly (up by 15-20% a year since 1991). By 1994, for the first time, there were more people working here than in the modern economy. The informal sector covers semi-organised and unregulated activities largely under taken by self-employed people or employers with just a few workers. Typically, they do not comply fully with tax, registration, and licensing rules, and this sometimes leads to conflict with the authorities. Workers are often paid below the minimum wage and have no social security. For many, the informal sector is, therefore, an 'employer' of last resort.

It is estimated that almost 50% of rural people and 30% of urban residents live in absolute poverty- unable to meet their minimum requirements for food and essential non-food items. While the percentage has remained fairly stable in recent decades, the increase in the number of 'absolute' poor is alarming. So too is the extent of the poverty: the gap between these people's minimum needs and their actual disposable income has reportedly increased over the last ten years. The bulk of the poor live in the central and western parts of the country, which have the best agricultural potential, the rich soils having always attracted settlers. For decades there was enough land to go around, but demographic trends have finally started to take their toll. The size of landholding has declined continuously, in many cases reaching levels which are no longer capable of sustaining a family.

There has been some progress in restructuring parastatals, but much remains to be done. The performance of key parastatals has been unsatisfactory by international standards and this has constrained growth. At Mombasa port, which is managed by the Kenya Ports Authority, handling charges are 50% higher than the global average, while container turnover is three times slower. Rail transport is unreliable, slow and more expensive than road haulage. The Kenya Power and Lighting Company has a shortage of generating capacity which means periodic power cuts. And intervention in the maize market by the National Cereals and Produce Board- at above-market prices-has prevented private sector involvement as well as placing a heavy burden on government finances. The Board has posted annual operating losses of between KSh 1.8bn and KSh 2.5bn each fiscal year since 1992/93.

Corruption, misuse of funds, and the politics of patronage remain endemic and these clearly distort development. Elimination of corruption has been an aim of most reform programmes but it seems that the effect so far has only been to change its form. Trade liberalisation has killed cash cows such as import and foreign exchange licences, and the commercialisation of parastatals has stopped them from doing deals with cronies which were profitable only for the latter. But other forms of non-acceptable wealth accumulation have emerged. In the early 1990s, alleged exports of gold and diamonds are thought to have resulted in a loss of KSh 7 billion of public funds. Land grabbing has also become widespread. This either involves land being sold to individuals or companies with well-established political connections at well below market prices, or the purchase of land by public institutions from the same individuals or companies at inflated prices.

After delays because of political differences, cooperation between the three states of the former East African Community (Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya) was revived in early 1996. The EAC Secretariat, based in Arusha, is headed by a Kenyan, Francis Muthaura, a former ambassador in Brussels. For the three countries, the new cooperation aims at facilitating movements of people, capital and trade within the region, and harmonisation of external tariffs and investment regulations. Currencies will be fully convertible. This revived cooperation is expected to have a major growth impact. The Nairobi Stock Exchange is currently assisting Kampala and Dar es Salaam to set up their own exchanges. And the NSE Chairman, Jimnah Mbaru, sees the future not only in a cross-listing of companies in the three places, but in a regional stock exchange.

Policy framework

The Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for 1996-1998, which was published in February ahead of the donors' Consultative Group (CG) Meeting, was highly applauded for both its content and form. The programme, which the media has dubbed 'the big push', promises finally to crack most of the 'hard nuts' of previous reform agendas, in particular in the parastatal and public sector. It also lays down measures aimed at supporting fiscal and monetary discipline through the next elections. These include cutting the budget deficit to 1.5 % of GDP by 1997/98, a tight monetary policy, and more autonomy for the Central Bank. In addition, it tackles some areas'that have emerged as avenues of corruption in recent years, such as the National Social Security Fund. While previous PFPs were highly confidential, this one was published, and the President appointed a Commission chaired by himself to oversee its implementation. These are seen as important steps in bridging the credibility gap which threatened to open up again in 1995. Donors are prepared to support the reform agenda and are eager to see it implemented speedily. Shortly after the positive outcome of the CG meeting, the IMF approved a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility programme for a total of $220m. The World Bank is expected to follow suit with a credit of $85m.

An increasing number of donors, however, have pointed to the link between democratic governance/ human rights issues on the one hand, and aid and investment flows on the other. If Kenya is to meet its ambitious targets and turn into a newly-industrialising country by 2010, foreign inflows will be vital. The point was succinctly put by a delegate to the CG meeting. 'If its (the Government's) economic successes are matched by a commitment to democracy and human rights, Kenya may yet prove that surging economic growth is not just for Asian tigers, but for African lions, too.' The period leading up to the next general election will be the acid test.

E.P.

Some countries have a strong folk memory. Despite its size, Mali appears hemmed in by its frontiers. For more than a thousand years, this state was a splendid empire, constantly spreading outward and reflecting the history of the African continent with its conquests and alliances, reversals of fortune and moments of glory. At its height, it extended from the Atlantic to the Sudanese border, from the south of Morocco to the north of Nigeria. Mali's history rests in the minds of its people rather than in any structures inherited from the past. This acts as an antidote to the 'amnesia' often brought on by colonisation, which has the effect of paralysing the future. Although poor, the country has a well-established sense of its place in the world.

A racial melting pot

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On the eve of colonisation, Mali was known es 'west Sudan'. In 1924, the territory then known as 'French Sudan' was split up and small portions of the Malian nation were incorporated into the seven states bordering it-a move certainly not calculated to have a cohesive effect on the remnants of the old empire. Mali has long been a melting pot of races, ethnic groups and cultures. They have learned to live together- intermingling, sometimes forming unexpected alliances, and occasionally fighting one another. The result today is a potpourri where true racial or ethnic confrontation is difficult to imagine. The interplay of history and the mixing of ethnic groups, families and individuals, has created what one intellectual de scribed to us as 'the anti Rwanda vaccine'. Historical mythology offers, perhaps, further evidence of the fusion of cultures in this country. As in ancient Greece or Rome, to take European examples, each ethnic group and each Malian empire, was 'backed' by a host of gods, spirits and totems. In this nebulous world, where dreams beget history and where vastly differing ethnic groups can trace themselves back to a common ancestor, the result was a multiplicity of interrelationships. Under various names, the python totem belongs to many different peoples, including the Peal, Ma/inke and Sarakolle. A study of the migrations of the peoples who make up Mali also reveals a great many relationships - for example, between the Dogon, who are black, and the Shongoi; who are more half-caste. They regard one another as cousins, originating from Aswan in Egypt.

Malians appear to share a genuine sense of belonging in keeping with their shared culture. The 'people' of Mali came into being long before the state of the same name. The guerilla war fought in recent years by the Tuaregs (this is the English plural, Tuareg already being the plural form of Targul) against the Malian army, is often viewed abroad as a struggle between whites (or Arabs) and blacks. But this is an illusion. Although the Tuaregs are probably the only 'white' minority in the country, they are an integral ingredient in the melting pot. They are also known as 'Kel-Tamasheq' - those who speak Tamashek, which was originally the language of their Bella slaves. Like all the country's ethnic groups, they have dominated and have in turn been dominated. They have forged alliances with one another, and, more commonly, have united against Arab or Berber invasions. The relative absence of bitterness overall is probably due to the fact that each of Mali's peoples has had its era of glory and imperial dominance.

Mali is lucky to have such knowledge of its history. For centuries, the most precise details have been collected by the griots. The same role has also been played by the many secret societies which have initiation periods lasting, in some cases, up to 50 years. They were, and sometimes still are, repositories for the secrets of history, magic, astrology and science, and also for the symbols of power-the religious objects and artefacts of the former emperors. There are written sources as well, something which is quite rare in Africa. These have been transcribed since the beginning of the millennium and, in recent decades, close collaboration between historians, griots and members of traditional societies has enabled a deeper knowledge to be gained of Mali's history.

A rich empire

Asselar Man, discovered near Timbuktu in the centre of Mali, was a contemporary of Cro Magnon Man.

Cave paintings from five thousand B.C. reveal similarities with those in Egypt and are probably the work of migrant populations from the east, who moved into Mali as the Sahara Desert expanded. Less reliable sources state that interbred populations of Jews and Egyptians under the command of an officer of the Pharaoh Dinga created the Soninke dynasty (originating from Aswan). These people probably laid the found ations of the first great Malian empire, that of Ouagadou. Other sources, equally unreliable, report that they were probably Judaeo-Syrians who arrived at the end of the third century A.D. and found a population already in place. What is more or less certain is that, during the first millennium, a Soninke dynasty was installed around the current frontier between Mauritania and Mali and that 40 princes ruled it in succession in the period prior to 750 A.D. Initially, these rulers were white but, with increasing intermarriage, their skins became darker and darker. To Arab chroniclers, Mali came to be known as Bafour or Bilad es-Soudan (the country of the blacks). At the beginning of the second millennium, the Ouagadou empire held sway over several kingdoms in the south, including the Nigerian delta and a number of Berber principalities. Documents dating from this period have replaced the name Ouagadou with that of Ghana, by analogy, perhaps, with the emperor's title. The empire was already very rich, the richest in the world according to an Arab chronicler who visited it in 970. A work by the writer A/ Bakri, which appeared a century later (1087) went into great detail about the empire's organisation-the system of matrilinear succession, the role of councils of dignitaries, and the capital, Koumbi (whose foundations were discovered in 1914 in southern Mauritania). This city was divided into two districts, one of these being the sacred, imperial city, home to the empire's python totem to which a young girl was sacrificed every year.

A story of courage

The killing of the snake totem is the most significant myths in the country's history. The hero of the story is Amadou Sefedokete whose love for his beautiful fiancee Sia (who was about to be offered in sacrifice), prompted him to descend into the monster's lair and confront it. By killing the totem, he broke the thread of countless generations before him, who had carried out the ritual sacrifice. He is still remembered for this magnificent action, based on love and a sense of nobility, and he remains a subject for artists of all types. His brave action still causes young lovers in Africa to shudder in admiration. However, this act of deicide brought about a reversal of fortunes. The monster's seven heads, which the young hero is said to have cut off one after the other, are reputed to have been scattered to the four comers of the earth, thereby dispersing the empire's riches and leaving it penniless. The true story is more prosaic. Ghana's wealth was eyed greedily by the Arabs and Berbers who had long traded with it. The empire's resistance in the face of Islam gave Moroccan religious fanatics a pretext for organising a jihad. It was invaded by an army of 30000 devotees supported by forces from some of the empire's black vassal states. The 'holy war' began in 1042 ending 34 years later with the occupation of Koumbi.

The occupation did not last long but was followed by internal clan wars which brought about the end of an era. Restoration came about at the end of the 72th century , in the small Sosso kingdom, south of Ouagadou (also set up by a small group of Soninké). One of the minor kings called Soumangourou Diarasso dreamed of recreating Ghana's empire, and, in 1203, he succeeded in sacking the ancient capital of Koumbi in a move designed to establish his own dynasty. This was an important symbolic act and in the fierce war which followed, Soumangourou subjugated Mandé, a region which was overflowing with wealth. One of Africa's greatest heroes, Soundjata, rose up against him. He was supposedly the legitimate heir to the Mandingo throne, but was unable to walk, having been born an invalid of a deformed mother who had been married at the recommendation of the king's sorcerer. His young half-brother took his place on the throne and sent the paralysed prince into exile. At the age of 18, Soundjata decided to seize his own place in history and a 'giant' was thus bom. In 1235, his army fought that of the bloodthirsty Sosso monarch whom he himself is said to have cut down in an extraordinary battle. It was a fight which, according to the legends, saw the use of all types of weapon, including magic. Soundjata had forged a grand alliance in order to gain victory. Rather than reducing to vassalage the small kingdoms which had allied themselves with him, the new emperor decided to form them into a federation-although he wisely declared that from Niani (his capital), 'I shall see all'. His empire took the name of 'Mali' (the hippopotamus) on account of that animal's strength and mastery of bath water and land. For 20 years, the empire was to stretch as far as the Atlantic Ocean. Its structure, based on a number of warrior clans, craftsmen, freemen and marabous, is still characteristic of Mali and neighbouring countries today. The empire was rich in gold once again but also in terms of agricultural organisation with the development of cotton and groundout farming. Soundjata disappeared mysteriously in 1255, leaving a prosperous empire.

'Conquest' of America?

In 1285, there was a struggle for succession between two princes and a third, Prince Sakoura (a freed slave), took advantage of the quarrel to take power for himself. Sakoura expanded the empire by subjugating the Timbuktu Tuaregs and the Gao Shongoi: After his short reign, a genuine heir of Soundjata, Aboubakar II, ascended the throne. He had his eye on conquests over the seas and, according to the story, he set sail westwards leading a fleet of 2000 vessels. He was never seen again. However, recent studies favour the hypothesis that he was not lost at sea as had always been supposed' but did, in fact, reach the Americas. A series of ineffective monarchs succeeded this 'conqueror of the impossible', who preceded Christopher Columbus by 200 years, leaving little real impression on history other than the records of their exuberant behaviour. One of them, for example, went on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 with a reported retinue of 60 000 and distributed considerable amounts of gold to all the dignitaries he encountered in that holy place. These kings, however, are acknowledged as having preserved the empire's unity, guaranteeing order without repression and allowing wide religious, moral and sexual tolerance, even for married women.

The kingdom centred on Gao dates back to at least the first millennium but it was usually a vassal of the Ouagadou empire and of Mali. One of its kings, Sonny Ali Ber (known as Sonny the Great), came to the throne in 1464, profiting from the decay of the Mali empire. His reign was marked by a bitter struggle against the Ulémas of Timbuktu who, over a period of four centuries following the Almoravid conquest, had converted a large portion of the empire to Islam. The circumstances of Sonny's disappearance are uncertain, but he is thought to have drowned in 1492, the year when a certain Genoese navigator was to achieve the ancient goal of 'discovering' the Malian empire.

Sonny Ber's successor did not last long in the face of Islamic expansion. The new Askia dynasty was installed to lead the Shongoi empire, and this expanded with the annexation of Dahomey and part of Nigeria. However, a small part of the former Mali empire never passed under their rule. The Askia dynasty blew hot and cold in terms of religious fervour. Tyrannical at first, it later took a softer line. Under the reign of one monarch, the Gao court based in the university city of Timbuktu became a place of exceptional refinement-only to slide once again into a state of intolerance. One of the Askias, having destroyed the last symbols of the former Mali empire, the city of Niani, set upon his former Moroccan allies. Another emperor, Askia Daoud (1549-1582), turned out to be a fine administrator. He developed agriculture and set up a genuine bank in Gaol War with Morocco continued throughout his reign and beyond. In 1584, imperial force defeated 20 000 Moroccan soldiers, winning a victory which might have been decisive had it not been for internal dissent. This weakened the Askia side and enabled Morocco, with a band of Spanish mercenaries, to take over the empire, following a battle in April 1591. Success was due, above all on this occasion, to the firearms deployed by the winning side. Such weapons were unknown to the 45 000 Malian cavalry and infantry who were engaged. It also turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. The occupying troops sent the great scholars from Timbuktu University to Morocco, where their peers took up their cause. Moreover, the foreign soldiers were won over by the easy life in Mali-and one of the first results of their presence was a big increase in the half-caste population. In 1612, the troops rejected the Moroccan command: the occupation was at an end and the last few Moroccans were later expelled from Timbuktu by the Tuaregs.

Black religious proselytism and colonisation

To each dog his day. In the 17th century, the Bambaras set up an empire around Segou, but the debauched lifestyle of several of the sovereigns and disapproval of the part they played in the slave trade proved to be their downfall. Once again, the history of the country was to be shaped by a slave- Ngolo Diarra-who founded his dynasty in 1766. He was able to restore a degree of prestige to the kingdom, but his efforts were undermined after his death. As a reaction, a proselytising Black Islam then began to evolve.

Massina became a theocratic state around the beginning of the 19th century, in common with other kingdoms which appeared at the same time. One of their most famous rulers, the conqueror El Hadj Oumar, was defeated by the troops of the French General Faidherbe who forced him to give up West Senegal. The days of Malian independence were now numbered. The courage of his successor only delayed the progress of French colonisation, which finally prevailed at the end of the century.

Resistance fighters carried on the war from other points in the old empire, particularly from what is now Guinea. The country was dismantled by the colonial system and pacified, but the end of the Second World War and the return of African soldiers brought a renewed desire for independence. French Sudan became the rallying point for freedom fighters in the French colonies-the old dream of reunification was not dead and buried. In 1946, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain was set up, later to become the USRDA (Union soudanaise-Rassemblement democratique africain). In 1956, the future architect of Mali's independence, Modibo Keita, was appointed leader of the movement and elected to represent the 'Sudan' in the French Assembly. A 'Malian Federation' project was drawn up to include Dahomey (Benin), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Senegal and 'Sudan' (Mali). A constituent assembly of independence movement representatives was set up in 1959. However, the constitution adopted by the local Malian and Senegalese assemblies was rejected by the other two. The Federation now had only two members but was nonetheless proclaimed independent on 20 June 1960. In the event, the spirit of unity was lacking and, on the pretext of a rivalry between the two leaders (the 'Sudanese' Modibo Keita and the Senegalese Mamadou Dia), Senegal withdrew from the union in August. On 22 September 1960, the 'Sudan', now without an outlet to the sea, adopted one of the most prestigious names in its history: Mali.

The new state was landlocked not only geographically but also, very soon, politically. Modibo Keita's socialist agenda prompted foreign investors to pull out, and the country was organised increasingly as a 'people's democracy'. Fortunately, the repression was not excessive but a sizeable proportion of the population disapproved of the system that had been chosen. Mali and Guinea still had modest aspirations to their old dream of unification. The founder of the Republic, Modibo Keita, was overthrown by a military coup on 19 November 1968. More than the break-up by colonisation, which left dreams of Sudan being reconstituted, this military putsch sounded the knell of the old empire. Mali became just another state whose colonial and post-colonial eras have been marked by a lack of success. Nevertheless, a sense of history is still omnipresent.

Hegel Goueier

It is just something you have to get used to-in French-speaking Africa, virtually all countries have imitated France in assigning a number to each republic formed under a new constitution. At the time of its independence on 20 June 1960, Mali was a federation of two states; Senegal and the former 'French Sudan'. It was an alliance which failed after only a few weeks'existence end 'French Sudan' then adopted one of its most prestigious former names- Mali.

The first regime, under Modibo Keita, became increasingly unpopular as its form of 'tropical' marxism caused it to become more and more isolated. One of its main shortcomings was its unrealistic five-year plans, none of which were ever implemented. Discontent became rife among various social groups. including the farmers who, opposed collectivisation and were adept at passive resistance which they employed to disrupt the supply of produce. The regime also modelled itself on the so-called 'people's democracies' in certain respects. For instance, it made a determined effort to improve education, health and social justice, while refraining from the more dictatorial excesses that often characterised such systems.

Initially welcomed by some sections of the population, the November 1968 putsch, by Lieutenant Moussa Traore quickly fumed into dictatorship although it was to be more than 10 years before there were any significant anti-government protests. At the end of 1990, opponents of the regime openly set up organisations which claimed opposition-party status. One of these was ADEMA (the Alliance for Democracy in Mali), formed by the current President of the Republic, Alpha Oumar Konare. Marches calling for a multi-party state attracted the support of tens of thousands of people.

The dictator then sought to neutralise the opposition, beginning with the Tuaregs in the north who had been waging a guerilla war. This conflict was viewed by many as the 'front line' in the people's struggle against dictatorship, and the Tuareg cause was supported by opposition movements. The government, which had for some time opted for 'soft' repression, now revealed its claws and in January 1991 it began to imprison student leaders. The streets were filled with armoured vehicles and the first death amongst the students brought condemnation. Repression reached its height on 22 March 1991, when several dozen students were killed.

Prior to this, in February 1991, Moussa Traore's UDPM (Democratic Union of the Malian People) came out in support of a multi-party system - a move which marked the beginning of the end of the regime. The day after the students were killed, a democracy coordination committee launched an appeal for a general strike, to last until the dictator was overthrown. This began on 26 March, and amounted, in effect, to a 'democratic' coup d'etat. Its instigator was Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure, who took charge of the transition to-tether with the democratic movements.

The former dictator was arrested and put on trial for his crimes. He was later condemned to death but his sentence was recently commuted by President Konare.

The Tuareg guerilla war continued despite the government's conciliatory attitude. The new administration also had to deal with a number of social claims which had long been stifled by the dictatorship. However, popular support for the regime remained firm. The new constitution was adopted virtually unanimously in a January 1992 referendum and, a week later, ADEMA won the municipal elections, the first in a series of electoral victories for Alpha Oumar Konare. He went on to win the Presidential election (for the Third Republic) in April, with almost 70% of the vote. Meanwhile, negotiations with the Tuareg rebels resulted only in signatures on agreements which were not observed. The situation grew worse with the Ghanda Koy counter-offensive, but this in turn led to a seemingly viable accord between the Azawad Arab Islamic front, the most important guerilla movement, and the Malian government. Last March, President Konare presided over an enormous bonfire of weapons seized from the former guerilla fighters. The flames lit up the skies above Timbuktoo, the symbol par excellence of rapprochement between the peoples of Mali.

At the beginning of January 1994, the regime suffered the effects of the devaluation of the CFA franc. Economic liberalisation had enabled Mali to improve its macroeconomic position, but social discontent, particularly in the towns and cities, demonstrated that the average citizen was continuing to suffer economic hardship. The President still enjoys considerable support, and political democracy is greatly appreciated. Obviously, the government cannot be blamed for all the difficulties facing the country. There is, for example, a lack of professionalism in the press. However, it could have given a lead in the case of the State media, which still studiously avoids criticising the government's actions. The administration has also been taken to task for its apparently lax attitude towards 'economic' misdemeanours.

Next year will see a series of elections. The government views these with apprehension, although it has stolen a march over its rivals by signing a political accord with several small parties. Opposition is centred around the MPR (Patriotic Movement for Renewal), the revamped former party of the dictator Moussa Traore. This has undergone a 'facelift, and now seems to be regaining support. lts trump card is decentralisation. Its former leaders, who held total power for a quarter of a century, can take advantage of the network of contacts they built up. The US-ADA, the party of the Republic's founder, Modibo Keita, which until recently appeared to be the herald of change, seems lately to have restricted its role to that of arbiter. Surprises are in the offing, but one thing is certain: the Third Republic's constitution will remain the guarantee of democracy in Mali.

H.G.

In Mali, the army has learnt if from the past

Mali's institutions were radically remodelled in the wake of the recent vote on decentralisation. This is aimed at allowing, among other things, a degree of autonomy for the north of the country-which is essential to guarantee national reconciliation. The sudden growth in the number of small towns and villages may result in some political surprises during the long e/ection campaign period which is due to begin early next year. The President of the National Assembly, Ali N. Diallo, finds himself in a pivotal position: his Adema (A/fiance for Democracy in Mali) party current/y holds a comfortable majority in Parliament. With democracy being consolidated in Mali, he must find this an exhilarating time. Our frst question touched on this

-This is certainly an excellent time to be in Mali, but freedom is the most difficult of man's needs to satisfy. Our National Assembly has 12 parties and most people in our country are inspired by ideas based on tolerance and respect for the right to be different. The main concern of those of us who lead the party currently in the majority, is to question constantly whether we are necessarily always right. We have a comfortable majority-72 members out of 115-but this certainly doesn't mean that the National Assembly is just a rubber stamp.

� There is, of course, another stumbling block when one has such a large majority, which is the possibility of internal divisions.

-Yes, I would agree with you there. Mali's MPs have to realise that they came into this business after a three-stage process. First there was a popular uprising, then the army intervened to put an end to the bloodbath.

Finally, we had the high level national conference to draft the constitution, the electoral code and the charter for the country's parties. MPs, therefore, must always bear in mind that, though they can claim legitimacy on the basis of the revolution, there is also a republican legitimacy they ought to respect.

� The second phase in the process was the intervention of the army-are you not a*aid that the 'Niger syndrome'will raise its ugly head in Mali, too ?

- Naturally, MPs have seen what happened in Niger and elsewhere, but fear is tempered here because officers in Mali's forces have also given a great deal of thought to the effects of military dictatorship. Democrats and republicans within the armed forces are very aware that only a minority of men in uniform profited to any degree from the previous regime.

� Do you think that because Mali had what might be called a 'moderate' dictatorship, it is now in a better position than it would have been had the previous administration been more repressive ?

-Let me put it this way. The military dictatorship went through three different stages. During the first stage, just after the coup on 19 November 1968, the junta chose Mao Tse Tung as a model, hammering home the idea that power could be won by force of arms-and it was carried away by the popular acclaim it initially received. Subsequent popular resistance then took them by surprise. People wanted more freedom, but they also wanted to keep what they had gained in social matters. Army officers asked the protestors to abandon their action so that normal constitutional life could be resumed, but the trade unions had their own ideas. They advocated things which the people in power opposed. The ensuing repression was therefore fierce.

There was a second phase during which the military were at odds with one another over the leadership question. The popular view was that the country had fourteen different heads of state at that time. This went on until 28 February 1978 when there was a brief Iuli and they were tempted to return power to the civil authorities.

Then came the third phase when, despite appearances, poverty was on the increase. At first, Malians said that there were two 'IMFs' on the loose in Mali-the International Monetary Fund and the intimate circle surrounding the Moussa family. When the social foundation of the regime contracted, and all the country's business became concentrated in the hands of Moussa, his wife and her relations, the popular forces went on the offensive. This was a period of vociferous protest. Moussa Traore reacted with brutality: hence the 200 dead amongst the schoolchildren and students who were protesting- we will never know the exact number.

� Yet, the former regime could be said to have made the crucial economic choices which your government has continued with.

-I wouldn't agree with that. There was a half-hearted discussion at the time about liberalising the economy but, in reality, bureaucracy got in the way. It is the economic laws voted in by ourselves which form the true basis of a liberal economy. However, if you really want to look to the past, I would say that it was the February 1967 accords signed between Mali and France, when we came back into the franc zone, which set the whole process rolling.

� The Tuaregs and the government have just signed an agreement but the question of the north of the country is still a sensitive one. What are your views on this subject ?

-The problem in the north of Mali is extremely complex. First, the Malian nation is made up of a patchwork of minorities, the largest being the Ban Mana (Ed. 'Bambara' in the colonial vocabulary), but no ethnic group is larger than all the others put together. Second, all groups have, at one time or another, held supremacy. But the fact is that the peoples involved have all lived in the same area throughout history- they have shared joys and sorrows, and their blood has mingled on Malian soil. l would accept that the Malian nation is not as well consolidated as it should be, but it is arguably one of the most advanced in the sub-region in terms of its constitution-though I don't mean to sound chauvinistic here.

Anyway, the problem in the north of the country seems to me to be one of development. The various regions have not all developed at the same rate on account of climate differences. In addition, the dictatorship did not show any great respect for minorities - although it did not direct its actions solely against the Tuaregs, who resorted to arms. The Tuaregs exaggerated the mistreatment they had suffered because they were unfamiliar with what was happening in the rest of the country. In fact, Moussa Traore oppressed everyone: the French-style Jacobin state we inherited did not allow for regional differences. After independence, the regime redoubled its efforts to centralise the state. both because it was Jacobin in outlook and because of Modibo Keita's communist leanings. In 1959, the French forced the Tamashek (ea. 'Tuaregs') to secede-Max Lejeune and Houphouet Boigny were mixed up in all that. This was when oil was first discovered in Algeria and the war with Algeria had been in full swing since 1954. Modibo Keita set up the Malian Federation and declared in 1959 that, upon independence, he would withdraw all soldiers from the Algerian front. Since the Malian Federation was dismantled, Gao virtually became an Algerian willaya, a base camp for its fighters. Mali did not accept this. Moreover, Algeria, around the time it achieved independence, took retaliatory measures and sealed off its borders, mercilessly sending back huge numbers of refugees. It mobilised them through humiliation, telling them that they were the last members of the white race-the only ones to allow themselves to be under black rule.

� But when Ganda Koy's militia halted the Tuareg movement, they appeared to have been supported by the black population. Doesn't that also suggest a racist attitude ?

-I addressed the Tuaregs in October 1992, and pointed out that their wish to regard themselves as overlords and the other peoples in Mali as vassals who ought to pay tribute would provoke a general uprising, with the risk of a slide into civil war. I told several of the Tuareg chiefs seated around me the legend of Ouagadou- about the serpent of the well who each year demanded that the Soninke people should sacrifice an 18-year-old girl in its honour. Then the day came when a young man refused to accept the sacrifice of his fiancee. He went down into the monster's lair, watched by a horrified crowd who saw his recklessness as folly, and cut off the serpent's head. In the beginning, the Malian people's sympathies in fact lay with the rebellion. On 26 March, when the rebellion against the dictatorship took place, the president at the time, Konare, asked for all the Tuareg chiefs to be brought to him so that they could set up a transition body. He got a nasty surprise when the Tuaregs resorted to arms.

� Was the government, as rumoured, behind the Ganda Koy ?

-Not the government as such. To my mind, it would be wrong to applaud when one faction of the people one governs wants to exterminate another faction.

� It appears that some of the people are unhappy with the concessions that have been made to the Tuaregs.

-This is a myth. The idea that we are frustrated because the Tuaregs were once our masters, is a story put about by Europe. The situation is quite the reverse. At the time of colonisation, they were unwilling to ream, like other nomads, such as the Peul people, for example. There were splits with them, of course, but no actual, all-out war. Forging a nation always requires tears, sweat and mourning. Those who return will find what they left broken or stolen and will want land which is less barren than that impoverished by the encroaching desert. However, those who stayed put in the face of rebel attacks had their houses smashed and their animals taken away. There will be problems when some Peals, for example, identify their cows which were stolen. We will have to negotiate, but I have confidence in the people. Just as they ended the war, they will be able to heal the wounds-of this I am sure. And the process has already started.

� I gather that you continue to practice as a doctor, on top of your political duties. Is this to teach a moral lesson to your political colleagues ?

-I would say that it is more of a weakness, an inability to abandon a passion, even for supposedly good reasons. l am an 'internalist' and I have a passion for mechanisms. If you cure an infection and it returns, you have to look elsewhere to solve the problem. There are those in authority who spend money on trying to tackle problems without troubling to locate the cause. I would like to think that the analytical rigour of clinical science might also be put to good use in promoting understanding in politics.

General information

Area: 1 240 190 km�

Population: 10 million

Population density: 8.15 per km�

Population growth rate: 3.1 %

Capital: Bamako (pop.700 000)

Other main towns: Ségou (65 000), Mopti (52 000), Sikasso (50 000), Koutiala (37 000)

Languages: French (official language), Bambara, Peul, Shongoi, Tamashek

Curreny: CFA franc. In July 1996,1 ECU was worth CFAF 647.5 ($1 = CFAF 515)

Politics

Government: Mixed presidential and parliamentary system. Greater powers are due to be transferred to the regions after the next elections.

Head of State: Alpha Oumar Konaré

Prime Minister: Ibrahim Boubacar Keita Political parties represented in Parliament: ADEMA (absolute majority). 'Opposition' - CNID, USRDA and numerous other smaller groupings.

Economy

(1993 figures unless otherwise stated) GDP: CFAF 753.8 billion

GDP per capita: $530

Origin of GDP by sector: agriculture 42%, industry 11 %, services 47%

Real GDP growth: 2.4%

Balance of payments: deficit of CFAF 84.1 billion (estimated)

Main trade partners (% of total trade)

Exports: Thailand (24.2%), Brazil (19.1%), Ireland (9.7%), Belgium/Luxembourg (9.7%)

Imports: Côte d'lvoire (22.2%), France (14.5%), Senegal (9.7%), Hong Kong (4.6%)

Main exports: cotton 40%, livestock 28%, gold 17.5%

Annual inflation rate: 3%

Social indicators

Life expectancy at birth: 46.2

Infant mortalityper 1000 live births: 158

Adult literacy: 28.4%

Enrolment in education (primary, secondary and tertiary): 16%

Human Development Index rating: 0.223 (171st out of 174)

'Macro-economic indicators tell you nothing about the distribution of the country's resources'

� It cannot be easy to be in opposition when Parliament is dominated by a majority which is given a good press and is regarded abroad as a good pupil.

-We do not really find it a problem. If one is familiar with Mali's current situation, the people's views, reactions and judgments count for more than outside opinion, despite the fact the latter may seem important. However, we do take account of others' opinions. We are pleased to be able to speak to you-to express our ideas and points of view- so that outsiders can see that the USRDA offers a credible alternative for Mali. We feel quite secure in our current position because the principles and values we stand for are those closest to the Malian people. So we have no problem in being the opposition party. We are not the kind of hysterical opposition which resorts to foul means as well as fair ones.

� Given that most Malian political trends stem from the revolutionary democratic movement, what are your party's special features ?

-Our party's origins are in the movement which dates from 26 March 1960-which itself grew out of an underground movement. The main component of this was the USRDA whose government was overthrown by a reactionary military putsch. Adema won the last elections, and we do not contest this fact despite a number of irregularities. Indeed, we supported the Adema government's initial actions. We were one of seven parties who regarded the Third Republic as our own offspring. Between 1992 and 1994, even when we faced grave difficulties and they were asking for suggestions, the government ignored our proposals. This happened, for example, at the time the World Bank threatened to pull out. As it functions at the moment, the government is not meeting the Malian people's basic aspirations. They want to see a change from the previous regime.

� What are your essential criticisms of the way Adema works ?

-We are critical on a number of fronts. Looking at it first from an institutional standpoint, when the Malian people rejected the old regime, they wanted the existing set-up to be changed into a democratic one. The few institutions that have been established since then do not reflect this desire. They are virtually no different from what we had under the single-party system. True, we have an opposition party, but its views are ignored. Second, in terms of the management of democracy, a number of bodies, such as the State Commission on the public media, simply do not function. You have been in Mali for a week now, so you must have heard Adema spokesmen on the TV or radio. But you will never hear a member of the opposition. The space reserved for that -formerly an open forum for free political discussion-has been removed and the state-controlled TV and radio stations do not allow political parties to have a say. In the economic sphere, our approach is also completely different. We believe that support for the development of the private sector means that the state has to act as regulator. Economic development cannot simply be left to run its course as a kind of 'rat race'.

� Could you give us a few practical examples of what you describe as Use selling-off of the family jewels ?

-With pleasure. Before the 26 March revolution, there was a general consensus that, in the process of privatisation, the state sector should be managed in a way that benefited the Malian economy. But the reality is that privatisation methods have not changed. They are no different from what they were in Moussa Traoré's time. The electricity sector, for example, which has not yet really been privatised, is now managed by the Bouyges group of France. And it costs more, which will hardly help the country's economic development. The state airline has simply been absorbed by Air Afrique.

� If you were in power, how much economic scope do you think you would have, given the prevailing trend towards international liberalisation ?

-I recognise that there is a dominant international lobby which has drawn up its own conditions, laws and principles. Even if one does not agree with this approach, one has to take it into account. However, it should be feasible to achieve privatisation in a different way. We know what we are talking about because we used to run this country. Indeed, we set up the national economy. Before 1960, there was no economic system to speak of. l am currently completing the text of a work which looks at our economic position at the time of independence. The plain fact is that we had nothing at the time of independence. There were only three pharmacists, fewer than ten doctors, and about ten people qualified to teach in our grammar schools-not much to write home about after 70 years of colonialism! After 1960, we had to set everything up from scratch. If you trace the history of every country in the world, whether under a monarchy or a republic, you see that the state has always made the first move in bringing about industrialisation, developing the maritime sector, and stimulating imports and exports. If you think about it, at the outset, the main manufactured activities were the domain of royalty.

� You claim that your party left a legacy, but some might say that the highly interventionist regime of your hero, Modibo Keita, who brought about independence, contained the seeds of Moussa Traore's dictatorship.

-These are just fairy stories. When a regime is overthrown by a coup d'etat, it always becomes the victim of systematic defamation campaigns in the press. We were maligned for 23 years with no right of reply and no right to issue a statement to set the record straight. In a way, we are talking today about a past which did not exist. You know the saying 'you are not only what you are but also what people say you are'. This reference to dictatorship is one of the most serious calumnies. But no matter what lies are told, something of the truth will always remain. If our regime had been dictatorial or inquisitorial, a coup d'etat would not have been possible. Before the 1968 coup, Modibo Keita was given a file by the security services warning him of the plot by Moussa Traore, and giving a list of his accomplices. He was advised to arrest the conspirators and put them on trial. His response was that he would not agree to a Malian citizen being deprived of his liberty without a scrap of evidence. I knew Keita very well. It will be a long time before we have another head of state with such democratic convictions.

� The ordinary people, the farmers, say that they did better under Traore, than under Keita.

-Yes, but it depends who you talk to. With Traore, there was an atmosphere of moral decline. We were free to plunder, steal and murder, but it was not real freedom. The farmers see it from a different perspective. However, l can still show you a copy of the 'Summary Report on the Seminar on Cooperation in the Rural Environment' which we drew up in 1968, just a few months before the coup d'etat. This highlighted the fact that socialism had not penetrated into the countryside during the seven or eight years we were in power. So you see our own self criticism appeared in a document published in May 1968. This demonstrates the fact that we were not complacent.

� What is your view of the compliments the current government is receiving from many foreign observers, and the good marks it has been given in the macro-economic field by international institutions ?

- Good macro-economic results which are due to good management of public finances are beneficial for the country. However, such management must be accompanied by greater welfare and an improved standard of living for the people. There is no point hailing a GDP increase of 3-4% if more than 10% of the population does not have enough to eat. You have been through Bamako and other towns and cities and you have seen the construction sites and big buildings. But in their daily life, people are now more ill at ease. They have been disappointed by the Adema regime. The welfare of the ordinary citizen cannot be defined by reference to the personal wealth of someone who is having a seven-storey building put up. All of this new construction is reflected in the higher GDP. But the macro-economic indicators tell you nothing about the distribution of the country's resources-and the scales are currently tipped towards injustice. Those who are working are earning less but those who do not work are earning more. Embezzlement and corruption are currently worse than under Moussa.

� What is the likelihood of a changeover of political power given that the opposition groups are at odds? The union between yourselves and Parena appears to have been suspended.

-We are capable of winning the forthcoming elections without entering into an agreement with any other party. Having said this, we are the party to which most groupings in Mali are now turning and we are currently in the process of forming an alliance which will carry a great deal of weight. l am not one to speculate but I am sure that Parena's supporters will, in time, reach the same conclusions as ourselves regarding the timeliness and suitability of an alliance between us. We have contacts with a number of other parties but we do not want to form an electoral pact in the way one would make preparations for a coup-forming a group, ousting the regime and then shooting at each other! Moreover, it is important not to confuse change with restoration. There are those who advocate the restoration of Moussa's regime. Opposition of that kind would suit the current government very well because it would allow them to raise the spectre of our former dictator in the hope of attracting support from those who are frightened by such a pro spect.

Interview by H.G.

In West Africa, there is a dry, desert-like region which a river tried to bring under its sway. Instead of flowing seawards, the river's path went in the opposite direction to find this region, impulsively tracing a majestic loop of 2000 kiLométres before heading seawards. The Niger may not have provided an ideal site for Mali's major towns and villages, but it was considerate enough to form a major waterway between them which is navigable over almost its entire course. Its network of tributaries has resulted in the formation of large landlocked lakes whose waters are full of fish-a reminder of the times when the Sahara was one huge expanse of water. It has also resulted in the extraordinary Niger basin, a central delta area the size of Belgium, criss-crossed by lesser tributaries which reach into the smallest valleys. The river has created a diverse landscape which entices the visitor back. The land is steeped in history and if one wishes to learn its secrets, one has no choice but to study the empires of the past, forged it is said, by mythological deities and heros.

During the dry season, visitors marvel at the beauty of the plains, which stretch as far as the eye can see. They will be tempted to return to view the waters that will cover them for just a few months during the rains. This is when the towns and villages appear as islands in the flooded landscape. Later in the seasonal cycle, Nature divests itself of its watery raiment and prepares to welcome the egrets, pink flamingos and all the other richly coloured birds which have flown in from afar. The cultural life of this region is also imbued with a rare richness, combining mystery and individuality. Mali has a distinctive character: it is accessible but not adulterated by frippery, welcoming but not taken over, affable but able to treat everyone as its equal. There is no need to make constant reference to the past which existed before colonial times-the past simply exists, eloquent in its tranquil humility.

A survey of Mali should logically begin in Bamako, the likely port of arrival. But if one immediately journeys to the towns and villages that were the cradles of empire, one is better able to appreciate this young capital, barely 250 years old, whose history owes much to its smaller forebears. We arrived in the evening and departed at dawn the next day. So Bamako was no more than a blur. The River Niger, still known as the Djoliba in the capital, is crossed by two long bridges which offer a view over the wild river banks. Most of the constructions are brand-new and some have a style borrowed from their thousandyear-old 'Sudanese' architectural heritage. It would have been more romantic to travel by river to the central part of the delta but, despite the welcoming nature of the Niger as it flows through Mali, it is difficult to navigate over the Sotuba rapids, between Bamako and Koulikoro approximately 50 km away. When the waters are in spate from July to December, it takes no more than two days to reach Segou, three to reach Mopti, five to reach Gao and an extra day to arrive in Timbuktu.

Segou, the rebel

Our first stop after Bamako is Koulikoro, the departure point for Niger cruises. After the unusual houses of the bazo fisherman on the banks of the river, as one leaves Bamako, it is the river itself which is a source of curiosity, transforming the voyage into a wonderful promenade through a forest abounding in game. Then there are the thatched, circular mud huts. Those without a roof are built on piles and are often ovens for preparing karite-nut oil whose bitter-sweet fragrance mingles with the fruity scent of the mango trees which line our route. In Koulikoro, every day is market day. The market spills out into the road and then shrinks back to allow vehicles to pass. It is also a centre for hunters and poachers who come here to seek customers. Above all, it is the centre for the guilds of masons who jealously guard the secrets of traditional Sudanese building skills. For the visitor who cares to linger, the griots will sing the praises of the old magician-king Soumangourou whose spirit has haunted this small town for eight-and-a-half centuries. When he was overthrown by the hero Soundjata, he just vanished into thin air-in the land of mystery that is Mali, great kings do not die, they simply disappear.

The first 250 kiLométres of the river's course from Bamako are enchanting. One's first real encounter with Mali's past come at Segou-when the balanzans come into view. The charming, independent city is close by. Segou, the Bambara capital, did not form part of most of Mali's empires. Indeed, the word Bambara comes from 'Ban-Mane', which means 'those who reject a master'. There are 4444 + 1 balanzans to announce the city, all of which are numbered except the last one, which still guards its secret. The balanzans conceal another secret: during the dry season they are covered with leaves, which they lose during the winter. A curious traveller might arrive at Segou with memories of Maryse Conde's fine prose (Segou, Robert Laffont, France, 1984). Her work is an epic fresco of life at the court of the Bambara kingdom in the nineteenth century. The city itself stretches for eight kiLométres along the river bank, with a promenade high above the river on an embankment from where there is an uninterrupted view over the water to the horizon. The richly coloured fabrics of the washer women create a dreamlike atmosphere, giving an impression of the shimmering tunics worn by princes, and the women who swim in the river are not given to excessive prudishness, another reminder of the city's enduring rebellious nature. The charm and cleanliness of the town are striking, its administrative buildings stretching along a grand boulevard lined with modern structures. We see in their profiles, the traditional architectural styles as well as a variety of colours. The whole scene is shaded by gardens full of flowers. It is easy to forget that Segou has retained none of its former architectural wealth. This was all destroyed by the organisers of a jihad who sacked this city of infidels who had never been won over to Islam or, later, to Catholicism. The city walls and the regal courtyards are all gone, so what remains is jealously protected: the sceptre and regal symbols of King Diarra, the kingdom's treasures and its secrets. On Mondays, market day, it is possible to see people kneeling at the feet of an old man. He is the custodian of the town's remaining riches, but will never reveal where they are held. Oumar Santara, one of Segou's intellectuals, is attempting to gain an insight into these mysteries in order to protect them better because, he says, the pillage is still going on. Mali's cultural heritage is being ransacked by outsiders. In some villages on the opposite bank of the river, it is still possible to find 13th-century coins in the village squares.

Trial marriage

Nearly 500 kiLométres separate Segou from Mopti. Midway between the two is San, barely more than a large village. San is bathed by the waters of the Bani, a major tributary of the Niger which it flows into it at Mopti. In the market, fine cotton fabrics can be bought, as can the skills of the blacksmiths. Here, however, there is above all an air of secrecy. The town's inhabitants are members of the Bobo people. The name translates es 'stammering', 'mute' being implied. This is the town which holds the secrets of fatal poisons- cocktails of poisonous plants and snake venom. There are also unguents of all kinds to relieve pain, alleviate scarring, and so on. San has another reputation, that of handing out severe punishment to adulteresses. This seems paradoxical when one discovers that women here enjoy exceptional sexual freedom during adolescence and up to the time of their marriage, and even afterwards. They enter into a trial marriage for three or four years, during which time they are free to 'play the field'. At the end of this period, on the occasion of a feast, they reveal whether or not they will accept their 'provisional' husband. If not, the woman regains her freedom and can start all over again as many times as she wishes. If she decides to become the man's wife, she chooses some of her husband's friends with whom she may 'have a fling' for two weeks, the aim being that she thereby lays to rest her unmarried freedom. She will then swear an oath of fidelity to her husband which she breaks on pain of being cast out of society and even, it would appear, at the risk of losing her life.

A 1 2-kiLométre dyke, which seems to float on the water during the winter season, links Sevare, the crossroads of the major routes across Mali, to Mopti. Situated below water level, Mopti owes its existence to the embankments which protect it. The dyke offers a fine promenade which opens out onto the quayside of this bustling town. The streets are crowded and the settlement has a vitality and beauty, with coloured lights mirrored in the water. On land, the crowds drift in much the same way as the multitude of boats anchored in staggered rows along the riverbank. These stretch for hundreds of metres- as far as the eye can see. All this wealth of detail forms a tableau punctuated by the outlines of the slender fishing smacks (pirogues or dugout canoes). Despite their size, these vessels retain their uncluttered lines, always giving the impression that they are slicing through the water. The biggest of them are perhaps 50 metres long, carrying cargoes of up to 150 tonnes. This strange, animated scene, which resembles no other in the world, seems to have been staged as a way of reviving the buried images of the Mali of legend-provoking a memory of things unseen and prompting new sensations. Despite the fact that it is replete with Malian influences, Mopti did not develop until colonial times. Like Segou, it never really belonged to any of Mali's great empires, although it became their meeting point. It is a place where all the country's languages are spoken. Indeed, the word 'mopte' in Peal means 'place of assembly'. At Zigui's restaurant or in a cafe down by the port, one find groups of beribboned Tuareg artisans still with their belle servants (former slaves) in tow. One can watch the Peals, also followed by their servants, negotiating their deals. Some trade in gold jewellery, dogon or other ethnic sculptures. Others buy and sell the magnificent Segou carpets or cotton fabrics. Others still dabble in ancient archaeological artifacts (which it is forbidden to sell) and in sacred objects from all over the country. The town itself is an artifact: the apparent hotchpotch is regulated by an internal, almost natural organisation. The hundreds of boats, fishing smacks and other small craft are arranged along the river banks according to the goods they are importing. There is one place for fishing boats, another for furniture imports, and so on.

Mopti merits an overnight stay. In the curve of the great arc which forms the port, a soft light lingers on the congested river banks. It is not just the people who seem to tire of the day's hustle and bustle. The biggest boats with their gentle backwash, anchored in the mud until the next incoming tide, grow too lazy for their images to be reflected in the water and they seem to hold on to the last of the sun's glow, awaiting the first glimmers of moonlight

The Dogon region, poetry in stone

As one approaches Bandiagara, on the threshold of the cliff faces which bear the name of this town, the landscape changes. Most of Mali is flat, but here, we find ourselves in the high land. In fact, the altitude is only a few hundred metres, but the landscape is dominated by sheer and rugged rock faces. This is Dogon country where everything seems to be made of stone: the roads, houses and hills appear in matching tones of salmon pink. The inhabitants, too, seem to have been hewn from the very rock. At first glance, the landscape is unremarkable apart from the sight of all this rock, but as one's perception grows keener, shapes can be made out. At the foot of the slopes are caves that are still lived in. And in the most vertical part of the cliff faces, we can pick out regular, sculpted barrel shapes, combining to form an impressive design. These stone cylinders are the ancient dwellings of the Telems, a mysterious people who preceded the Dogons and were conquered by them. Nothing is known about their disappearance. Today, the cylinders are used as Dogon graves. Access is gained to them during funeral services, by means of a system of ropes. At the top of the cliff is Shanga, the beauty of the Dogon region. It stands atop a 400metre sheer drop which extends over a length of 200 kiLométres. Reaching Shanga from Bandiagara involves picking one's way through the rocky landscape and sliding over sandstone scree.

Before the Europeans arrived to colonise the country, no one had succeeded in subjugating the Dogon region. Was it really ever under the sway of the colonists ? This region, whose beauty lies in its harshness, has no embellishments. And its language is as hard on the ears as the rock is underfoot. As everywhere, to feed themselves, the Dogons till the soil. But this must be carried on the backs of men and women over distances of several kiLométres and then deposited on the rock. Every onion bulb and every root pulled from this thin layer is a testament to the tenacity of humankind.

The Dogon region is like a magnet-it attracts pilgrims from afar who come to venerate El Hadj Oumar, the founder of the Islamic brotherhood of the African Tidjani-a military and religious leader whose life and disappearance are shrouded in mystery. It also attracts people because of the beauty of its works of art. Some of these, apparently of recent manufacture, are actually centuries old. For the custodians of the sacred objects, the interest of outsiders is viewed as a catastrophe. The artefacts are constantly pilfered and sometimes, their keepers commit suicide in their horror at such desecration.

Fine regalia

Djenne translates as 'the beloved of the waters' and is surrounded by two strekhes of the Bani river. Thus, apart from a short time in the dry season, when the river can be forded, it is an island accessible only by boat. The town has always been a rival of Timbuktu, the 'daughter' of the desert. Before Mopti was created, Djenne was the country's meeting point. The town is dominated by its mosque which is a masterpiece of Sudanese architecture. This imposing clay structure has been a magnet for the faithful since the thirteenth century. It has always been rebuilt in the same style, each version scrupulously identical to the previous one. The most recent reconstruction dates from the early 1900s.

Centre of the Malian empire, Djenne has retained all its finery, magnificence and prestige. It was annexed by the Shongoi empire at the end of the Middle Ages and its conquerors have always been seduced by the town's beauty. The mosque has been designated a World Heritage Site, and the entire town has protected status. For centuries, its architecture influenced other towns and cities in the Sahel and it continues to do so. The secrets of the knowledge and skills of its master masons are still jealously guarded, passed on only reluctantly to the initiated. The whole town is built around the mosque, revealing an interplay of balance and power. There are magnificent inner courtyards to which entry is gained through massive, ornate studded gates. The elaborate and finely carved windows, the intertwined leaves and scrolls of the arabesques and the moucharabies, all bear witness to the Moroccan influence. This has, however, been toned down and it now blends in with Djenne's indigenous forms of decoration and architecture. Whilst all Mali's former great towns and cities were known for their power and military glory, Djenne takes pride in having dispensed with brute force, its spirit protecting it from subjugation. All those who pass through take something of Djenne's spirit away with them.

Coca Cola kept at bay

Returning to the capital from where we started, we discover that it was colonisation that turned Bamako from a village into the large city that it is today. It inhabitants now number approximately one million. Although a city of recent origin, the site on which it is built dates back to the dawn of time. The hills overlooking the city are home to cave paintings and the underground tombs provide more evidence of a human presence dating from ancient times. There is then a gap of several thousand years in Bamako's history. In early colonial times, just two centuries ago, the village had no more than 700 inhabitants. Bamako began to be developed at the beginning of the 1900s and it is the only city in Mali to have a colonial atmosphere. It has not, however, lost out to change. The ministerial buildings at Koulouba hill, one of five dominating the city, or the Point G houses in the National Museum area, may not equal the beauty of Sudanese architecture, but they are elegant nonetheless. Their plain style is softened by their leafy gardens. The administrative buildings in the lower part of the city are often a fusion of colonial or modern styles and traditional architecture. These edifices are also made more attractive by fine gardens, which lend originality to the city. One of the most successful combinations is the great market, unfortunately in the process of restoration at the time of our visit and whose beautiful interior we were unable to appreciate. It is interior beauty which characterises this city in comparison with other African capitals. Despite its congestion and the density of its population, Bamako still has the atmosphere of a lively village. There is little of what one might term a 'social scene', but it is enough to be invited into the 'squares' or respectfully to visit the block-shaped houses which are still home to entire families and where discussion sessions (grins) last into the small hours. These sessions are enhanced with food and the omnipresent cup of tea. Bamako still prefers tea to imported beverages and to receive guests in the family home rather than joining in the social round in the hotel foyers so characteristic of major capital cities.

For those hesitant to venture into the traditional life of Bamako (although they would be assured of a welcome), there are many restaurants which make a good attempt at recreating a homely atmosphere. One is not, however, required to take part in the conversations. Two restaurants (the Djenne and the Santoro), which have opened recently, allow one to enjoy the pleasures of art and history. They are part of a wider project to promote Malian art and set up an organisation for artists and craftsmen. They contain areas modelled on the refinement of former imperial furnishing, interior design and architecture, as well as exhibits by Mali's greatest artists. Their creator, Aminata Traore, is an intellectual, art connoisseur and international expert. In Dakar or Abidjan, patrons of such establishments would probably be expatriates with perhaps a few local dignitaries. But at the Santoro and Djenne, prices have been kept reasonably low (no account having been taken of the 50% devaluation in the CFA franc) and the art remains accessible to middle-class Malians. Thus, the spirit of the 'grins' is preserved. The preferred beverage is still a cup of fragrant tea or perhaps a glass of refreshing juice. Whisky will never replace tea, nor will Coca Cola replace fruit juices. Mali is not a country which rejects other people, but it resists cultural encroachment, preferring the

familiar to the exotic.

Hegel Goutier

Roads and adjustment

by Theo Hoorntje

For 1990-95, ECU 151.7m was allocated (mainly in project aid) under the seventh EDF National Indicative Programme (NIP). This is equivalent to about 1.5% of Mali's GDP and 13% of its public-sector investment programme for the period in question. European funds from sources other than the NIP-emergency aid, Stabex, European Investment Bank (EIB) venture capital and resources from the structural adjustment facility- reached ECU 87.2m over the same five-year period.

In 1995, support for the structural adjustment programme represented 5.4% of the balance of payments deficit and 7.8% of the budget deficit. Looking at all instruments together, the amount involved in financing decisions taken by the Commission last year was ECU 42m, with the disbursement figure rising to ECU 40m.

The NlP's primary commitment level under the 7th EDF rose from 76% at the beginning of the financial year to 92% at the end, which means that virtually all available programmable resources are now allocated to projects and programmes. The secondary commitment level, which involves the conversion of proposals into concrete agreements and contracts, rose from 33% to 45% by the end of the financial year. Disbursement rates remain relatively low (32% of available resources).

Allocations

Aid is distributed to the various sectors, as follows:

- Roads (29% of the total);

- Support for structural adjustment (20%);

- Rural development / Environment (1 4%);

- Support for the private sector (12%);

- Decentralisation (9%);

-Public health (9%);

-Water supplies (4%);

-Education/Culture (3%).

It is clear that Community aid concentrates mainly on road infrastructures-covering both maintenance and the opening-up of remote regions. Support for structural adjustment, which comes second, is used to finance the State budget's current expenses, particular emphasis being placed on improvement of fiscal and customs income and greater efficiency in health-policy matters.

In other areas, such as rural development, Community aid also makes an attempt to consolidate gains from previous actions, particularly through the development of rice growing and stock rearing, which should improve supplies to the domestic market and offer further export potential. As far as the environment is concerned, the aim is to contribute to the sustainable management of natural resources on the part of basic users, such as farmers, breeders, etc.

The private sector is supported by actions in key areas and by a programme that was recently set up which involves directing resources through a financial institution (Credit Initiative SA). The objective is to promote lending to SMEs, which is in keeping with the general aim of achieving economic growth.

In the context of administrative reform, priority is given to the decentralisation process which aims to promote the emergence of new local decision making centres (which should, in the long term, become key players in project development and implementation), and to give such decentralised bodies the means they require to fulfil these new public-sector missions.

As for health, Community aid has contributed to the PSPHR project financed by other donors. Its main focus is initially on infrastructures and on the policy relating to the supply of essential medicines.

In the water-supply sector, actions are aimed at strengthening village infrastructures, particularly in the Bankass and Koro areas. A solar-pump programme has also been set up in the Mopti and Koulikoro regions.

In addition to a school reconstruction programme in the north of the country, the Commission has been able to support education and culture through a dozen or so film projects.

Under the general 'heading' of non-programmable resources, there have been a number of interventions. These include extra support for structural adjustment, Stabex transfers, deployment of the balance from the 5th EDF and EIB projects. Emergency aid has been deployed in the north of the country where, despite difficult conditions, programmes have been able to continue without interruption.

Finally, Community regional aid is helping to combat rinderpest, as well as being directed towards road maintenance, and the provision of training and information on environmental protection.

T.H.

Catherine Beauraind and her five colleagues in the small team of foreigners and Malians, woke early. It had been a short night: our fault, since we had arrived at Bandiagara on the edge of the Niger valley much later than expected having taken the Sevare route. This is the gateway to the rocky Dogon region and travellers on the road occacionaliy fall victim to bandits-which probably made our hosts somewhat apprehensive about our late arrival. The people we had come to see are road builders, working without sophisticated equipment in a region of rocks and cliffs. They seem very youth froml, particularly those who have come from afar.

These are 'Progress Volunteers', the name given to the many young people who come to this very poor African country to offer their commitment and dynamism, if not perhaps their experience. On this particular morning, still feeling fatigued, Catherine was having to coordinate the departure of escorts for seasonal workers who were being dispatched to various locations. Their job is to ensure the upkeep of the rocky roads, and the equipment they use is rudimentary to say the least. The Bandiagara-Dourou stretch is maintained by the AFVP (French Association of Progress Volunteers) and is one in a long list of NGO projects. In 1995 alone, the European Commission supported over 50 NGO schemes, to the tune of ECU 1.5 million. Most EU countries and a number of others also have their own projects. On top of this, there is the emergency help provided by the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which has just approved a grant of ECU 1 million for the north of Mali. Now that a peace accord has been signed between the government and the Tuareg rebels, this region is likely to see a huge influx of refugees returning to villages that are ill prepared to receive them.

Mali is a least-developed nation and one of the most highly subsidised countries in terms of per capita aid, though recently, its political fortunes have been boosted by the democratisation process. And the efforts of the NGOs now seem to be paying off. The recent times of famine have faded in people's memories even in the Dogon region, where many families ate calabashes in desperation before succumbing to starvation. Mother nature is playing a part in the country's renewal: there has been ample rain over the last Many NGO projects are aimed at helping the population use its meagre resources to exploit the natural wealth of the River Niger and its tributaries. At Konna, for example, a striking village at the confluence of two rivers, the Regional Literacy and Self-Management Project is up and running. Financed, among others, by the European Development Fund, this is being implemented at a number of localities, and it has played a part in the renewal which can now be seen. Fresh coats of paint, repairs to houses, fewer starving children and the return of many migrants all underline this new vitality. Each of the 17 small cultivated areas in the village that are covered by the project (worked by about 60 people), receives no more aid than a motorised pump, a few cereals and a small amount of cash in the first year. A basic course in management is also provided. It is up to the villagers to use these resources to yield a profit. Results tend to be good, proof of success being the growing number of such schemes which are being set up without aid from the organisation. The project is now in its seventh year. It did experience one bad year-1992-when, despite bumper harvests, rice imports into Mali were excessive and prices dropped. The village has therefore made an attempt to diversify its crops. Its objective is to sell onions in Cote d'lvoire, where the inhabitants are very fond of this vegetable.

Most villages have been able to save money which was initially placed in banks and then invested elsewhere in the wake of devaluation's harsh lessons. Konna opted for purchasing livestock. In nearby Kotaka, surpluses partially funded the construction of an impressive mosque. Kotaka was one of the places most affected by the recent meningitis epidemic, but a hospital would probably have been too expensive.

Hegel Goutier

Small countries with a limited resource base are frequently buffeted by economic forces over which they have no control. If you live in Western Samoa, however, you are likely to be preoccupied by forces of a different kind. For while most of the time, Mother Nature presents a benign face in this attractive and fertile Pacific state, every once in a while, she loses her temper.

Tropical storms are an unavoidable reality in much of the Pacific and they breed a special form of resilience which should impress the inhabitants of more temperate climes. The people of Samoa, and other cyclone prone countries in the region, are adept at picking themselves up and, if necessary, starting all over again, once the winds have passed. But between 1989 and 1993, the Samoans' capacity for renewal was to be tested more than ever before. Like a plucky boxer facing a much stronger opponent, the country would just be struggling back to its feet when another hammer blow would send it reeling.

The closest to a knock-out punch came in December 1991 in the shape of Cyclone Val-the worst storm to hit the islands in more than a century. This brought death and injury, as well as widespread economic devastation. The coconut and coffee trees on which the country depends for much of its export income were either swept away or stripped bare. Many homes were also destroyed and infrastructures were severely damaged. (The 1993 cyclone, although less powerful, caused further crop destruction.)

Over the last five years, virtually all the damage has been repaired. Indeed, a great many facilities have been upgraded with plans for further improvements in the pipeline. To some extent, the credit for this remarkable recovery must be shared. Overseas donors played an important part in restoring key infrastructures while expatriate Samoans, whose remittances are an important 'invisible' earning for the country in normal times, also rallied round. But the key players, of course, were the people themselves, who rose to the challenge of reconstructing their country.

Today, Western Samoa - which has a population of 165 000-is experiencing an economic mini-boom. Growth during 1996 is expected to be between 5% and 6% for the second consecutive year and there are encouraging signs of a new, home-grown entrepreneurial spirit. This is not to say that everything in the garden is rosy. The latest growth figures need to be set against the unavoidable recession caused by Cyclones Val and Ofa (which struck in 1990) and a mediocre economic performance throughout the 1980s. And while there is some evidence of diversification, the economy is still very narrowly based. There is also considerable room for improvements in health care and education provision. Doubts have been expressed, for example, as to the accuracy of the official literacy figures. Finally, there is a high level of dependence on foreign aid (the country's main donors are the Asian Development Bank, Japan, Australia and the European Community).

Economists will tell you how notoriously difficult it is to express the wealth of a developing nation in statistical form. GDP figures can offer a pointer, but they do not present the whole picture as they take no account of the informal economy. Western Samoa provides a particularly good illustration. At US $950, the estimated per capita GDP is very low by Pacific standards. Yet there is clearly no starvation. A great deal of the food consumed by the Samoans simply does not 'show up' in the cash economy. The term subsistence agriculture seems peculiarly inappropriate here since locally available food sources are many and varied.

Similarly, many of the materials used to build the 'fares' (traditional houses) in the villages are obtained without recourse to builders' merchants. And when a Samoan wants a new house, he builds it himself-with the help of his family and neighbours. This involves skilled carpentry work-for which people would pay highly in industrialised societies - and which does not register either in the country's economic statistics. So it is clear that the basic GDP figures do not paint a complete picture. Nonetheless, they illustrate the relatively underdeveloped state of the formal economy.

Agriculture

Looking at exports, Western Samoa's traditional agricultural sector has gone through some rough times, for a variety of reasons. In the past, the mainstays were copra and coconut products (oil and cream), cocoa and tarot

The storms destroyed or damaged many of the coconut and cocoa trees, wiping out exports for a number of years until new plantings could reach maturity. The market in food products derived from the coconut had been depressed in any case. One reason for this was negative publicity over the high cholesterol content of coconuts, although more recent research, suggesting that not all types of cholesterol are bad for you, has at least partly restored the reputation of this highly flexible crop.

Taro, which is Western Samoa's staple food crop, was exported in ever increasing quantities during the 1980s but the trade has suffered badly in recent years because of an outbreak of taro leaf blight.

Today, Western Samoa's most important primary exports are, once again, coconut-based (oil and cream). With the new trees reaching maturity, production recommenced on a small scale towards the end of 1994. The following year saw a big jump in exports and the figures for 1996 are expected to - come close to pre-cyclone levels,The marketing situation has also improved as a result of privatisation. The old Copra Board, a parastatal with a reputation for inefficiency, was abolished in 1990, its assets being bought for a nominal sum by a Samoan businessman who has invested heavily in refurbishment. This has all been achieved despite continuing low prices for coconut products in the world markets.

Cocoa takes longer to recover but harvesting of the first new crop is due to take place this year with the emphasis on a high value, fine tasting variety. A new chocolate factory (Wilex C.C.P. Ltd), also masterminded by a local entrepreneur, Eddie Wilson, has been built with assistance from the EU's Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) and a credit from the European Investment Bank (EIB) channelled through the Development Bank of Western Samoa (DBWS). This is a particularly significant venture since it aims to maximise added value before export. The factory is currently operating well below full capacity, awaiting the arrival of the first local crop, but there are high hopes for its long term success.

The other main crops exported are bananas and kava. The latter is a mild narcotic based on the root of the pepper plant, which is used in pharmaceutical preparations. It also has an important place in Samoan (and wider Pacific) culture, being drunk in diluted form on ceremonial occasions.

With a view to achieving further export diversification, a number of other agricultural/horticultural export possibilities have also been identified. These include asparagus, mangos and cut flowers. The most likely potential market for new tropical production is New Zealand-already the destination for more than half of Western Samoa's exports. However, this country has stringent health rules with rigorous controls on the import of plant and animal material. The understandable aim is to protect the local farming sector from diseases introduced from outside, but it creates an additional hurdle for potential exporters in the developing countries of the Pacific. In particular, Western Samoa needs to come to grips with the fruit fly problem, if it wishes to make inroads into the New Zealand market.

Timber also once featured prominently in the trade statistics before declining at the end of the 1980s. There are hopes for a revival here with the authorities keen to encourage value added processing of wood products within the country.

Despite its obvious association with the sea, Western Samoa has never really gone in for commercial fishing. While the Exclusive Economic Zone is small by Pacific standards, the country being 'hemmed in' by other island nations and territories, it is still more than 40 times the land area. The government would particularly like to attract foreign investment in fish processing and canning.

Industry

It is probably unrealistic to expect a small and geographically isolated nation such as Western Samoa to develop a highly diversified industrial base but there have been one or two notable ventures which show signs of potential. The above-mentioned chocolate factory is one such. The country also has a highly successful brewery. It is not uncommon for developing nations to produce their own local beer but Western Samoa's Vailima brand has managed to break out successfully into the regional market, bringing in useful foreign exchange in the process.

The biggest industrial success story-dwarfing all other manufacturing ventures-has been the establishment of a factory by the Japanese company Yazaki to produce wire harnesses for cars. The business employs some 2500 people (mainly women) in a highly labour-intensive operation-and it makes a significant contribution to the trade balance. The value-added electrical components are re-exported for incorporation into cars sold mainly in Australia.

The company was attracted by a number of factors including low labour costs in this non-unionised society, and the political stability of Western Samoa. Perhaps most important, however, were the incentives offered by the government. These went well beyond the usual tax holidays provided by developing countries to attract foreign investors. Indeed, it was the government that built the factory and the company was allowed to occupy it rent-free. Some observers have expressed concern at such largesse but the authorities are insistent that it was still a good deal. They point to the jobs that were created (a huge number by Samoan standards) at a time when many people's livelihoods were threatened by taro blight. They also argue that the profits of the operation are retained in Western Samoa, thereby helping to boost the wider economy.

Services

The service sector offers perhaps the best potential for expansion of Western Samoa's formal economy. Top of the list here comes tourism (featured in a separate article), which has been expanding much faster than the underlying rate of economic growth. Despite the increase in both visitors and income, tourism is still underdeveloped. The government (supported by the opposition) believes that this is one field where Western Samoa definitely has a 'comparative advantage'.

Linked to tourism, of course, is the air transport business. Although it might still be possible to obtain passage on a merchant ship bound for the South Sea islands, the vast majority of visitors arrive by plane, and good air connections are obviously essential. The history of the country's national carrier, Polynesian Airlines, offers two object lessons. The first is how not to run an airline and the second, more recent and encouraging one, is how to grasp the nettle when the crisis finally breaks. In 1992, with tourism in mind, the government owned airline decided to expand its operations substantially. It leased three long-haul aircraft which it hoped to fill with visitors in search of a new tropical haven. The market research was clearly inadequate and the planes flew with many empty seats. Other aspects of the company's management proved deficient and there was a chronic lack of financial. Debts mounted at such a frightening rate that the budgetary position of the entire country was threatened.

In 1994, the government took decisive action, bringing in Richard Gates, the experienced airline entrepreneur, who is credited with having turned Air New Zealand around. Relatively small airline businesses in the Pacific are not likely to make a.fortune for anyone, but with proper management, they should at least be able to break even and perhaps even turn in a small profit. This was not something that even the prodigious talents of Mr Gates could achieve, however, with the crushing burden of debt accumulated by Polynesian Airlines. So the government assumed responsibility for the debts and then gave the new manager a free hand, on the firm understanding that the taxpayer would not come to the rescue again.

On the airline side, the operation was drastically slimmed down. The leases on the large aircraft were terminated, staff 'down-sizing' took place and bath ticketing and financial management were tightened up. The positive impact of these measures was soon evident, with a small operating profit registered in 1995.

Left with huge debts, the action of the authorities was equally impressive, although it entailed discomfort for most Western Samoans. In order to restore its own financial position, the government instituted 15% public expenditure cuts across the board. In macro-economic terms, it is generally acknowledged that this strong medicine was needed, but the social consequences were all too clear as well: reduced funds for health and education, and pressure on important capital investment budgets. Perhaps fortuitously for the country, the financial crisis caused by the Polynesian Airlines debacle coincided with the payment of a substantial Stabex payment from the European Community. The country's was eligible for Stabex funds because of the collapse in agricultural export receipts following the cyclones, and the money-which was directed mainly into infrastructure projects-could hardly have come at a better time. Meanwhile, the government has paid off a large portion of the airline's debt with the residue rescheduled for payment over a five-year period.

The government has taken a number of steps aimed at attracting offshore finance business to the country. Western Samoa now has a comprehensive legal framework governing such activities, including crucial provisions guaranteeing secrecy. Another vital factor in attracting offshore funds, which has already been mentioned, is political stability. There is even the suggestion that the country's time zone, which puts it almost a day behind Australia and New Zealand, might somehow be turned to its advantage in global financial dealings (although it is not clear how the benefit would be derived in otherwise legitimate transactions).

The last three years have seen a big increase in company incorporations and there are now more than 2500 offshore companies (including 15 banks and eight insurance companies) registered. It is difficult to imagine Western Samoa ever challenging the likes of Liechtenstein, the Bahamas or Jersey in this market, given its geographical distance from the main industrialised nations, but even a successful 'niche' operation could bring some useful income to the country.

Politics

Five years ago, when the Courier last covered Western Samoa, the emphasis was heavily on recent constitutional changes and most notably, the introduction of universal franchise. At the time, there was a lot of interest in how the traditional Samoan way of life (faa-Samoa) would be affected. This is based on the village structure and the matai system which vests considerable authority in family heads. There is also a strong attachment to the Christian faith, as exemplified by strict Sunday observance rules (also found in Tonga and other Pacific countries).

In fact, the Samoans appear to have embraced their more 'westernised' system of government without any difficulty. Although everyone over 21 has a vote, one still has to be a matai to be eligible to stand for Parliament. In contrast to hierarchical structures elsewhere in the Pacific, however, the system here seems to be based largely on merit and it is not particularly exclusive (there are an estimated 19 000 matai). The matai, nonetheless, exercise considerable authority in village affairs, most notably over the use of customary land.

In short, the change seems to have caused few problems because Western Samoa already had its own decentralised form of democracy. It was not a question of educating people about hitherto alien concepts.

The fact that change in Western Samoa is slow and progressive rather than sudden and violent, is recognised by most observers to be a good thing. An illustration of this evolutionary approach is the arrangement governing the position of Head of State. The post, which is held by His Highness Malietoa Tunamefili 11, currently appears to be a cross between a presidency and a monarchy. Under the 1962 independence constitution, two of the country's four paramount chiefs were given the position, to be held jointly, for life. With the death of Tupua Tamasese Meaole in 1963, the surviving incumbent became sole Head of State. There will be no automatic succession, however, and Parliament will decide who should have the post in future, with the term of office limited to five years. There is obviously a great deal of respect for the Head of State and his office among Western Samoans, although it should be stressed that his role is largely ceremonial, with political authority being vested in the elected government.

As for party politics, there are two groupings represented in Parliament, the ruling Human Rights Protection Party and the opposition Samoa National Development Party. The party system is not particularly strong, however, being based more on personalities than ideology. Corruption is not seen to be a major problem although a major row did blow up recently over a critical report issued by the Auditor-General for 1994. This led to him being suspended and this issue had not yet been resolved at the time The Courier went to press.

Western Samoa is not unique in having to adapt to a rapidly changing world. The phenomenon affects all societies, with modern communications technology increasingly breaking down the 'protection' that geographical isolation used to afford. In Westem Samoa, as elsewhere, there must be concern about the impact of this on the country's traditional way of life. Yet the indications are that this Pacific nation is managing the transition rather better than many other developing countries. The people seem to combine an unselfconscious pride in their traditions and cultural assets with a pragmatic welcoming of ideas from outside which help to improve their material wellbeing. The hope must be that this process can continue as we approach the third millennium. S'imon Homer

Historical summary

According to archaeological evidence, the islands of Samoa were first settled about 3000 years ago, after gradual migration within the Pacific from people originally from South East Asia. Samoa, it seems, was the cradle of the Polynesian culture, and settlers from there spread to other islands of Polynesia in the east, north and south.

The first European to sight the group in 1722 was Jacob Roggeveen, and although there was intermittent contact between European sailing vessels and the islanders during the 18th century, more permanent contact was established with the arrival of the European missionaries in the early 1980s. They were soon followed by traders looking for copra, beche de mer, sandalwood and other products. Later, some of the trading firms, notably German, fumed to large-scale production of copra and other products such as cotton, cacao and rubber, which also led a corresponding increase in interest on the part of colonial powers.

In the late 1800s, the Samoan group became the focus of colonial rivalry between Great Britain, the USA and Germany, leading, in 1900, to the partitioning of the islands between Germany and the United States. The eastern part of the group came under American control and has remained so to this day, while Germany controlled the western islands. Britain received territorial concessions elsewhere in the Pacific.

At the outbreak of World War I, New Zealand took over what had come to be known as German Samoa, and became the administrative power there under the League of Nations and later the United Nations until Western Samoa became the first Patific island nation to become an independent state in 1962.

(Source: Government of Western Samoa. this text is taken from the information brochure prepared by the authorities for distribution to delegates at the recent ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting).

Dream ticket ?

Depart Nuku'alofa-12.00, January l 2000 Arrive Apia - 14.00, December 37 1999

People with cash to burn are often ready to spend surprising amounts of money in their pursuit of the unusual. Tonga has already recognised this as it begins preparing for the third millennium Lying just to the west of the International Dateline, it believes it will the first country to see the sun rise on the new millennium, although other Pacific territories have also made the claim. (For this purpose, we ignore the purists who point out that the third millennium will not actually begin until January 1, 2001.) Celebrations are planned and bookings are already being taken.

Westem Samoa is obviously not in the running for this distinction since it is east of the dateline, but what this means is it will be the last nation in the world to say goodbye to the old millennium. This surely presents an opportunity for the local tourist industry.

And what about those intrepid voyagers who fancy greeting the year 2000 in Tonga and then 'seeing out' the old millennium 24 hours later in Samoa. If i were an airline manager, I would be examining the possibility of extra flights from Nuku'alofa on the big day. (Let's hope it's not a Sunday I)

'Economic future in tourism end manufacturing'

The Courier visited Western Samoa at the end of June while the country was hosting the ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting. At the time, veteran Prime Minister, Tofilau Eti Alesana, was recovering from an operation, and his duties were being carried out by his deputy, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, who is also the Minister of Finance. Despite a hectic schedule, the Deputy Prime Minister kindly managed to find a slot for a keynote interview with The Courier.

� There is growing evidence of a new economic dynamism in this island nation, which has managed to find its feet remarkably speedily after the destruction wrought by cyclones in 1989 and 1990. With this in mind, we began by asking the Minister about the economic prospects for the country ?

-I think they are excellent. Our country suffered a major catastrophe as a result of the cyclones, coming, as they did, in two successive years. There was major damage to our infrastructure and forestry resources- coconuts and cocoa. At the time, we estimated the bill at more than $600m. But the rehabilitation of the infrastructure went ahead quickly, thanks to the major support provided by bodies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and of course, the European Union, not to mention the bilateral donor countries who answered our call for help. So in some ways, it was a blessing in disguise. We suffered badly, but with the assistance that came, we have been able to improve our roads and electricity supply, and the protection of our foreshore. It also encouraged us to embark on replanting to replace the trees-mainly cocoa and coconut -that had been destroyed. Last year, for the first time since the cyclones, our copra exports came back in strength. We have, at last, started to approach the pre-cyclone export levels.

� What are likely to be the key sectors for future economic activity ?

-We believe that the economic future of our country now lies more in tourism and in manufacturing industries. Dealing with the latter first, we have already succeeded in attracting some industries. The major investment so-far has come from Yazaki, a Japanese company that produces wire harnessing systems (electrical components) for vehicles. This employs almost 3000 people in Western Samoa. In fact, the company set up here before the cyclones and it did not take long for us to see the benefits. The value added equivalent provided by just that one plant is roughly equivalent to our total agricultural exports for last year. So you can see the importance of manufacturing industry for us. We have provided very generous incentives and have also allocated sufficient government land to provide space for factories.

The other industry which is now in the forefront, in terms of foreign exchange earnings, is tourism. We now earn four times more from this sector than we do from agriculture-and agriculture is supposed to be the mainstay of our economy.

Of course, we mustn't reduce the priority that we give to agriculture. It is one area where we have the resources. More specifically, I think that we have great potential for beef production. If we should have another cyclone, the trees will be damaged but cattle should not be affected. So I think we should look more towards beef production and other forms of agricultural diversification. We do have some good commercial farming in place at the moment, but it is not enough. We need to do more.

� What about the chocolate industry ? You have traditionally grown cocoa but you now also have a factory to process the raw material right up to the end product.

-This is a direct result of our drive to promote more manufacturing - whether it is export-oriented or geared towards import substitution. The chocolate venture is a new one and I think there are good, prospects here as well.

An important point is that we are moving back into growing the fine flavour variety of cocoa here. We used to be one of the 14 producers of fine flavoured cocoa in the world, and we got premium prices for it. But somehow, over the years, we switched to producing inferior quality bulk cocoa. We regretted doing that and are now switching back to the higher quality variety-which is just coming back into production following the cyclones. So here we have another potential area for exports. On the other hand, taro which used to be our major export prior to 1993 is facing difficulties. It is affected by a disease, the taro blight, which seems to be uncontrollable.

� Thinking in particular of the impact of tourism, are you concerned that an influx of foreign visitors might damage Western Samoa's unique and very special culture ? I see, for example, that you now have a 'McDonalds' restaurant in the centre of Apia.

- No. I am not really concerned. In 1992, we set up our own tourism festival. This takes place in the first week of September and is quite clearly intended to be a feature event with an emphasis on promoting tourism. All the activities at the festival focus on the various aspects of our culture-the arts, the dances, the preparation of food, the singing and so on. It seems to me that our drive for tourism is actually helping to revive some of the cultural aspects that would otherwise have been dvina out. So I believe there is a complementarily between culture and tourism, so long as we ensure that the relationship between the two is maintained. I think this point is backed up, if you look at the growing popularity of ecotourism nowadays. This is very much concerned with preservation-of both the environment and of local cultures.

� In international circles, Western Samoa is deemed to be a least-developed country on account of its low GDP per head figures. Yet nobody is starving here and you appear to have a very 'rich' lifestyle, even if people don't have a great deal of cash in their pockets. Do you think the international classification is a fair one ?

- I think the first point to emphasise is that a lot of the signs of development you see here are of recent origin. They date back only to 1992-93. Infrastructures have improved considerably over a very short time and this could well create a certain impression about the people's standard of living. On the other hand, it is true that our economy is not completely based on cash. And, of course, our earnings are in Tala which go a lot further here than their dollar equivalent in the United States.

� Presumably, it is to your benefit to be classified as an LDC because it gives you access to more sources of foreign funding ?

-I am happy to leave the classification to the experts. They are the ones who come and estimate our average per capita income, which is then used as the yardstick for placing a country in one or other category. I think it is ironic though, that if you go to a country like the USA, which is supposed to be very rich, you find beggars on the street. It certainly makes you wonder. Perhaps it is not really the statistical wealth of a country that is important, but its social system. And our social system here ensures that no-one goes hungry.

� That leads on rather neatly to my next question. What do you think are the main social challenges that need to be tackled here ?

-We still have quite a lot of 'service care' needs in the villages that we need to attend to. That is why we have placed the highest priority on social services over the next five years. I am talking here in particular about health, education and water supplies. There are still a lot of villages that need to have piped water brought into the home. Education-wise, we have reasonable access, but we need to improve the teaching material that is available in the classes and upgrade the general level of village schooling. We need to dissuade families from moving to the capital in the belief that they can get better education for their children here. So we still have a lot of work to do to ensure that the primary schools in the villages are upgraded. It is not simply a question of ensuring that competent teachers are available, but also as I say, providing good teaching materials and laboratory equipment for science subjects.

� All of this obviously needs to be paid for, which entails healthy government finances. You recently had a serious problem over the debts run up by Air Polynesia, and you took very stringent measures to tackle this which resulted in expenditure cuts. What do the figures look like today ?

-They are OK. We are running a budget deficit which means we have to borrow both overseas and locally, but we try to keep the deficit at a reasonable level.

� What has been the effect of introducing the Value Added Goods and Services Sales Tax (VAGST) ?

-It has helped enormously. Of course, in order to sell the idea, we had to reduce other taxes and duties. As you know, there is an international trend towards removing customs duties and shifting revenue-raising in the direction of consumption taxes. Customs levies, which are the traditional source of revenue are diminishing. So what we have done is to lay the foundation for the eventual shift in our revenue base. Also, we promised to cut income taxes even more-from 38% to 25% within two years.

� Has this measure been implemented yet ?

-No, it is due to be introduced in 1998.

� Finally, I would like to turn to a constitutional question. Western Samoa introduced universal franchise some five or six years ago, but you still have a system in which only matai (family heads) are entitled to stand as candidates in elections. Do you envisage any further changes to the system ?

-I cannot really see that we will ever change again. The Constitution stipulates that our government is based on Samoan traditions and Christian principles. When we introduced universal suffrage, we were applying something that had always been there in any case. Samoans have always taken part in the process of choosing their leaders and voting is simply another way of doing this. The only difference is that we would arrive at a decision by getting together through our village structures and talking, whereas your system involves marking a ballot. So the change was quite in accordance with our customs.

Let me say something about the way villages choose their matai. When there is a question of succession, everyone has a right to take part in the process. There is no age limit. So in that sense, you could argue that we are more advanced. And we always had female matai, even before the arrival of the Europeans.

In this respect, I believe we are quite different from Fiji and Tonga. In Tonga, the dividing line is quite clear. If you are born a noble, you remain a noble and if you are born a commoner, you will always be a commoner. It is the same in Fiji. There, you are automatically a ratu K your father was one. By contrast, here in Samoa, my son cannot automatically succeed to my title. So to become a matai, a person has to earn it, and to put his case at the family meeting which is convened to choose a successor. Usually, the person chosen is the one who displays the best leadership qualities. I think I should also point out that becoming a matai is not that difficult. If you want to be one, you inform the family and if they think you have matured sufficiently, you will generally get the position and then become eligible to be a parliamentary candidate. It is typical that when a family sees a fellow has matured, he becomes a matai.

General information

Area: 2934 km� (Exclusive Economic Zone of 130 000 km�)

Population: 165000

Population density: 57 per kiLométres

Capital: Apia (situated on the island of Upolu)

National language: Samoan (English is the business language)

Currency: Tala (WS$) made up of 100 sene. In June 1996, 1 ECU was worth approximately WS$ 3. (US$1 = WS$ 2.3)

Politics

System of government: A unicameral constitutional democracy with strong traditional elements. The current Head of State is one of the country's four paramount chiefs, and he holds the office for life. Thereafter, the Fono (Legislative Assembly) will elect the Head of State for five-year terms.

There is universal franchise (introduced in 1991) but in order to be a Parliamentary candidate, one has to be a matai (family head). Western Samoa is said to have about 19000 matai. The minimum voting age is 21.

Head of State: HH Malietoa Tanumafili II

Prime Minister: Tofilau Eti Alesana

Main political parties: Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), Samoa National Development Party (SNDP)

Party representation in Parliament: HRPP 35, SNDP 11, Independent 3. (The HRPP total includes 11 members elected as independents in the April 1996 election who subsequently joined the governing party).

Economy (1995 figures unless otherwise stated)

Annual GDP per capita: approx US$ 950

GDP growth rate: 7%. The target for 1996 is 34%

Principal exports: coconut oil (WS $8m), coconut cream (WS $4.8m), copra (WS $2.2m).

Balance of payments: exports - WS $21.7m, imports - WS $228.1m. 'Invisible' earnings, officially described as 'net foreign earnings' amounted to WS $171m, leaving a current amount deficit of WS $36.8m in 1995 (20%lower than the previous year). The main 'invisibles' are private transfers (remittances from Western Samoans living abroad), tourism, income from services and the value added trade of the Yazaki electrical components firm.

Inflation rate (end 1995): 1 %. Inflation tends to fluctuate a great deal. The figure for 1994 was 18.4%.

Government budget (projected for 1996/97): revenue WS $288.4m, expenditure WS $312.7m, deficit WS $24.3m.

Accumulated government debt: WS$ 389 m

Social indicators

Life expectancy at birth (1993): 67.8 years

Adult literacy (1993): 98% (A UNESCO report in 1994 suggested that real literacy levels were significantly below those indicated in official figures)

Enrolment in education: all levels from age 6-23: 74%

Human Development Index rating: 0.700 (88th out of 174)

Folasaito Joe Annandale and his wife Tui are the brains behind Western Samoa's latest tourist facility- the Sinalei Reef Resort, which has just opened on the beautiful south coast of Upolu island. They are among a growing number of Samoan entrepreneurs who are injecting new dynamism into the country's economy although they are somewhat unusual in the tourist trade. With the notable exception of the famous 'Aggie Grey's Hotel' in Apia, tourist accommodation in Western Samoa has tended to be the preserve of foreign investors, including some of the major international hotel chains.

At first sight, it is surprising to discover how underdeveloped the tourism sector is in Western Samoa. Tour operators may be inclined to use the phrase 'tropical paradise' a little too freely but this island nation certainly seems to meet most of the essential criteria. It has the obligatory golden beaches fringed with palm trees, extensive coral reefs and striking mountain scenery overlaid with lush vegetation. The vivid colours leave a particularly strong impression. Greens predominate but there are also many copper-leafed trees and bushes, and an abundance of red, orange and yellow flowers. Western Samoa can also offer a number of special features which are important in marketing terms. There is, of course, the legendary hospitality of the Samoans and their distinctive and vibrant traditions. This must be one of the most musically 'literate' populations in the world, a talent which is reflected in the numerous choirs/dance groups. The harmonies are impressive and the traditional dances are both expressive and entertaining. There is also the unique 'fare' architecture which is a particular source of fascination to outsiders, not to mention the Robert Louis Stevenson connection. The famous author spent the last four years of his life in Western Samoa and the house where he lived- which used to be the Head of State's residence - has recently been converted into a museum.

Good prospects

The potential for expanding tourism is something that has not escaped the government. In today's highly competitive free-market world, countries are being urged to exploit their 'comparative advantage' and the Western Samoan authorities recognise that this sector offers some of the best prospects for future growth.

Like most other economic activities, the tourist trade was badly hit as a result of cyclone devastation in 1989 and 1990. However, visitor numbers have increased substantially since then. Indeed, looking at year on year earnings, the tourist sector is performing better than any other area of the economy. In 1994, income was WS$.58 million (50 000 + visitors). The following year, it reached WS$.78m and there are hopes that it could top WS$.100m in 1996. Of course, no-one in Samoa is talking about 'mass' tourism. The country is too far from the main industrialised nations to be able to offer traditional package holidays (perhaps fortunately !), and too small to absorb the cultural and environmental impact without lasting damage. Having said this, the market can be divided into two very distinct portions. At one end of the scale are the low spending 'back-packers'-often taking advantage of relatively cheap 'round the world' airline tickets to stop off and sample the pleasures of Western Samoa. These tourists may not spend very much on a daily basis but they are reasonably significant from a financial standpoint because they tend to stay for quite lengthy periods.

At the other end, you find the high-spending, 'exclusive' customer willing to pay for high quality accommodation and catering. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Government is more interested in attracting the latter, which is why they are keen to encourage investors such as the Annandales.

The Courier spoke to Joe Annandale about his business strategy when we recently visited the country. The Sinalei Reef Resort, which has received EIB loan financing channelled through the Development Bank of Western Samoa, has just 20 rooms (including four suites) giving it a capacity of less than 50. Customers will be offered a tropical idyll and a chance to escape completely from the pressures of modern living. The long term aim, according to Mr Annandale, is to entice Europeans in general and Germans in particular. The latter, it is said, have a preference for environmentally-friendly, 'escapist' vacations and, of course, there is a historical link between Germany and Western Samoa. Until a European clientele can be built up, the focus will be on attracting guests from Australia and New Zealand.

Culture clash?

Although there is no question of Western Samoa being swamped by visitors from overseas, even a modest increase in tourist numbers is bound to have an impact in this country of just 165000 inhabitants. On the negative side, the Samoan system of customary (village) land ownership sometimes appears at odds with entrepreneurship founded on individual ownership of property and resources. In the early stages, Joe and Tui Annandale encountered local difficulties-including squatters-when they bought the land to develop the resort. The usual arrangement is for overseas tourism operators to lease customary land, a process which may involve protracted and ultimately fruitless negotiations with the matai (village heads) who have traditionally used the land for other purposes. Of course, the clash between traditional land tenure systems and 'modern' capitalism is not restricted to tourist ventures-as mining operators in Papua New Guinea have discovered. But while one understands the frustrations for developers, who may find themselves embroiled in complex and interminable land disputes, we should also recognise the concerns of local people who see a possible threat to their way of life.

On the positive side, new tourism developments mean jobs and trading opportunities. In the building of the Sinalei Resort, the Annandales drew heavily on local labour, employing 35 people from the neighbourhood. As Mr Annandale pointed out, this was essential for a complex designed to fit in with the local environment. The Samoans have always built their own houses and only they had the required carpentry skills. The resort also employs 35 regular staff for catering, housekeeping etc. and again, the majority are local people.

Finally, there is one criticism often levelled against tourist ventures which certainly does not apply at the Sinalei Reef (or other Samoan hotels). This is that most of the food and drink consumed by visitors is imported. The Annandales make a point of purchasing their fish, meat and fruit locally, thereby ensuring that some of the financial benefits of their venture flow back to their own community: in short, a happy combination of astute public relations and good economics.

S.H.

'Revive the agricultural base'

Tupua Tamasese Efi a former Prime Minister of Western Samoa, is leader of the opposition Samoa National Development Party which won 11 of the 49 seats in the parliamentary elections held in April 1996. In this interview, he outlines his own and his party's views on some of the key political and economic issues in his country.

� In what ways does your party offer a different agenda from that of the governing HRPP ?

-I think the differences are mainly of emphasis. The present government tends to focus on law-making and exploiting the country's least developed status. Our focus would be more on developing our indigenous agricultural industries. If you scrutinise the economic picture in Samoa, you will find that there has been a very substantial decline in agricultural exports in the last fifteen years. Our economy, if you can call it that, is increasingly sustained by largesse-the donations that we get from overseas. This has complicated our situation. Our relative economic independence has been sabotaged to a point where, suddenly, we are getting a proletariat. That might be unavoidable in a lot of places, but it doesn't have to happen in a small country like ours which has self-sustaining village units, and a potentially secure agricultural base supported by products like cocoa, copra and bananas. If you look at what is happening today, you see that, all of a sudden, we have a new class of under-privileged people with absolutely no income at all. And the tragedy is that it has happened without anyone really noticing.

So our emphasis is to try and revive our agricultural base, and to seek out exports. In the past, our economy was sustained by cocoa and copra exports, and a lot of our food was sold to New Zealand. Now, you find that there are hardly any exports.

� So your focus would be more on boosting the traditional aspects of the Samoan economy.

-Not necessarily traditional. Our party is not bound to cocoa, or copra or whatever. But we are committed to improving our agriculture. It matters little whether it is traditional or other crops. But we need to break back into the New Zealand market. This is the best place to aim for. Australia has its own tropical sector and nothing that we can produce is needed by them. New Zealand is different. One of the biggest challenges we have to overcome in getting back into that market is our fruit fly problem. It would seem sensible for us to channel substantial resources into overcoming this hurdle so that we can sell to New Zealand again. There is a tremendous potential market-and not just for copra. There are also products such as flowers, and a whole number of other possibilities.

� Given what you have just said,what emphasis would you place on sectors like manufacturing and tourism ?

-I think that tourism is an obvious way to go and this is where we are in agreement with the government. Of course, you will have heard of the debacle of the Air Polynesia finances. When you compare the losses that were run up with our foreign exchange reserves you get some idea of how enormous the problem was. It was a situation that went badly awry.

This issue aside, we agree that we need to get into tourism-but it must be within reason. Part of the explanation for people gravitating towards tourism is that they see it as the only available avenue-or at least the most visible way of making money.

Another economic point I want to raise concerns debt. Loans can be a quick fix, but when your whole economy is tied to indebtedness, you are creating something that is built on sand. You end 'A potentially secure agricultural base' up acquiring more and more capital items that are totally unrelated to your present or likely future resources. This is one of the most destructive things that can happen to a society, and it is very clearly happening here.

� You have a rich and vibrant living culture here in Western Samoa. Are you concerned that globalisation could ultimately pose a threat to this ?

-No, I am not worried. You have to accept it as a natural development. The things that are distinctive in our culture have to find their place in adapting to the new realities. There is no point putting your head in the sand.

� Turning to political aspects, you now have universal franchise, but you still have to be a matai to be eligible to stand for Parliament Does your party have any plans to change this ?

-Some years ago, we had a constitutional convention which led to changes in the system. Attached to that was a provision requiring a further constitutional convention to be convened in 20 or 25 years (I can't remember the exact period). So we are committed to that. We have to sit down and look at the overall picture. We have gone a long way in terms of universal franchise and it is possible that we need to go even further.

But if one takes the United Kingdom as a model, I think the important lesson is that you should 'make haste slowly'. The genius of the Westminster model is that it involves careful evolution. I hope that this tradition will be followed by our country. The constitution, as it was put together some 30 or 40 years ago, has served its purpose very well but there are quite a few anomalies appearing now.

� What is your view about regional cooperation in the South Pacific What future do you see in working together with the other countries of the region- perhaps presenting a more united front to the outside world ?

-There is a lot of sense in the SAS approach-I am referring here to the Scandinavian countries getting together to form an airline. It is sensible to take a common stand where we have a common interest. But there are obviously intricacies resulting from historical, economic and social factors. At the moment I am reading a book on lain Macleod, the British Conservative statesman. His experience in the failed attempt to form a federation in the Caribbean is very revealing.

When you enter a common endeavour, there is always the pull of your own particular interests. And there can be a suspicion that the 'bigger boys' will use the others to promote their own interests. A lot of this may be perception rather than reality. Also, traditional rivalries can intrude. Sometimes you need to fall flat on your face before you Let me give you an example from the world of rugby. It took Rupert Murdoch to get Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa to realise that our fates are intertwined. He has come in with a commercial package that has taken over the entire rugby scene in the region- with a heavy emphasis on Australia and New Zealand-and this has hit us in a big way. For example, we find ourselves being cut out of traditional rugby tours. There is no point in us trying to claim that we are self-sufficient in this area. The big lesson is that we need to cooperate a lot more with the Tongans and Fijians in order to make an impact on the wider rugby scene._

Focus on utilities

by Mylanwy van de Velde

Western Samoa's cooperation with the European Community began in 1975 with its accession to the Lomé Convention. From the start, the sector to benefit most from programmable funds (ECU 4.6 m under Lomé I and ECU 6m under Lomé II) was the energy sector, with the financing of the Samasoni Hydroelectric Scheme in the late 1970s and the Sauniatu Hydropower Scheme in the early 1980s.

In parallel, a programme of 260 microprojects was funded involving the development of poultry and pig farming, and fisheries, covering 96 villages on the main islands of Upolu and Savai'i. A further ECU 890 000 was allocated to the Western Samoa Development Bank, in the form of a credit line, to increase the Bank's lending capacity. In addition, at a time when copra exports were still considerable, the Community financed storage and handling facilities for coconut oil and copra pellets (ECU 900 000).

On top of programmable aid, Western Samoa received 12 Stabex transfers totalling ECU 9.3m for export losses on copra, wood, bananas and cocoa in the period 1975-84.

Under Lomé III, the development of the country's substantial hydroelectric power potential continued, and Western Samoa began to make considerable steps towards self-sufficiency in energy needs. While in 1980 some 78% of the electricity generated came from diesel plants, by 1986 this percentage had dropped to 26%. The volume of petroleum imports for electricity generation dropped to 36% in the period 1982-86. With the building of the Afulilo Hydropower Plant (Lomé III and IV), these volumes have decreased further, with positive benefits in terms of foreign exchange savings. The scheme (which was co-funded by the Asian Development Bank, the EIB, the World Bank and the Western Samoa Electric Power Corporation) involved the construction of a 10 million cubic metre reservoir, a penstock, a powerhouse, and the installation of mechanical equipment and transmission lines, and has contributed substantially to the quality of electricity supply on the island of Upolu.

Additional work has been done with Lomé IV funds to address the question of rural water supply: a water master plan and design study for a number of rural areas have been completed, and a public awareness programme on the rational use of water resources has been designed for implemention at such time as planned infrastructural work goes ahead.

Finally, an ECU 1 m microprojects programme has been initiated with the aim of financing the renovation of infrastructure for rural communities in the fields of water supply, health, education, tourism, agriculture and fisheries.

Stabex payments under Lomé 111 (1985-1989) and Lomé IV (1990-1994) amounted to ECU 11.1 m and ECU 5.7m respectively. These were paid to compensate for losses in coconut oil and copra products, especially, but also for losses on exports of cocoa beans and of wood in the rough.

In addition to the above grant aid, the EIB has provided a total of some ECU 9m in risk capital in the years since 1981, the bulk of which was used in connection with the Sauniatu and Afulilo Hydropower Schemes.

A further total of ECU 660 896 has been allocated in emergency aid to Western Samoa, in 1983 after a serious fire on Savai'i, and in 1990 and 1991 after the disastrous cyclones Ofa and Val.

Programming of the next tranche of EC funding under the eighth EDF has still to be completed, but the indications are that prominence will be given to extending and upgrading the water supply network.

M.v.d.V.

A new health-centre for Tafua

The sight that greeted the people of Tafua when they emerged from shelter in 1990, following the passage of Ccyclone Ofa,was one of complete devastation. The tropical storm had been one of the worst in living memory and this village community on the island of Savai'i, together with many others in the Samoas, found themselves having to start almost from scratch. Homes had been swept away' crops destroyed and much of the essential infrastructure Iay in ruins.

It is a testament to the resilience and determination of the people in these communities that there are few signs today of the havoc wrought by the winds just six years ago. In some places, rows of dead trees still stand in silent witness to the power of Mother Nature, although the scene is softened : by the new crops and lush vegetation growing beneath. But the villagers have rebuilt their houses and, with some help from outside, they have been able to re-establish i the essential community facilities as well.

Through its micro-projects programme, the EC was able to offer a helping hand in the task of reconstruction. For the modest sum of just ECU 10 000, Tafua now has a new community health clinic adjacent to the site of the old one which was swept away by Ofa. In keeping with the rules of the scheme, the villagers were obliged to contribute 25% of the cost-which they provided in kind, in the shape of the labour for rebuilding the clinic. The Courier visited Tafua in June and was shownaround the facility by Nurse Agata Leuelu who provides primary health care for the 600 villagers. We also met local Methodist minister, the Rev. Siaosi Selesele, who explained how the people had taken shelter in the neighbouring school when the storm reached Samoa. It turned out to be the right choice as it was one of very few structures left standing in the neighbourhood. Villagers are obviously hoping that there won't be another 'Ofa' for a very long time' but if and when the next big wind does strike, the new ctinic-which has been built to withstand a lot more strain-should hopefully be able to weather the storm. In the meantime, it provides an important service in the delivery of health care to the people of the area. The European Community has also provided micro-project funding to help rebuild the health clinic at Taga on Savai'i.

S.H.

(Dossier coordinated by Augustine Oyowe)

Previous editions of The Courier have dealt, separately and at length, with various aspects of human resource development, especially in the context of recent dossiers on population and social development, education and training, public health, women, and poverty. Our current dossier looks at the issue from the investment perspective.

To say that investing in people makes economic sense is to state the obvious. But to what extent are the implications of this statement fully understood in the developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa in these days of constantly shifting development theories?

Labour or 'human capital' has long been recognised as a key factor of economic growth. As opposed to sustainable human development, which places human beings at the centre of economic activities (the recipient of the fruits of economic progess), 'human capital' places them at the beginning of the process. The difference of approach is thus evident even though the objective is the same.

Investing in people is a concept which simultaneously combines 'human welfare' with the 'human capital' approach at the beginning of the economic development process. It encompasses nutrition, health and education, and should, under the right investment climate or conditions, enable any investor, whether State or individual, to reap an adequate return .

After three decades of considerable efforts at investment in health and education by sub-Saharan African countries, the returns in terms of standards of living, economic grovvth and rate of development have been extremely disappointing. The conclusion which can be drawn is that the conditions necessary for adequate returns on these investments have been absent.

Colonial legacy

Sub-Saharan Africa inherited from the colonial regimes, infrastructures in health delivery and education that were not only alien to its culture and traditions, but also totally inadequate for nation building. It is a well known fact that in 1960, there were no more than 1200 university graduates in Capital redefined

It is important when thinking of investnent in human resources to understand the real concept of capital. Below is an extract of a definition given by Stefan de Vylder (taken from his UNDP discussion paper: 'Sustainable Human Development and Macroeconomics strategic links and implications' .

A child in the North is born wealthy. His or her share of the capital accumulated by earlier generations is worth a fortune. The higher wages and salaries in the North, compared with those in the South, largely reflect differences in endowment of the country, rather than of the individual. The fact that, for example, a nurse in Germany earns 30 times more than one in Bangladesh or Zambia has little to do with individual differences in training or skills; the higher salaries in the North simply reflect the higher dividend on the capital bestowed from the past. Part of this wealth or heritage is easily visible: factories, roads, schools hospitals, universities, telecommunications, and other infrastructure.

However, there are other, less tangible, forms of capital that constitute a crucial complement to physical and infrastructural capital; parliamentary democracy, a free press, respect for human rights' norms for social interaction, systems of rapid dissemination of new ideas, trade unions and a myriad of other large or small social organisations, a judiciary system which, by and large, defends law and justice, and other institutions. This latter form of capital may be called institutional or social capital. It is also highly unevenly distributed in the world, with large differences both between the North and the South and within individual countries of the North as well as in the South the region as a whole. Indeed, some countries had no graduates at all and in others, they could be counted on the fingers of one hand. In what was effectively a race against time, African leaders understandably responded by investing massively in human resource development. This was made possible partly by small, but steady rates of economic growth and partly by sustained foreign assistance. Between 1960 and 1980, sub-Saharan African governments consistently allocated high proportions of their annual budgets to health and education. Households and individuals made similar efforts (accounting for nearly 75% of all spending on health). They made sacrifices and gave a high premium to the education of their children.

The results were tangible and very significant. By the late 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa was producing over 70 000 graduates a year. Major cities had hospitals and health centres and the rural areas, clinics and dispensaries. Amid a general improvement in nutrition and health-care delivery, the incidence of infectious disease, and maternal and infant mortality were considerably reduced.

Despite these achievements, the approach to manpower building by the post-independent African leaders was, to say the least, haphazard. As a result, a number of problems, such as the appropriateness of school curricula, under staffing and the long-term budget implications of recurrent expenditures, were overlooked (although reform efforts have since been attempted in some countries with varying degrees of success).

The consequences were felt in the 1980s when Africa's economic crisis was only just beginning. Health and school infrastructures deteriorated for lack of maintenance. There were shortages of qualified teachers and teaching materials leading to falls in educational standards as well as in primary school enrolments. And health systems failed for lack of personnel and drugs.

The situation has worsened as the continent's economic crisis has deepened-a crisis characterised by huge budget deficits, high inflation rates, sluggish growth rates and a heavy debt burden. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), introduced in response to this, have only served to undermine further the gains made in human resource development. SAPs have been aimed mainly at macroeconomic stabilisation, deregulation and privatisation of state enterprises, and the social sectors have lost out in the process. Subsidies on basic commodities, especially food, have been removed, civil servants and employees of state enterprises have been made redundant and cost-recovery has become the standard practice in medical services. These measures have all combined to produce a level of poverty never before seen in the region, a situation which has adversely affected nutritional standards, provoked malnutrition in many countries and reduced resistance generally to infectious diseases. Because of the rise in unemployment, large sections of the educated population have been rendered unproductive, a waste of several years investment by both the state and the individuals in question.

Appropriateness of skills

Although sub-Saharan Africa produced a large number of graduates before the economic crisis began, few had the kinds of skills needed for industry and agriculture. The evidence of this lies in the unsuccessful attempts by some governments in the late 1970s to indigenise executive positions, most of which required high levels of technological knowledge or experience. The 1980s saw a dramatic increase in the number of foreign technical assistants working on the continent and, paradoxically, in the number of qualified African professionals leaving, mainly for Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

International technical assistance to, or cooperation with, subSaharan Africa has intensified. Organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNESCO, European Union and Commonwealth are all involved in one form or another. The effectiveness of this assistance varies, however. This dossier features articles on the work of three of these bodies (the Commonwealth, UNDP and VNESCO). The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation was set up more than 25 years ago to mobilise Commonwealth skills to meet the needs of member states as required. The UNDP's TOKTEN programme is designed to reduce the negative impact of the brain drain by getting highly qualified developing country expatriates to contribute their skills to the development of their home countries without necessarily having to return permanently. Finally, UNESCO's university twinning programme is designed as a mechanism for the rapid transfer of technology and sharing of knowledge.

While international assistance or cooperation is indispensable, it is surely no substitute for Africa's own efforts at human resource development. Three years ago, Edward Jaycox, then World Bank Vice-President for the Africa Region, announced what appeared to be a change of policy at the annual conference of the African-American Institute in Washington DC. He said that the Bank would no longer pay for foreign technical assistants to help resolve African economic problems but would instead help African governments build their own capacity. Although the Bank has traditionally had enormous influence on development thinking and policy worldwide, the apparent policy change does not appear to have influenced other donors. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that the Bank itself is implementing it vigorously. The number of foreign experts being sent to Africa continues to grow. There were over 100 000 in 1988.

Rationality of investing in people

In addition to the negative social impact, ten years of structural adjustment have not produced the sought-after stabilisation or the economic growth that was initally anticipated. Even the World Bank and IMF, who spearheaded the structural adjustment idea, have admitted that it has flaws and the need for a new approach to sub-Saharan Africa's economic problems could hardly be more urgent. In the Dossier, Giovanni Andreas Cornia argues for a new focus for structural adjustment, based on restoring adequate levels of public spending on health, education, social welfare and water supplies, so as to enable sub-Saharan Africa to restore and develop its human resources.

Evidence of the impact of a healthy and educated population on economic growth and development abound. Studies on the economies of the East Asian 'tigers' have all concluded that big investments in education in the late 1950s and 1960s were largely responsible for the rapid growth they have experienced in recent years. Malaysia, although a latecomer, appears to be following in the footsteps of its neighbours. After nearly two decades of investment in human resource development, and the introduction of a foreign investment policy which requires some technology transfer, the Government now predicts Malaysia will achieve 'fully developed' status by 2016-twenty years from now.

A relatively well-educated workforce and a certain amount of physical capital or natural resources are all a country needs to succeed economically. Sub-Saharan Africa has sufficient natural resources as is often pointed out. The other side of the equation-a relatively well-educated workforce-is missing.

Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other regions in human resource development for a complex variety of reasons. The natural and political environment are not conducive to the delivery of social services: low population density and weak transport infrastructures make such delivery expensive and the achievement of economies of scale impossible. The region's climate favours a variety of diseases (such as malaria and sleeping sickness) and many areas have little or no access to natural water sources. Political instability and weak institutions also continue to cast a long shadow. Although these constraints are long-term, appropriate policy measures could reduce their negative impact significantly.

Giovanni Cornia analyses the distributive effects of appropriate health care, nutrition and education on economic growth. He suggests ways of making rational use of available resources for maximum returns and of mobilising funds through taxation, foreign aid and other sources.

In an age of increasing globalisation, where technology is more easily transferable across borders, a healthy and educated population is essential, not only for the absorption and use of new technology but also for meaningful participation in international trade.

It is insufficient, however, to have an educated workforce. Sub Saharan Africa must acquire the institutional and managerial capacity to make the right decisions, both in the public and private sectors. This is essential in the quest to eliminate poverty, achieve sustained and sustainable economic growth and ensure a realistic integration of the region into the global economy.

by Giovanni Andrea Cornia

Over the past two decades, a clear consensus, supported by a growing amount of empirical evidence, has emerged on the growth and distributive effects of appropriate health care, nutrition and education, and on the rationality of investing in human resources to promote development in low-income economies, and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. It is now clear that public and private rates of return on investment in primary and secondary education are substantially greater than those in most industrial sectors. Similarly, it is now well demonstrated that nutritional interventions in favour of workers at low levels of food intake has a very large impact on labour productivity. Also, provision of simple but adequate nutrition and health care at an early age has been shown to spare substantially greater health outlays over the longer term. While the number of these examples can be multiplied, the lesson is overwhelmingly clear: investing in people is a sound development policy.

During the same two decades, a broad political consensus has also emerged on the need to establish realistic targets in these areas and mobilise adequate resources to achieve them. The latter decade, however, has also been characterised by a widespread and acute recession which has reached its lowest point in the African continent.

While there has been a general recognition of the link between the deterioration of the social sector and Africa's economic decline, the interpretations of the causes of this decline and how best to address them vary considerably.

The 1980s also witnessed the advent of structural adjustment, an approach aiming at revitalising economies affected by severe crises and which calls, amongst other things, for a reduction in public spending, including on social services. With sharp falls in revenues, it was argued, African governments could no longer afford to provide health and education free of charge.

Governments were to encourage instead the role of the private sector (since competition between state, private and non-governmental agencies fosters efficiency and enhances quality) and make households bear a greater share of the cost of publicly provided social services (as-it was alleged-households had a strong 'willingness to pay' for better quality health care and education).

In a debate characterised by an overwhelming concern for expenditure reduction, little thought was given to protecting the provision and effectiveness of basic health care and education for all. Nor was sufficient attention paid to the mobilisation of additional revenue through taxation, foreign aid or other measures Even the introduction of rationalisation measures, which would have allowed for use and preservation of limited resources, received scant attention. During this period, public policies often ignored a number of well-known public finance arguments concerning market failures, externalities, natural monopolies, etc. typical of basic health and education. It was all too often forgotten, for instance, that the market systematically undersupplies 'quasi-public goods' like education, safe water, immunisation and collective infrastructure (i.e. goods which produce benefits not only for consumers but also for society as a whole); that incomplete or non-existent markets alone are unable to provide complete insurance coverage against the risks of sickness and disability; that the free play of market forces can generate levels of poverty that are socially unacceptable, and that competition among many small providers does not allow for the realisation of the economies of scale which only the public sector can realise because of its size, administrative infrastructure and revenue raising ability.

Greater and better government involvement

In this paper, I will attempt to point out the main distortions in the social sector in sub-Saharan Africa and the major reforms, part of an alternative policy paradigm to the standard approach focusing on large expenditure reductions. My main line of argument is for more efficient and renewed but, in most cases, greater rather than less government involvement. I do not deny the important role of communities, nongovernmental bodies and private providers of social services, but the retreat of the state, which has been underway for several years in most of Africa, is palpably wrong: it may be a good survival strategy, it is definitely not a good development strategy.

Any approach to revitalisation of the social sector in Africa must aim at increasing both the quality and the relevance of services to the life, health and productivity of the population; enhancing efficiency; reducing distributive biases in the use of public expenditure, and improving the flow of both public and private resources to the social sector. These sets of measures are briefly discussed here.

Raising relevance, reducing unit costs and enhancing quality

Two basic initiatives are essential to the achievement of this goal. Firstly, it is necessary to adapt the content of services to the demands placed on the child, the adolescent and the family by the external environment. Secondly, in doing so, it is necessary to provide minimum resources, particularly recurrent inputs, for every unit of service offered.

Much can be done to improve the relevance of education in Africa. A key element in this is the wider use of African languages in the educational system. Admittedly such a step would probably encounter obstacles, but the results of pilot projects in the continent and experiences in several English speaking countries have been encouraging. The use of African languages should be expanded throughout primary and at least part of secondary schooling. And the curriculum of basic education should include basic health science, agriculture, food and nutrition, basic technological science, ecology and environmental studies as well as reading, writing, arithmetic, history, geography and elementary civics.

While responding more appropriately to the life and developmental needs of children and adolescents, these measures offer the potential to improve substantially the cost effectiveness of the educational system by reducing the number of drop-outs and repeaters, particularly if the measures are accompanied by school-based nutritional support programmes and by steps to ensure a steady, if basic, supply of teaching materials such as books, chalk, slates, pens, exercise books and so on. Minimum expenditures for the latter, estimated at $5-10 per child per year, have been shown to have a profound impact on the quality and attractiveness of education.

Improving the relevance and quality of African secondary and higher education will require an increase in the number of courses in science, engineering, agronomy, management and other fields. Given the limited success of vocational training and yet the profound need for this type of education, a more flexible approach may be appropriate. Business associations and ministries of labour, rather than ministries of education, for example, could organise the type of vocational training that responds more closely to labour market conditions. Much needs to be done to gear university research to local and national needs. Rather than maintaining the model of independent residential universities, faculties could interact more with and rely upon local institutions and non-governmental organisations.

In the health sector, a more vigorous approach is necessary to implement the 'Health for All' strategy. In particular, more attention must be paid to the quality of the training imparted to village health workers, the provision of minimum supplies of essential drugs, adequate supervision, the mobilisation of communities and the strengthening of family planning services in the first tier of the primary health care pyramid.

Greater efforts are needed to contain unit costs through the mobilisation of community resources (such as materials and time) and the introduction of 'product standards' and 'production techniques' more in line with local factor endowments. With respect to capital expenditure, one major source of potential savings is the substitution of imported materials with local ones in the construction of schools, clinics and other public health facilities. Through this approach, capital costs per student could be more than halved.

In health care, savings are also possible, in some cases, in wages and other recurrent expenditures. The potential for savings through increased efficiency in the procurement, management, storage, distribution and prescription of pharmaceuticals is substantial.

And there is a need for more carefully articulated manpower policies, with recognition of the cost implications of alternative skill mixes. Many tasks carried out by senior professionals can be performed by auxiliary personnel. In this regard, there is substantial scope for the application of nominal fees as a tool to guide demand for health care and thus increase efficiency.

Similar considerations are valid in the education sector. Despite considerable declines during the 1980s in both French-speaking and Eastern and Southern Africa, teacher salaries in the late 1980s were still considerably higher than per capita GNP in several countries. While a cutback may be possible in some countries, reductions below the 'efficiency wage' should be avoided as they affect the quality of teaching.

There are, of course, other approaches to reducing unit costs such as using teachers trained on crash courses and- paid salaries lower than that of fully trained ones, multi shift education to increase teaching hours, multigrade classes to increase class sizes and the creation of regional training centres with donor support. In addition, in most of sub-Saharan Africa, all university students receive fellowships to cover living expenses while at school. In many cases these fellowships represent a substantial proportion of total unit costs at the tertiary level. They add, in effect, to the regressive nature of educational subsidies and should be suppressed for all except for those who are least able to pay.

Improving distribution

Substantial improvements in the distribution of benefits of public expenditure could be obtained through its restructuring towards basic services which benefit the poor more than they do the rich. This would mean, typically, the reallocation of part of the expenditure on hospitals to primary health care activities and part of the expenditure on universities to primary education. It would also mean that a greater share of investments in water supply and sanitation should be assigned to rural areas.

Correcting existing misallocation, however, is not simple, as capital and labour resources are only partially mobile. This is particularly true of capital expenditure which has already been invested in physical infrastructure. Inter sect oral reallocation is easier for recurrent expenditure, particularly when budgets are expanding, and it can lead to the achievement of more efficient and distributive gains.

Government subsidies need to be improved through effective targeting on 'merit goods' (such as food and shelter). Targeting is distributionally and administratively more effective when it is accomplished according to some objective criteria such as geography (the poorest areas), type of commodity ( low quality foods not consumed by the rich), easily identifiable population group (like pregnant women, young children, children in elementary school in poor areas, etc.) or season. It is less effective when carried out by means-testing or by targeting individuals.

The decentralisation of health care and education in the African context is likely to improve the geographical distribution of services. Poor communications and transport systems, population dispersion and the fact that the supervision of personnel, resource distribution and operations is easier at lower levels of administration, are all arguments in favour of such decentralisation. Nonetheless, where it means loss of control over the implementation of national policies (in curriculum development, manpower training, drug procurement and so forth) and excessive additional financial burdens on households and communities, decentralisation is potentially damaging. This was the experience of Kenya when the purchase of drugs was decentralised at the district level. It subsequently had to reverse this policy because of the problems.

Increasing the flow of resources to basic social services.

Despite the considerable scope for protecting and, in some cases, expanding the delivery of cost-effective and high-impact social services, even during periods of declining resources, there are limits to what can be achieved through the measures discussed above, particularly in countries where the share in GDP of public health and education expenditure is already low. Indeed in most African countries, the flow of resources to these sectors must be vastly increased. The options available include:

-Increasing the share of government expenditure on key social services.

Top priority should be given to a radical restructuring of government expenditure involving the shifting of resources towards those sectors with high social rates of return. Expenditure on defence can be cut substantially, while subsidies to chronically lossmaking public and private enterprises and interest payments on debt (the relief effect on foreign-debt interest payments of current provisions is utterly inadequate) should be reduced. If realistic expenditure restructuring like that proposed here were implemented, 1015% of overall public spending in many countries could be redirected to social activities with high rates of return. One half to two-thirds of these savings could be allocated to health care, nutrition, training, education and welfare, thus raising the share of these activities to about 30-35% of total expenditure.

-Increasing taxation.

Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the average tax to GDP ratio for sub-Saharan Africa fell from 18% to 16-17%. (Only recently are there signs of recovery, but these are confined to only a few countries). This resulted mainly from the recession affecting the region and from the limited priority attached to revenue collection in most adjustment programmes implemented during the first part of the 1980s. In these 'first generation' programmes, the stabilisation of deficits was achieved mainly by cutting expenditure and raising excise duties. Increases in income taxes and progressive indirect taxes were far less frequent and land and property taxes were almost never introduced.

While taking effect rapidly, the measures implemented led to excessive drops in public expenditure on 'quasi public goods' and have had a regressive distributive impact. It is now widely recognised that a more active tax policy is needed. Such a policy should aim at improving revenue generation and enhancing the efficiency and equity of the overall tax system. This would permit a controlled rise in specific 'socially efficient' public expenditures, particularly basic health, primary and secondary education and public infrastructure.

In the 1980s, a number of countries, including Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe, initiated efforts to reform their tax systems. While the choice of optimal tax instruments has depended on specific country conditions, a few general principles of tax reform apply to all countries. First, colonial type tax systems emphasising the taxation of exports (and to some extent, of imports) should evolve towards systems which focus on income taxes, progressive and efficient indirect taxes and increases in the prices of such public utilities as telephone and electricity which benefit mainly the wealthier sections of society. Second, purchases of goods and services consumed by the poorest should be exempted from indirect taxes. Third, efforts should not concentrate on raising marginal tax rates but rather on broadening the tax base by reducing tax evasion and tax elusion, and fourth a low, uniform and broad-based tax on wealth (such as on land or other assets) should be introduced.

A non-distortionary and equitably-spread increase in the tax ratio equivalent to 2-3% of GPD is technically feasible in a good number of African countries and would by itself add to the real flow of resources to health care and education by about 15%, even assuming no growth and no shift in priorities towards the social sector.

-Introducing 'earmarked' taxes or raising local ones.

The flow of tax resources to the social sector could be augmented more readily if the new tax revenue thus generated, or at least part of it, were directly earmarked for specific health and education activities (for which there are guarantees that tax money is spent efficiently), or if these taxes were raised directly by district and provincial authorities, who are usually entrusted with responsibility for social services at the local level.

-Mobilising additional resources from households and communities.

In sub-Saharan Africa, as in most other developing regions, households have long borne a substantial share of the national expenditure on health, education, water supply and so on by contributing resources (in kind, cash and time) for the construction of health and education facilities, covering direct and indirect costs (transport uniforms, fees, drugs etc.) associated with the provision of public services and making payments to private providers. Despite these already considerable contributions, user charges have been introduced or raised on a large scale in recent years in many countries to alleviate the burden on public expenditure imposed by the economic crisis.

However, while the small but significant contribution of user charges to health and education budgets should be acknowledged, the negative effects of the indiscriminate application of these charges should also be emphasised. Indeed, in many African countries the need for health care, education and other social services rarely coincides with the ability to pay. The implementation of user charges can have adverse effects in three ways. First, it may lead to a contraction in the demand for services. Second, in the health sector, it tends to discourage the use of preventive services for which potential patients may not see an immediate relevance (such as ante natal care and immunisation). Third, it may adversely affect a household's ability to meet other basic needs, such as the purchase of food, particularly if fees are charged simultaneously for health, education and other services and if the household's income declines. In addition to these problems, there is little evidence that the revenue from user charges is actually reinvested to improve the quality or expand the coverage of local services, as those who promote user charges argue. Despite recent attempts at keeping a share of the user fees at the local level (e.g. at the collecting facilities), in most cases revenue merely flows to the public treasury. Moreover, user charges usually generate a relatively small proportion of the total operating cost of the health care sector, with gross yields at around 5%. If the costs of fee collection are included, the yields are lower and, in some cases, negative.

However, health care, education and the provision of water include different types of services, some clearly geared to the needs of the poor and others catering more for middle and upper-income groups. While user charges are not well suited to primary education, disease control programmes, basic curative services and communal water supply, the same cannot be said of university education and other 'income elastic' services. For the latter, cost recovery measures would be advisable, although subsidised access for the deserving poor must be assured. For the intermediate category, which includes most curative health services and secondary education, selective cost-recovery measures might be desirable, with low income individuals exempted or charged only a nominal fee.

While direct user fees (levied on patients at the moment of their treatment) are problematic from several perspectives, there are other indirect ways to mobilise resources from communities (generally before episodes of illness), such as various kinds of prepayment schemes, health insurance, lotteries, mutual funds and the sale of produce from community fields, in addition to their contributions in kind. These schemes have two main features which are attractive for health-care: they shift the moment of payment, so that individuals are not burdened with relatively more significant expenditure at the time of illness, and they spread the burden of costs (e.g. for drugs) over a larger group.

-Increasing the volume of international aid.

There has been a considerable shift in official development assistance (ODA) in favour of Africa over the past two decades. Africa's share in total ODA rose from 19.4% in 1975/6 to 25.1% in 1980/1, and to 34.2% in 1988/9. However, the share assigned to human resource development has dropped, while- debt-service obligations have often absorbed a growing share of ODA. Greater flows are therefore needed. In the late 1980s, the World Bank estimated that additional annual aid of about $1 billion was required during the 1990s to halt social retrogression and ensure reasonable progress. But this flow of aid has not materialised on any appreciable scale. Indeed the trend in the 1990s has been towards an absolute decline in aid flows. The simplest and the most cost-effective way to effect such aid transfer would be through debt relief, although some increases in ODA are needed. Improvement in the quality of aid, including substantial shifts to programme aid, greater participation in the financing of recurrent costs and more focus on primary health care and education and on rural water supply are also required.

What role for NGOs and private providers?

While private providers, including church missions, have always been important in Africa, much of the market oriented literature tends to be very optimistic about the scope for expanding private services in order to replace government ones. Although a multiplicity of providers is desirable (and frequently unavoidable), there are several reasons why such optimism should be tempered. First, private sector services in Africa are typically concentrated in urban areas, and because of their cost, cater for upper-income groups. Although non-governmental providers (especially missions) are often located in rural areas, and they generally provide valuable services, they are seldom able to guarantee extensive coverage and in some cases may duplicate government services. Second, private providers are not without costs to governments; they often receive subsidies or preferential treatment in the allocation of foreign exchange and typically offer higher salaries and better working conditions which draw manpower away from the public sector. In Zambia, for instance, a teacher in a primary school run by the Consolidated Copper Mines can earn more than a lecturer at the University of Zambia. In countries with extremely limited numbers of doctors, certified nurses, qualified teachers and so on, greater privatisation would exacerbate the 'brain drain' from the public to the private sector and the undersupply of 'quasi public goods' for the majority, leading to harmful social differentiation. Third, quality is not necessarily an important incentive in the private sector in developing countries. The view that private institutions in health care and education are more efficient tends to be based largely on analyses in developed countries. Fourth, the growing pressure for pluralism in social service provision often gives scant attention to the problems of central coordination and planning and the development of an adequate 'regulatory framework' for private sector activities. While playing an important complementary role, the private sector and, to a lesser extent, the NGO sector, are thus affected by important objective limitations. Indeed, ironically, their proper functioning and social utility depends crucially on the existence of a stronger, not weaker, state able to regulate, coordinate and ensure that basic social services are provided - possibly through a multitude of public, NGO and private providers-to all citizens of a nation. G.A.C

by Franklyn Lisk

The development experience of much of sub-Saharan Africa in past decades provides ample illustration of the importance of capacity building in the development process. The importance is related to the ability to manage economic and social processes, including the analysis and formulation of policy options, for attaining development objectives such as employment generation and poverty reduction. The consequences of failures in domestic economic management, compounded by the effects of a prolonged economic crisis in the region have, inter alla, contributed to high and rising levels of open unemployment and underemployment, declining per Capita incomes and real wages, and an increase in the incidence and intensity of poverty in a number of African countries. The persistence of these adverse consequences, which represent a serious threat to economic growth and sustainable development, are somehow linked-either as a cause or an effect -to weaknesses and instability in the institutional framework for management and public administration.

The problem of weak institutional and general capacity for management in Africa today can be traced to the colonial legacy. This left many countries in the region, at the time of independence, with insufficient institutional and human capacity to cope with the transition from colony to independent sovereign state, particularly with respect to the responsibility for economic management. More specifically, this related to the unequal and disadvantageous manner of Africa's incorporation into the international economic system in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Lack of technological know-how, inadequate infrastructure and limited investment resources compounded the immediate post-independence problem of weak institutional capacity, and left many African countries highly vulnerable to external shocks.

It was extremely difficult for the majority of African countries to break out of the old 'protected' colonial production and trade systems and rapidly to diversify their economies in line with the requirements of participating effectively in a competitive world economy. Since independence, institutional and human capacity for management in many African countries has not grown fast enough to keep up with the requirements of changing socioeconomic circumstances at the national level and to face the challenge of increasing globalisation. Critical skill shortages in public administration and private sector management in Africa can hardly be addressed in the context of the current economic crisis. The consequences of this crisis can be seen, for example, in underfunded and poorly equipped training and management development institutions, and in low-paid and demoralised civil services. At the same time, the 'brain drain' from the continent, partly as a consequence of poor pay and career prospects, has further undermined capacity in Africa. The interaction of foreign donors and African governments has not always served the interest of capacity building. It has been admitted, even by the World Bank that 'aid has done much less than one might have hoped to reduce poverty (in Africa)'. There is now more or less a consensus in the international donor community that expatriate technical assistance does not and cannot solve all kinds of development problems in the region. Far from solving problems, the imposition of foreign technical assistance has, in some cases, become a destructive force which undermines the development of domestic capacity that is critical to solving local development problems. Where donor assistance is inappropriate in terms of project concept and design, or there is a mismatch between design and domestic implementation and management capacity, technical assistance could end up becoming part of the problem rather than the solution.

Conceptual issues

Before examining the requirements for institutional capacity building in developing countries, and particularly African countries, it is necessary to clarify salient issues pertaining to the concept. Broadly speaking, capacity building in a development context refers to a comprehensive process which includes the ability to identify constraints and to plan and manage development. The process usually involves the development of human resources and institutions, and a supportive policy environment. Ideally, it aims at improving on existing capabilities and resources and using them efficiently to achieve sustainable economic and social development.

Narrowing the concept to focus on institution-building, the emphasis will be on the development of particular institutions, their human and material resources, their organisational management and their administrative capacities. More specifically, the aim of institutional capacity building is to improve significantly the outputs and impacts of institutions concerned with economic management, public administration (including project management), enterprise development and so on-in both the public and private sectors.

It is obvious that relevant development-oriented institutions within an economy can exert a decisive influence on economic growth and employment prospects, and indeed on the attainment of sustainable economic and social development. From a macro standpoint,planning and similar development institutions are required for better management of the economy including, more crucially, the ability to mobilise, allocate and utilise human and material resources in an efficient and productive manner. At the micro level, human and institutional capacity is critical to sound project management and public administration.

The framework

The general situation in Africa today suggests that capacity building is required in relation to the following priority areas:

- good governance, to ensure stability;

-economic management, to maximise resource mobilisation and promote sustainable development;

- human resource development, to support employment creation and income generation, and reduce poverty;

- science and technology, to increase the efficiency of the population and facilitate infrastructural development;

-enterprise development, to enhance the critical role of the private sector in overall development.

The degree of emphasis given to each of the above in a given context would vary according to the level and complexity of existing human and institutional capacities, the economic and financial means to support capacity, the relative roles of the public and private sectors, and the degree of involvement of civil society in the decision-making process.

The policy context for institutional capacity building should be multi-sectoral and flexible, but coherent in relation to the desired objectives of development. This is to ensure that the process of capacity building is adaptable to changing circumstances-an issue that is particularly relevant in the context of countries undertaking structural adjustment and economic reform programmes when there is a need effectively to nurture and utilise local skills and to mobilise investment resources efficiently.

In the light of the development challenge facing African countries, the process of capacity building in the region requires, above all, appropriate and adequate human and institutional capabilities to plan and manage economic and social development processes. These capabilities should include the means of assessing the achievements and impact of capacity building on poverty reduction, employment creation, etc. Existing public sector institutions for development planning and management could provide the operational framework for national capacity building, but the process should also include the participation of diverse social forces, the private sector and non-governmental institutions.

Regarding the role of external donors and technical assistance agencies, the approach should be based on the concept of 'partners in development', which implies consultation and dialogue between donor and recipient on all aspects of project planning, design and implementation- with project 'ownership' resting with national authorities. Technical assistance from foreign donors should therefore go mainly towards developing the necessary domestic capacity, rather than contributing to the undermining of existing or potential capacity. Furthermore, assistance provided by external donors should be directed towards the building of capacity for promoting regional economic cooperation and integration through support for the development of viable African regional and sub-regional development organisations.

Support initiatives

The issue of domestic capacity building in Africa has more recently been the focus of attention by the international community as a whole. Indeed, the former World Bank vice-president for Africa, Edward Jaycox, has described 'capacity building' es the 'missing link in African development' which is 'critical to the development effort (of the region) and the chances of success'. UN agencies, spearheaded by the UNDP, have been active in promoting capacity building as a major requirement for attaining sustainable development.

In 1991, the UNDP Governing Council took a decision which resulted in the development of guidelines covering assistance to governments in the formulation and implementation of national capacity building strategies relating to all stages of the project cycle in the developing countries. The decision coincided with the introduction of the 'programme approach' by the UNDP which emphasised the centrality of national development programmes as the hub for the integration of UN technical assistance activities with national efforts. Emphasis on the use of national skills in the development process was consolidated within the general operational framework for 'national execution', which implied that overall responsibility for management of UN operational activities and accountability remained with the government and other national institutions and beneficiaries who 'owned' these activities. Under these new arrangements, a high priority was thus placed on the strengthening and sustaining of development management and administrative capacities on a long-term basis as an integral part of UNDP technical assistance.

The World Bank's interest in capacity building in Africa has been more closely linked to the need for administrative and technical capacity at the national level to carry out policy analysis and economic management in the context of on-going structural adjustment and economic reform programmes. In a trailblazing address to the African American Institute Conference in 1993, Mr Jaycox came out strongly in favour of a new approach to lending to African countries which gave top priority to the development of critical human and institutional capacity. He admitted that the Bank's $4 billion a year lending programme in sub-Saharan Africa had not had the desired impact on development in the region because not enough attention had been paid to national capacity in the past. He went on to criticise the international donor community and financial institutions, including the World Bank itself, for designing and carrying out technical assistance activities which not only fail to solve problems but end up undermining the development of capacity in Africa. Mr Jaycox accordingly pledged to give direct support to capacity building in the Bank's lending programmes, mainly through human resource development and the creation of a 'demand for professionalism in Africa.'

The UNDP, the African Development Bank and the World Bank, collaborated in the early 1990s to set up the 'African Capacity Building Foundation' (ACBF), based in Harare, Zimbabwe, with initial seed money of about $30 million and another $70 million attracted from bilateral donors and African governments themselves. The fund is to be used by the Foundation to support capacity building in Africa through training and institution building. Particular attention will be paid to the rehabilitation and strengthening of selected research and training institutions to meet the challenge of indigenous capacity building. Another initiative set up with foreign donors and African support, the Africa Research Consortium in Nairobi, is a good example of collaboration at regional level that is contributing to capacity building in the critical area of economic policy analysis and management. Similarly, the African Development Bank helped establish the African Business Round table which promotes entrepreneurship and enterprise development based on African ownership and control.

Role of the ILO

For well over three decades the ILO, as part of its technical cooperation programme in Africa, has been involved in a wide range of management development, productivity and institution building initiatives at both national and regional levels. This is consistent with the need to strengthen African training institutions to play a crucial role in providing development managers with the necessary skills to analyse and formulate policy options and manage public and private enterprises efficiently.

One of the most successful initiatives undertaken by the ILO, in collaboration with the UNDP and the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank, is the UNEDIL programme for strengthening management training in Africa. Since its inception in 1987, the UNEDIL programme has proven to be a worthwhile initiative in institutional capacity building in the management field. Support for the programme has also come from national and regional management development institutes (MDIs) in Africa, regional and sub-regional organisations such as SADC and the Commonwealth Secretariat, and major bilateral donors such as USAID, CIDA, NORAD, the Netherlands and France.

Apart from aiming at strengthening institutional capacity, the UNEDIL programme has been instrumental in fostering networking among African development institutes and promoting professional contacts and the exchange of experience. One outcome of the programme has been the revival of three subregional MDI associations which enjoy the direct support of UNEDIL and serve as focal points for UNEDIL's subregional networking arrangements.

Networking on a subregional basis has made it possible to optimise the use of scarce resources and talents, and this has helped to increase managerial capacity in the region as a whole. Collaboration has also permitted an exchange of experience among African institutions, and has brought together expertise both from within Africa and from outside to assist in the development of managerial capacity across the continent. This fits in with the goals of technical cooperation in general, and of South-South cooperation in particular.

F.L.

Increasing demands and diminishing resources in higher education

by Professor Dumitru Chitoran

As we approach the end of the millennium, higher education world-wide finds itself in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, it is witnessing unprecedented growth. Enrolments are on the increase and so are the expectations placed on it by society. The correlation between investment in higher education and research, and the level of social, economic and cultural development of nations is well-established and is gaining increasing ground at a time when all development has become knowledge-intensive. On the other hand, higher education is in a state of crisis in practically all countries of the world, under the pressure of serious financial constraints. It has to compete for public funds with many other sectors and very often it is among the first to undergo severe cuts. These cuts have reached a dramatic threshold in the developing countries. As a result, the gap between the developing and the developed countries with regard to higher learning and research is wider than ever and it continues to grow.

Inter-university cooperation has emerged as a major tool for the support of higher education in the developing countries and as a flexible mechanism for the rapid transfer and sharing of knowledge, channelled via university links and exchanges. As emphasised in the Policy Paper for Change and Development in Higher Education issued by UNESCO in 1995, 'the most pressing need for international cooperation in higher education is to reverse the process of decline of institutions in the developing countries, particularly in the least developed.' The internationalisation of higher education has advanced steadily, reinforced by current processes of economic and political integration and facilitated by the steady advances in information and communication technologies. But, as indicated in the UNESCO World Education Report (1993), it is increasingly subject to the competitive laws of the market. Universities have been urged to develop an entrepreneurial, commercial attitude and to regard international cooperation mainly as a source of additional income. Fees for foreign students have risen considerably in many countries. As a result, academic mobility is becoming more North-North and less South-North or South-South. The benefits of study abroad, of exchanges, networking and access to data are recognised, but the costs involved render them increasingly a privilege, restricted to those who can afford it.

An innovative programme

UNESCO's response to these trends was the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme, launched in 1991. While serving as an instrument to foster overall inter-university cooperation, it was aimed at giving a clear direction and goal, namely to support higher education in the developing countries. It was meant to mark a return to the spirit of international academic solidarity, through twinning, networking and other linking arrangements among universities. The programme was also designed as an innovative form for the rapid transfer of knowledge, and for institutional development in higher education, including the establishment of transnational centres for advanced studies and research, as a means of redressing the widening knowledge gap between industrially developed and developing countries. One other aim of the Programme was to alleviate the negative effects of the brain drain.

The UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme has seen steady and dynamic development from the very beginning, and has emerged as the major thrust of UNESCO's action in the field of higher education. The favoured institutional framework for carrying out activities is a UNESCO Chair. The programme's activities are extremely diverse. They include the appointment of visiting professors, provision of scholarships and fellowships, facilitating of staff and student exchanges and undertaking of joint research. The 'chairs' are typical of basic units of research and training, with a strong international dimension, since either the chairholder, or some of the professors or researchers associated with its programme come from abroad. Other projects involve complex inter university networks, varying in size from three to more than 50 institutions. Within networks, certain institutions serve as focal points, responsible for initiating activities and securing broad participation in their execution. Also included are cooperation programmes established by UNESCO with major university associations and networks in order to carry out UNITWIN-related activities.

At present, there are 163 established UNESCO Chairs (a further 84 are under consideration) and 34 largescale networks (18 more are being developed). A total of over 750 teachers, researchers and other support staff are involved in their activities. It is estimated that 350 courses (mainly at the graduate level), attended by more than 7500 students, were organised by the established UNESCO Chairs during the 1992-1996 period. Also, 120 seminars, training workshops, symposia and colloquia were staged over the same period, attended by more than 6000 participants. Some 580 academics from developing countries spent short periods of time at partner universities in the developed countries to upgrade their training. In addition, 355 scholarships have been granted to students and young academics from developing nations within the framework of the Programme. Research has been encouraged through 240 projects (mainly joint ones) resulting, according to progress reports received so far, in the publication of 55 volumes, some 100 published articles and over 150 monographs and progress reports.

The ACPs in the programme

A large number of these projects (UNESCO Chairs and networks) concern ACP countries. Africa has been given top priority. Over 30 of the established Chairs are located there and 18 more are under consideration for subSaharan Africa, in order to reinforce the contribution of the programme to the development of higher education in this region. In addition, certain projects located at institutions in Europe and North America carry on activities which are designed to support African universities. A few examples illustrate this. Starting from its bilateral links with several African universities, the University of Utrecht proposed developing these into a broader, multilateral project under the umbrella of UNITWIN. For this purpose, it joined forces with three other European institutions: the University of Lund in Sweden, the Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany and the University of Porto in Portugal. The result was the establishment of the Utrecht/Southern Africa/UNITWIN (USU) network. It includes, at its southern pole, the universities of Harare, Maputo, Namibia, and Western Cape, where UNESCO Chairs have been established in different fields. The aim is to develop each of them into (sub)regional centres of advanced study and research. This is well under way in the case of the UNESCO Chair in Mathematics and Science Education at Western Cape University in South Africa. A first step was to link its activities to those of the MESA (Mathematics Education in South Africa) project, a cooperation project between the Utrecht-Freundenthal Institute for Mathematics Education and the University of the Western Cape. A school for Science and Maths Education is to be established at the University of Western Cape.

Another large scale project is the Network of African Teacher Training Institutions, built around a UNESCO Chair at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Dakar. This is designed to serve as a regional centre for postgraduate training and research in the field of education. After several years preparation, activities were launched in 1995. The strength of networking is illustrated by a number of other linking arrangements in support of African higher education institutions. These include the network initiated by the NATURA Group of European universities in the field of agriculture, the ORBICOM Network in the field of Communication, which is a global network but pays particular attention to the needs of African universities, and the UNESCO/John Hopkins University Networking and Partnership in Adolescent Youth Health and Development. The last-mentioned focuses on HlV/AIDS-related research, and includes institutions such as Addis Ababa and Makerere Universities.

The agreement signed by UNESCO with the Association of African Universities (AAU) within the framework of UNITWIN provides for support of the latter's staff development and management programme. A UNESCO Chair in Educational Management and Administration is to be established. It will function on a rotating basis at several universities in South Africa, Botswana and Malawi. There are also a number of 'tailor-made' chairs which respond to more specific needs of institutions, notably to develop training and research capabilities in areas such as human rights, democray and peace (at the Universities of Namibia, Addis Ababa and Fianarantsoa in Madagascar), or in the field of Water Resources and Water Culture (at the Universities of Malawi and Omdurman in Sudan). In the latter field, an interesting example is the UNESCO Chair established at the University of Nice, which, although located in France, carries out its activities in Mauritania and has produced the most comprehensive study so far on water resource management in that country.

The programme has also made a good start in the Pacific and the Caribbean, even if achievements there are on a more modest scale. There are already 22 established chairs with 14 more under consideration. They cover a wide spectrum of priority fields, including the sustainable use of rain forest resources at the University of Guyana, higher education management and information technology at the University of Havana in Cuba, educational sciences in Fiji, and the use of drugs in Chulalongkorn University in Thailand.

UNESCO works closely with the University of the South Pacific and the University of the West Indies, with which it has established four UNESCO Chairs. Moreover, it has signed a cooperation agreement, in the framework of UNITWIN, with the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Association of Commonwealth Universities for activities in both regions. There is great potential for the further development of the Chairs programme in the Pacific and Caribbean, given the existence of the two regional universities mentioned above and the strong interest of universities in a number of developed countries (such as Australia, Canada, Japan and Spain) in supporting the programme. It appears to be particularly well suited for the systems of higher education in the two regions.

Funding

The cost of international cooperation in higher education has risen steadily and this is currently one of the major obstacles preventing the full use of the potential of academic links. New information and communication technologies help reduce costs, but universities in the least-developed countries would first need considerable investment in order to procure and maintain the necessary equipment. That is why UNESCO has based the Chairs programme on funding principles aimed at lowering costs and sharing them in a genuine spirit of academic solidarity.

At the outset, UNESCO made it very clear that, since it was not a funding agency, it could not, by itself, assume the financial burden of such an ambitious programme, involving several hundred institutions and thousands of university teachers, researchers and students. However, it decided to make a commitment by providing some initial funds. Rough estimates indicate that, over the 1992-1995 period, UNESCO has contributed some $2.5 million (from its Regular and Participation Programmes, Fellowship Bank and Funds-in-Trust) to the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme. At the same time, it has pressed for increased international development aid for higher education, particularly from the developed countries, and from international organisations, including the UN specialised agencies. A strong case is made for the benefit of pooling resources and for involving directly the higher education institutions themselves

UNITWIN-based projects, including UNESCO Chairs, are usually initiated through the direct contributions of UNESCO (the range is generally between $15 000 and $25 000 per individual project). This is meant to help prepare and launch projects and to secure further funding from other sources. The institutions themselves must include allocations for the respective projects in their own budgets and request their appropriate national authorities to make contributions. This applies equally to universities in the developing countries, however poor their resources may be. It serves to indicate that the project in question is indeed seen as a priority by them and by their national authorities.

Experience of the UNITWIN funding formula so far gives cause for cautious optimism. Many projects have been able to secure funds by having recourse to the various sources mentioned above. Thus, the Utrecht/ Southern Africa/UNITWIN Project received a first UNESCO allocation of $50 000 in 1993, in order to launch its activities. The fact that it concerned a large-scale project (a network of eight universities, with four chairs established at four African universities and one at the University of Utrecht) explains the larger UNESCO allocation. This was followed by a second allocation of $70 000 in 1994 for the actual implementation of activities in Africa. The UNESCO seed money led to additional funding-$600 000 annually, for the 1992-1995 period, from various Dutch donors (mainly the Ministry of Development Cooperation, through NUFFIC) and from the European Union, and $450 000 from the University of Utrecht budget, including the total cost for the functioning of the UNESCO Chair on African Studies established at that university. The other three European universities participating in the network (Bochum, Lund and Porto) have also made contributions and are now looking for donor funding in their countries. It is important to mention that the four African universities belonging to the network have also allocated funds from their own budgets to the UNITWIN projects and are actively seeking additional resources from aid and development programmes established for their countries by various donor agencies.

It can be fairly argued that in terms of cost-effectiveness, efficiency and the ability to generate funding from various sources, UNITWIN compares favourably with existing cooperation schemes in higher education and research. But it is still too early to conclude that the Chairs Programme can continue and develop further on the basis of the present funding arrangements. The needs are arguably too big for the institutions and individuals involved, who may find themselves in a perpetual search for funds. An evaluation of the programme is under way and this will be submitted to the Member States for their decision. UNESCO is hoping that its efforts to revive academic solidarity, and its campaign in favour of higher education in the developing countries will receive the support of the international community. More than ever before, these countries need to develop their capacity for advanced training and research in order to achieve self sustainable development. The academic community has already indicated its willingness to join forces with UNESCO in this undertaking.

D.C.

When a highly qualified professional chooses to leave his own country for another, he does so for one or several legitimate political or economic reasons: peace and security for himself and his family, job satisfaction, better pay and conditions. a higher standard of living, etc. Throughout history, countries and centres of academic excellence which offer these attractions have received the largest numbers of professional migrants and these have, in turn, made substantial contributions, not only to the economic growth of their host countries, but also to the scientific and technological advancement of humanity. The wave of German scientists who moved to the United States after the Second World war, and their discoveries and inventions, come readily to mind. On a global level, therefore, the free movement and interaction of highly skilled people is a positive thing. But the costs to the home countries of losing their professionals is incalculable-in terms of both development opportunities and loss of investment.

Whereas Western Europe was the main loser, especially to the United States, up until the 1960s, the developing countries have emerged in recent years as the biggest suppliers of qualified professionals to the industrialised world as a whole. Today there are more than a million and a half skilled expatriates from the developing countries settled in Western Europe, the USA, Japan and Canada. The USA's educational system and its research institutions are heavily dependent on them. These migrant professionals contribute in no small way to increasing the disparities between the world's rich and poor nations. And it is the developing countries that need them most.

Africa, which has serious shortages of manpower, has been worst hit. It is said to have lost 60 000 professionals (doctors, university lecturers, engineers, surveyors, etc) between 1985 and 1990 and to have been losing an average of 20 000 annually ever since.

There are more than 21 000 Nigerian doctors practising in the United States alone. Meanwhile, Nigeria's own health system suffers a cruel lack of medical practitioners. 60% of all Ghanaian doctors trained locally in the 1980s have left the country, according to the UNDP's 1992 Human Development Report, while, in Sudan, 17% of doctors and dentists, 20% of university lecturers, 30% of engineers and 45% of surveyors have gone to work abroad.

Although it is difficult to calculate the cost of an expatriate professional in terms of the nutrition, health care and education provided by households and the State, it is clear developing countries are losing colossal amounts of investment annually to the developed countries.

The US Congressional Research Service, for example, computed in 197172 that the USA gained $20 000 annually on each skilled migrant from the developing countries. If this rather conservative amount is extrapolated for Africa, then the continent lost more than $1.2 billion of investment between 1985 and 1990 on the 60 000 or so African professionals who emigrated during that period. Much closer perhaps to the truth today would be the estimate made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), using 1979 prices, which put a cash value of $184 000 on each African professional migrant (and this only for those between the ages of 25 and 35).

On the other hand, expatriate remittances, particularly from skilled workers who earn higher salaries than the average migrant, constitute an important source of funds for development in their home countries. Throughout Africa, households are being maintained by remittances from relatives working abroad. Also, fine buildings are being put up and small-scale projects are financed in villages and cities across the continent with funds sent from overseas. But taken together, these will never be large enough to compensate Africa for the loss of investment suffered as a result of the 'brain drain'.

Serious flaw in international cooperation

The migration of highly qualified professionals from the developing countries is an extremely complex problem which presents the international community with a major dilemma. First, the 'brain drain' cannot be stopped by force nor can it be legislated against. It is linked to fundamental human rights- the right of individuals to move from one country to another, although the exercise of that right is governed by the immigration policies of individual countries. Second, it is fundamentally a national problem which can only be resolved at the national level by providing enough incentives for qualified nationals to remain at home. Third, some industrialised countries like the USA and Canada, have historically operated liberal immigration policies. Even European states, whose immigration policies tend to be more restrictive, have a good number of third world professionals, but there are over a million in the USA and Canada. It is arguable whether, under the circumstances, the liberalisation of the international labour market under the World Trade Organisation, as is being suggested (even by some developing countries), will actually be in Africa's interests.

The reasons for Africa's brain drain problem are legion and easily identifiable, being both structural and economic. The most often cited cause is the continent's school curricula which many see as still largely modelled on the systems of the former colonial masters. This, it is argued, has led to the production of graduates in disciplines that have little or no relevance to the socio-cultural and economic milieux of the continent. This is a highly debatable assertion, given the large numbers of the technical assistants currently working in Africa who are products of the educational systems of the former colonial powers-at least some of whom are having a positive impact on the continent's development. This, however, must not distract from the fact that African higher schools systems are illequipped to produce the right skills for Africa's development needs. Because of shortages of both science equipment and teachers, the system instructs the vast majority of pupils in arts rather than in science and technology-and it is the latter which hold the key to economic growth and development. Thus, there is overproduction of graduates in areas where there are few employment opportunities. This results in high levels of migration, even, paradoxically among the few trained scientists because of the absence of an environment conducive to full professional expression and satisfaction. It is not uncommon for things as simple as electricity and water supply to provide reasons for emigration. Examples abound of frustrated African scientists who have had their experimental work of several years destroyed overnight through power failures.

Powerful factors in the brain drain include Africa's poor rates of economic growth over the past 30 years (worsened by structural adjustment measures which have resulted in dramatic falls in living standards) and political instability (disturbances in Nigeria and Zaire, civil war in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia etc). Thousands of qualified professionals have been forced unwillingly into exile, and the majority of those left behind, in these times of serious economic crisis, are engaged in unskilled pursuits-in petty trading and taxi driving-far removed from their professional training. The loss of investment associated with this situation cannot be underestimated.

Sub-Saharan Africa is in the paradoxical situation today of having large numbers of graduates in various disciplines -from medicine and engineering to architecture and accountancy-who have either emigrated or are simply unemployed, while it hosts a large army of foreign technical assistants. Indeed, Africa receives more advice per capita than any other continent. In 1988, there were more than 80 000 technical assistants, and today the figure is well over 100 000. These experts are believed to cost donors a total of $4bn annually to maintain, a figure which represents nearly 35% of Africa's total official development aid. This situation reveals a serious flaw in the operation of international development cooperation. Would it not be more efficient and cost effective to employ qualified African expatriates in the place of many of these foreign technical experts. The former, after all, have both linguistic and cultural links with the continent. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a programme in this area which points to a possible way forward. The article on that programme, TOKTEN, follows.

A.O.

On the scale of the brain drain problem facing the developing countries, the UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project may not amount to much, but it has proved, in its 19 years of existence, to be a cost-effective way of getting highly qualified expatriates from the developing countries to contribute to the development of their countries of origin.

It all started in Turkey in 1977 by pure accident. A Turkish mineral expert in Alberta, Canada, was asked by a compatriot if he would be kind enough to come over to Turkey and explain his innovative coal cleaning process to the staff and students of his old university in Ankara-the Middle East Technical University. He expressed his interest in the project. Soon afterwards he was contacted by the UNDP which offered to fund part of his trip to Ankara. The expert spent one month in Turkey giving a series of seminars, not only at the Middle East Technical University, but also at the Istanbul and Dokuz Eylul Universities. During these lectures, he made recommendations on resolving Turkey's specific coal utilisation problems. His impact was immense and such that the UNDP was inspired to set up the TOKTEN project along similar lines to help developing countries gain from the knowledge of their expatriate professionals.

The system is simple. Member States of the United Nations can apply to join the project. The latter is administered in each country by a National Working Commitee (NWC) which is made up of representatives from the government, local organisations, the private sector and the UNDP. Institutions of that country (government ministries and agencies, private and public sector enterprises, universities, research and development institutions, hospitals, etc) can apply for assistance in a variety of areas.

Applications are processed by the NWC and recruitment of experts is usually in one or more of the following ways:

� through consultants with lists of experts recognised by the Government as having extensive contacts within their expatriate communities;

� through embassies and missions, alumni associations and research institutions;

� through prominent members of the country's expatriate community who identify and alert other high level expatriates of the opportunities to return home and serve their countries.

When the Working Committee chooses a consultant, an offer of assignment is made. The beneficiary organisation and the consultant will then determine the timing of the mission and inform the UNDP.

TOKTEN assignments last between one and three months depending on the ability of the consultant and the needs of the beneficiary'. They are not meant to be highly remunerative. Consultants are only entitled to round trip economy fare tickets (by the most direct route) and a daily subsistence allowance at the prevailing UN rate. The costs are paid out of the beneficiary country's 'Indicative Planning Figure'(IPF) which is the amount of assistance the UNDP makes available to a developing country over a five-year programming cycle. Health insurance cover and accommodation is not provided. Usually these are the responsibilities of the beneficiary government or organisation. The salaries of the consultants during their absence are paid by their affiliated employers whose agreement is often necessary for the projects to go ahead.

TOKTEN consultants are thus not motivated by money but by a genuine desire (with a modicum of patriotism) to contribute to the development of their countries of origin to which they retain strong cultural and linguistic ties. And their impact on the ground is usually immediate and measurable. Pressures are not put on volunteers to return permanently to their countries, although many have chosen to do so since the programme began in 1977.

The system is not only low-cost and cost-effective. It covers a great variety of specialised fields and enables programmes to be implemented with speed.

Conditions for success

A UNDP assessment of the programme in 1987, ten years after it began, concluded that regular monitoring of its operation had enabled information garnered to be applied to increase its effectiveness. It had been found, for example, that short-term expatriate consultancies were especially beneficial when the problem tackled was specific and the consultant selected was of international standing, when both the requesting organisation and the expatriate were well prepared in advance, and when the initial mission was followed up by a series of measures, often including a return visit.

By 1992, 35 countries were participating in the programme and over 3800 consultancies had been run. Since then, the number of countries has increased dramatically to 51 and con

sultancies to 5000. In 1994 and 1995 alone, 28 countries reported over 700 consultancies.

It has also become clear that, whereas the main recipient institutions have been government agencies, science and technology research institutions, universities and organisations, the private sector is increasingly showing interest in the programme. The number of female specialists is also increasing: in 1991, 40 consultants were women and last year this figure rose to over 100.

So far, the ACP countries participating in the programme are; Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, St Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago and Uganda.

Success stories include a highly skilled Guyanese medical practitioner in the United States who returned home after 17 years to assume the post of minister of health. He had been sent to oversee the introduction of certain aspects of health care such as preventive medicine (immunisation, general child care and nutrition), treatment of trauma (victims of accidents and violence etc) and the establishment and management of the physical facilities for emergency patients. During his stint, his recommendation on the upgrading of the emergency room facilities was rapidly implemented and this contributed significantly to improving patient care. Another story involved a Guinean banker who, after a consultancy stint in Guinea, abandoned a lucrative job in France to return home permanently to work at the Central Bank of Guinea, helping to set up a new loan system for commercial imprt and export businesses. Guinea, in fact, has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the TOKTEN programme with numerous consultancies involving the University of Conakry, covering more than 20 disciplines.

For very small sums the programme is ensuring that developing countries which have invested enormously in the education of their expatriate nationals have a return, at least, in the form of the knowledge they oquired.

A.O

The role of the Commonwealth in the economic and social progress of its member states is neither widely known nor widely publicised. Yet for over 25 years, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) has made significant contributions to the efforts of its developing member countries to accelerate the pace of their economic development.

The recognition by the Commonwealth that people are its greatest resource forms the basis of its approach to development assistance-providing, in the short term, specialist technical skills which are either not available or are in short supply to governments to enable them to fill key positions in areas as diverse as export and industrial promotion, high-level economic and legal services etc, and in the longer term, a wide range of training programmes in areas that are crucial for economic development.

The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation is funded by voluntary financial contributions from member governments which, as has just been mentioned, can also draw on it according to their needs and priorities. As a pioneer of technical cooperation between developing countries, the Fund recruits its experts from these countries and encourages South/South cooperation. It is thus not uncommon to see West Africans serving, on short-term contracts, as legal officers in remote Pacifc island states or Sri Lankans or Indians advising on new agricultural techniques in Africa. The Fund is administered by four separate divisions within the Commonwealth Secretariat: the management and training division; the general technical assistance division; the export and industrial development division, and the economic and legal advisory services division. In 1994-95 the CFTC's financial resources stood at around f23.6 million (ECU 30m).

Human resource development

Nearly one-third of the CFTC's budget is spent on human resource development, helping enhance people's skills through a mix of training workshops, study visits and individual attachments.

Some 4000 training fellowships were awarded in 1993-95 to enhance technical skills. These were given to middle and senior professional, technical and administrative managers to study at some of the Commonwealth's best institutions or to take up work attachments (63% of training takes place in less-developed countries).

The Fund also enables universities and other institutions to become centres of excellence and upgrade the tuition they offer by appointing academic and technical specialists. In 1993-95, for example, it helped five universities in Africa and the Caribbean to run applied Masters courses through collaboration with other Commonwealth universities.

As the CFTC is usually able to meet only 60% of the requests it receives for specialised training, its programmes are held on a regional and pan-Commonwealth basis to maximise impact, especially in topics such as administrative reform, financial management and strategic planning.

The Fund's training priorities include:

- first and foremost, identifying needs (consultants are sent to countries to examine their development plans and help them to prioritise training needs).

- providing education and training in key areas that reflect CFTC concerns such as well-managed economic and financial reform by government, sustainable development, participation of women and application of technology.

- ensuring an integrated package of consultancy, advice and training to help managers in government, and public and private sector enterprises to coordinate and manage reforms and restructuring.

- organising policy workshops and seminars that bring together senior government officials, executives and academics from Commonwealth countries to pool experiences, learn examples of best practice, discuss problems and reflect on emerging issues.

- giving support to institutions to offer new and specialised education and training programmes.

- providing technical and vocational training under the Commonwealth Industrial Training and Experience Programme (between 1993 and 1995, workshops were held in hospital equipment repairs, railway repairs and maintenance and computer-assisted manufacturing).

- providing training in information systems, new technologies and environmental issues (governments are helped to develop management information systems and apply information technology).

-setting up programmes for women with a particular focus on entrepreneurs and community managers (among other initiatives, the CFTC is helping three African universities develop specialised programmes in entrepreneurship for women in non-traditional sectors).

-coordinating wider linkages among professional networks to facilitate exchanges of information and examples of best practice (the CFTC recently helped to set up the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management to assist in improving public service performance and in raising ethical standards).

Expertise on tap

Shortage of skills is one of the biggest stumbling-blocks facing countries trying to raise the living standards of their people. Providing experts accounts for about one-third of the CFTC's budget.

Because its assistance is relatively small and carefully targeted, it avoids the potential waste associated with larger scale projects and poor technical planning. In 1993-95, the cost both of a typical long-term expert and an average project was around �50 000 (ECU 62 000) a year. Experts can be in place within three or four weeks of project approval.

During the same period, over 200 long- and short-term experts were provided to 43 developing Commonwealth countries, six dependent territories and 18 regional organisations. The expertise requested is extremely diverse, from hydrography and agroforestry to tourism, statistics, legal affairs, health, social planning and computer science.

Assignments for short-term experts can range from a few days to six months. Their role is advisory, helping governments to introduce new systems or technologies. Long-term experts stay usually from six months to two years; others may stay up to four years. Experts assist in the development and implementation of policies or in the provision of managerial skills and the training of counterpart staff to take over in due course. Some long-term experts are trainers in specialist fields.

The CFTC makes every effort to appoint women experts. In 1993-95, they made up 13% of experts that were sent to the field. These included a consultant anaesthetist in Ghana, an agricultural economist in Mozambique, an information specialist in Barbados, a fisheries development officer in Papua New Guinea and an environmental lawyer in Seychelles.

A scheme to allow suitably qualified and experienced people to volunteer as short-term experts for a maximum of three months was launched in mid-1995. The scheme draws on experts from the Commonwealth who are willing to give their services on a voluntary basis to developing countries.

Entrepreneurs come first

In its help to small businesses, the CFTC focuses on those who manage the businesses and identify new entrepreneurial talent. Most assistance is given to small states, especially in the Pacific. The programme has three phases: the first relates to 'surveys of opportunity' which is aimed at identifying suitable entrepreneurs, investment opportunities and potential for expansion as well as specific problems. Next comes 'workshops on entrepreneurship development' during which business owners and operators are helped to think creatively, to become more aware of opportunities that are available and to act strategically when planning expansion. And the last are what we call 'business clinics' in which one-to-one counselling is provided to an entrepreneur at his or her business. This personal support has proved very successful in helping individual entrepreneurs to become more efficient and competitive and, by implication, adapt to changing world economic conditions.

Developing exports

The CFTC has pioneered the use of Contact-Promotion programmes and 'Buyer-Seller Meets' forums to help small exporters. These forums allow company representatives, often from small Commonwealth countries, to display their wares and meet prospective buyers from other countries. CFTC consultants plan these activities well ahead, short listing producers that are likely to succeed, identifying suitable foreign markets and advising on redesigning of products. Sometimes exporters and factory staff also receive training.

The CFTC funds a special 'export development programme' for women entrepreneurs. This includes detailed country studies of women engaged in exporting as well as sales promotions abroad. Studies of this type have recently been conducted in Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Zambia.

Women are helped, under the programme, to adapt their handicrafts for export, improve their manufacturing techniques and undertake sales missions abroad. Training is also given in export marketing, product development, costing and pricing. If necessary, changes to government policy are recommended. In 1994, the assistance given to Ghanaian women to develop markets for their basket ware and handicrafts is estimated to have helped generate sales worth US$3.1 million (ECU 2.4m).

by Digby Swift

The European Community's investments in human resource development-health, nutrition and education-in ACP states have regularly been covered in the pages of this magazine whether in the context of dosiers or of country resorts. Here we present a brief description of how the EU's policy in education and training evolved under the Yaounde and Lomé Convemntions.

Educating all the people. This is not just a slogan. In a poor, underdeveloped country, there may be some short-term gains from supplying high quality education and training to an elite few. But, as the 'Asian Miracle' has proved, major long-term gains in development and wealth are possible only if the entire population possesses a reasonable level of education.

Now for the problem. For many countries, notably those of sub-Saharan Africa, a large proportion of school age children receive no education at all. Of those who do attend school, many receive little benefit from their education because of the very low quality of provision. Only a small minority reach secondary education. And yet a higher proportion than ever of national budgets is now going to the education sector.

The problem is urgent because of the time it will take to resolve. Even if we could wave a magic wand to provide all children with a good primary education, it would take a decade to see the benefits.

How is European aid helping to tackle this problem? What have been the guiding principles of European aid to education in the past? And why is the problem still acute in, for example, subSaharan Africa, despite decades of investment in aid to education ?

Aid mirrors developments

Aid to education has mirrored developments in the education sectors of the countries concerned. For example, the low-income countries of Africa, which account for 73% of Africa's population, have seen a rapid expansion in their education systems followed by a collapse of funding. This has resulted in a serious decline in standards of provision. European aid, which began by providing piecemeal assistance to infrastructure and manpower, shifted to a 'project approach' to tackle these emerging problems and is now moving towards a coordinated sectoral approach to help tackle the reform of whole education systems.

From 1970 to 1980, the number of pupils enrolling in the primary schools of developing countries more than doubled, and the numbers in secondary and tertiary education quadrupled. Even relative to the increasing population, there was a 90% increase in the proportion of primary-aged children in school, and a large increase in the proportion of girls. This growth was accompanied by a doubling of government budgetary resources made available to education.

In the massive general economic decline between 1980 and 1985, the money made available for education from the public purse fell by 40%, yet the education systems continued to grow. The result was that teachers' salaries plummeted, and funds for non-salary recurrent costs such as teaching materials and maintenance virtually dried up.

Since 1985, the financial situation has somewhat improved and funding is now at an all-time high. Nevertheless, for many African states, the education sector is in a state of crisis. Buildings are crumbling and inadequate; teachers are untrained or undertrained and often absent because of low incentives and weak supervision. There are few books and other teaching materials. Consequently, many pupils leave school virtually illiterate and innumerate. Moreover, because of the low quality of instruction and increasing costs to parents, many parents are no longer bothering to send children to school even when places are available. Primary enrolment fell by around 10% between 1990 and 1992. Thus in many countries, a fundamental reform of the sector is seen as the only way forward.

Evolution of aid

In the early days of European aid, education and training were seen as suppliers of manpower for countries to modernise their economies. The priority themes of the 1970 Yaounde Convention for European Community aid were industrialisation, regional cooperation and international trade. Community support to education and training focused on the construction of colleges and university faculties to serve industrialisation and regional cooperation.

The 1975 Lomé I Convention referred specifically to 'the establishment of regional institutions of advanced technology, in the context of training programmes to enable nationals to participate fully in economic development'.

The 1980 Lomé II Convention introduced multiannual training programmes, and support in the form of training awards and courses/seminars; experts and instructors; teaching equipment; collaboration between training or research establishments and universities. The emphasis was still on vocational training for other sectors.

A significant proportion of European bilateral aid to education and training took the form of European teachers for secondary schools, colleges and universities. These helped to cover the shortage of locally trained teachers, whilst educating an elite able to fill senior and middle positions in the public and private sectors.

By 1985, problems were becoming all too apparent within the education systems being supported. As in other sectors, there was increased emphasis on the 'project approach' towards tackling these problems. Thus the Lomé Ill Convention includes support to education and training 'in the form of integrated programmes aimed at a well defined objective'. This could include, for example, 'assisting the ACP States' own efforts to restructure their educational establishments and systems and to update curricula, methods and technology employed, in order to step up the effectiveness and cut back the cost of all types of training'. A concern for under-represented groups, particularly women, was also becoming explicit.

By 1990, the concept of investing in people through education and training had moved high on the donor agenda, and alongside it, a growing concern for sectoral reform. According to the 1989 Lomé IV Convention, 'Cooperation shall be aimed at supporting development in the ACP States, a process centred on man himself and rooted in each people's culture. It shall back up the policies and measures adopted by those States to enhance their human resources, increase their own creative capacities and promote their cultural identities. Cooperation shall also encourage participation by the population in the design and execution of development operations.' In a chapter entitled Operations to enhance the value of human resources, a section on Education and Training refers to supporting the ACP State's efforts to 'reform their basic education institutions and systems, in particular by providing overall primary education coverage and adjusting imported systems as well as building them into development strategies'.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, European states and the Community joined the World Bank in support of structural adjustment. In a 1991 communication to the European Development Council, the Commission stated that it 'will give absolute priority to the social dimension of adjustment, in particular ensuring that the health and education sectors are adequately covered, in conjunction with sectoral reforms introduced or planned in these two areas.'

Balancing this concern for system reform has been a growing appreciation of the importance of decentralised cooperation. An example is the cost-sharing microprojects for grassroots development first introduced in Lomé I with explicit mention of support to primary schools. Another example is the need to support the activities of nongovernmental organisations.

A new policy

Two events in the early 1990s have had a profound impact on European support for education and training. The first was the World Conference on Education for All: Meeting the Basic Learning Needs held in Jomtien in 1990. This emphasised the need for universal

primary education and adult literacy to be firmly placed on the political agenda, and has resulted in a profound swing of donor support away from higher education and towards primary education. The second important event was the 1992 Treaty of European Union which requires the coordination of Member States' policy and operations, particularly in the social sectors. Guidelines are contained in the 1994 Council Resolution on support to education and training in developing countries in which 'the Council emphasises that education, in particular basic education, is a fundamental right'.

According to the Resolution, 'the priority for the Community and the Member States must be both to maximise access to education within the limits of the resources available and to ensure that the quality of education provided is suited to the needs of the majority of students. 'This is to be achieved through 'a balanced, programme-based strategy, tailored to the specific circumstances of the individual developing country', with pride of place accorded to basic education. It should provide 'support to the developing countries' own policies and efforts', not acting as a substitute for local initiative, and should involve better integration of action under structural adjustment with education sector priorities and aid activities. The Council also recommends a special emphasis on coordination in a number of pilot countries.

From the outset, Community aid to education and training in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries has been in response to requests from the ACP states with an emphasis on ownership of the resulting programme by those states. What the new policy introduces into this process is a dialogue between government and all donors on needs, priorities and approaches set in the context of the education sector as a whole. Only through such a comprehensive approach can developing countries and European states reach a true partnership in realising the education and training needs of all citizens on which the future of their countries so crucially depends.

D.S.

by Kenneth Karl

1989 saw the end of the Yalta inspired twin-superpower dominance. Nations had to examine their priorities in their desire for integration in an international environment in which geostrategic and economic realignment would be unavoidable. The philosophy which had served as a basis and reference point for North/South relations throughout the Cold War period is now being called into question and necessary adjustments in ideas have been triggered.

The Lomé Convention, which governs the development-cooperation relationship between the EU and the 70 ACP countries, is a unique North/South cooperation agreement on account of its contractual nature, its durability, the funds it allocates and the fact that it provides for a permanent dialogue. But it is also now at a decisive point in its history.

Those who regard the Convention as out-of-date and in need of renovation, and those more radical critics who believe that it no longer serves any useful purpose and must be phased out, both argue that a new direction is needed.

- Beyond all the criticism formulated against this system, the fundamental question remains as to whether the Lomé Convention will be able, given the necessary changes, to carry on after its fourth version expires.

The years between now and the end of the century will, naturally, see the application of the revised Lomé IV, including the substantial improvements made to it. However, this same period must also be used to prepare the ground for ACP/KU development cooperation in the future, whatever form it might take.

Shortly after his nomination as European Commissioner for relations with the ACP countries and South Africa, Professor Pinheiro commented, realistically, that the ACP countries are no longer 'in fashion'. The change of emphasis can be seen clearly if one looks at the EU's burgeoning relations with its eastern neighbours from the former Communist bloc (illustrated by the wide range of European programmes now benefiting these countries). One might also cite the strengthening of ties with countries in the Mediterranean basin. Economic and security concerns underpin this development, but it undoubtedly reduces the significance which was once accorded to the ACP states.

Moreover, the economic objectives of virtually all EU countries, as they seek to reduce budget deficits and deal with increasing internal social problems inevitably put pressure on the amount of development aid being granted to the Third World.

This situation is, of course, not restricted to the European Union - which in fact remains the world's main contributor of official development aid. At the instigation of a Republican dominated Congress, the United States is planning much more swingeing cuts in its contribution, both to certain international agencies and to certain regions (including Africa).

This undeniable cutback in public development aid has been offset in recent years by net increases in private capital flows, but the geographical distribution is highly skewed. Only a few of the poorest developing countries have benefited from the trend, the main 'winners' being the emerging states of Asia. These include countries such as China, India and Indonesia which, it is worth noting in passing, do not have particularly good human rights records, in the sense that the term is understood in Europe. Despite the fact that ACP countries have identified potential for attracting foreign investment, they have not actually benefited from this change in resource flows.

In this climate, with official development aid in inaeasingly short supply, innovative methods for making optimum use of the available resources must be devised within the context of the Lomé Convention.

On current indications, it is quite possible that in the year 2000, the Lomé Convention will be filed away in the archives. ACP/KU relations will certainly have to be more in step with recent developments on the international scene. The initial reasons for the establishment of a cooperative relationship between Europe and the ACPs, following the signature of the Rome Treaty, are now outmoded. As Paul Valery has commented: 'One of the worst mental aberrations is to think that things can survive when the reasons for their existence have gone'.

So, what type of development cooperation should the countries of the European Union and their ACP partners aim for in the future ?

Alternative trends

The EU has stated that it is in favour of a globalisation of aid within an innovative framework. One of the first questions to be asked is whether uniform cooperation with regions whose monolithic character is being increasingly called into question is still desirable.

Variable geometry in development cooperation relations is increasingly being seen as the trend to be followed.

If this option is chosen, there is a risk of the following scenario being created: The EU's relationship with the Caribbean could become diluted within its relationship with Latin-American countries and links with the Pacific countries could become confused with economic relations with Asia. What would then become of Africa, the continent needing most attention on account of the wide range of its difficulties and its increasing marginalisation ?

In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly, aware of the African question, adopted a new agenda on development in Africa, thus making that continent its number-one priority. Europe, on the other hand, must not simply focus on Africa but must invent new modes of action which are more concrete and more effective.

Secondly, recent trends imply greater conditionality. This has been taken on board not just by EU Member States. A number of multilateral aid agencies have also included it in their strategy. The OECD's Development Aid Committee believes that future relationships between North and South will be greatly influenced by conditionality and, indeed, the Organisation goes so far as to advocate this approach.

However, conditionality in terms of development is a strategic element which must be handled with extreme caution. If cooperation, whether today or in the future, is to be based on conditionality, then it can only be rendered effective if aid recipients (both governments and the governed) are genuinely committed to the idea. They must be convinced, in a climate of resource-scarcity, than the approach is motivated above all by a desire for greater success.

The European Union thus has a vital role to play, making full use of its advantages in terms of dialogue and consultation in order to prevent conditionality being perceived as a condescending mechanism. Thereby, it can help to prevent conditionality from generating the well-known perverse effects of 'tied' aid.

Of course, conditionality raises the thorny question of national sovereignty, but it is important to observe that modern international relations have moved on, both de jure and de facto, from a concept of absolute sovereignty to one of relative sovereignty. This is illustrated by the trend towards humanitarian intervention as a right, the requirements of the Bretton Woods institutions, supranationality in certain regional international organisations, and the very fact of world economic interdependence.

This does not mean that the developing states should sell off their sovereignty to the highest bidder but that conditionality should be the subject of negotiation. Donors must be more flexible in their demands and thereby give the country in question such room to manoeuvre as is necessary for programmes to succeed.

Thirdly, development of the private sector appears now to be approved by all parties. Since independence, the State has been omnipresent and omnipotent in most productive areas of ACP economies. Given the failures of the public sector, private enterprise is now being called in to help. Its development is one of the sector specific policies which will and must receive most support.

The development of the private sector must permit better distribution of the fruits of the growth that it generates and promote integration of the ACP countries into the market economy. There can be no question of pitting private enterprise against the public sector, because any Manichean approach in this sphere might prove to be risky. It is important also to stress that free market development cannot take place overnight and that it is subject to inescapable macro and microeconomic preconditions.

Indeed, the birth and expansion of a dynamic private sector depends on the politico-economic fabric. This includes reliable financial bodies, functioning financial intermediation, adequate infrastructures, technical qualifications and training, a suitable legal/ regulatory framework, institutions to support private businesses, the channelling of the informal sector and a public sector which is prepared to play fair, aware of its regulatory role. These, in short, are the necessary ingredients for the adjustment of the private sector to permit the development of a true enterprise culture.

The development of a harmonious private sector will make it possible more easily to achieve the transformation and export objectives required by international competitiveness. It should, therefore, help to counteract the erosion of commercial preferences generated by the Uruguay Round. The latter's time limits should, in any case, be extended, because it seems clear that the ACP countries will be unable to fulfil their obligations by the end of the moratorium obtained by the EU during the negotiations.

The notion of compensating for inequality that is found in international development law, implies the adoption of a normative system to counteract the weak trading position of developing countries vis-a-vis their competitors in the North. But in recent times, this idea has been losing ground and it is unlikely to cut much ice with the WTO authorities. Legal equality in a situation where there is structural inequality is not, in fact, equitable, and it is therefore necessary to find some other way of mitigating the adverse effects, looking at it in a global context.

Promotion of domestic and foreign investment should be better supported. People talk of the 'risk/ country' threshold that deters foreign investors. It may be that this can be measured objectively by looking at economic and other indicators, but even if this is not possible, it clearly exists as a psychological barrier. This is a problem for many ACP countries and it needs to be crossed, using measures which tackle the many obstacles to investment.

Changing the culture of development cooperation

Besides all the technical aspects, one could argue that the shortcomings of the Lomé Convention stem also from the perceptions of those involved in development cooperation. In short, it is the actual concept and culture of development aid which must be changed.

On the European side, the colonial legacy has conditioned attitudes, imprinting on them a dominant patemalism which is prejudicial to the aim of development. This European concept of cooperation must be overturned. Moreover, development cooperation must not be seen as the art of the possible but as the art of making possible what is strictly necessary, by virtue of genuine negotiation with the countries which have resolved to move forward.

Moreover, it is desirable to have a better developed policy of informing European public opinion about development cooperation. An effort is needed to counter false impressions, such as the one left by the French journalist who wrote: 'Official development aid is like taking money from the poor in rich countries to give it to the rich in poor countries'. Better information is needed to ensure that the public can decide such matters for itself.

Coordinating the Union's policies with those of the Member States now presents an enormous challenge. The political obstacles are huge and development cooperation may well suffer as a result of them if the objectives of coordination, coherence and complementarity contained in the Maastricht Treaty are not achieved.

As for the ACP countries, success in their economic development depends on many factors, cooperation being only one of them. Many political leaders in these nations have too often described cooperation with the North as the only way in which they can develop. In fact, this should be seen as nothing more than an additional factor - supporting the national effort and a genuine desire for development. It is pure fantasy to believe that development can be set in motion solely on the basis of an external impetus. To succeed, it must come from within a country. This is why future cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries must progress towards reinforcing the aptitude of the latter to devise, master and control their own development process.

In the future, the ACP countries must propose concrete and responsible solutions to their partners, doing so by means of the dialogue system. They must also promote development based on participation, particularly with the involvement of young people and women.

The fact that the ACPs can offer a credible prospectus for development must be acknowledged. It is undoubtedly a challenge, but it can successfully be overcome if a climate of stability, security and confidence is created, matched by an unambiguous political will.

In KU/ACP relations, programmes must include the long-term vision necessary for sustainable development. Too often in the past, the strategy has been aimed at an immediate and ostentatious result. Successful development in the future will depend crucially on a change in such attitudes.

K.K.

Let us know what you think

The debate about the future of cooperation between the European Union and the ACP states is now beginning to gash' pace. Last year, we established the 'Analysis' section in The Courier to report on this debate-and give readers an opportunity to express their own views on the subject.

The response so far has been encouraging, but it has come mainly from the European side. We are keen to receive contributions from ACP readers as well. If you have you own ideas or opinions about what should happen after Lomé IV expires, why not put them on paper and send them to us. Our address is on the inside front cover of the magazine.

This was the subject of a conference which took place in Maastricht from 12-14 June, under the auspices of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). It brought together participants from ACP countries and Europe, including representatives of civil society (NGOs, the private sector, etc.). Four major topics were addressed:

� How can a new KU/ACP commercial relationship be constructed ?

There was agreement that some form of preferential trade regime should continue after 2000. Some participants stressed the need to Promote 'fair trade', which would contribute not only to growth but also to development. The impact of individual trade preferences is not always clear-cut, but obviously there cannot be a single solution covering all problems in all ACP countries. An analysis of negative constraints demonstrated the difficulties involved in reconciling the rules of the Lomé Convention and those of the World Trade Organisation.

� How can the private sector become involved in development ?

The most important aspect of this topic is knowing how to create a favourable and business-friendly environment which will enable the private sector to play its part-and the role the European Union could play in this process. The private sector was defined as both formal and informal, encompassing large, medium and small enterprises, whether local or foreign. The importance of a strong local private sector in guaranteeing long-term stability was particularly emphasised. In this respect, the view was expressed that the role of the state and its relationship with the European Commission should be redefined. There was also a call for time to be set aside time for effective dialogue, and to create the space for a partnership between the public and private sectors. It was felt that the role of Economic and Social Councils should be expanded and specified more clearly. As for the specific issue of privatisation, the point was made that this should not be seen as a panacea and that it should be approached on a country-by-country basis.

As regards current instruments, it was noted that their objective is essentially to meet public-sector requirements. The role of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) attracted some criticism. Speakers felt that the private sector should be more involved in the preparation and implementation of cooperation programmes with the European Community. Direct financial support to the private sector was seen as desirable, including backing from the European Investment Bank.

� What partnership ?

The partnership concept was seen to have been eroded over the past two decades, with the pretext of efficiency resulting in a more paternalistic approach. Mechanisms needed to be found to enable EU priorities and the prerogatives of ACP countries to be reconciled. Reference was made to the political nature of the origin of the partnership and the need to find a new political raison d'etre for this type of relationship. The problems of cohesion within the ACP group and its relations with the EU were also raised, and there was a discussion about the possibility of giving the Convention a regional character-although a number of speakers expressed reservations about this.

On the European side, two lacunae emerged, namely coordination between donors, and consistency between Lomé and other Community policies (including relationships with the Bretton Woods institutions).

In addition to the principle of partnership, some participants were keen to stress the motives of solidarity and common interest that lay behind cooperation. It was not simply a matter of 'negative' interdependence. The appropriateness of the term 'partnership' was questioned, if this was only to mean financial and technical cooperation. The politicisation of Lomé appears to be on the agenda, involving a move from the current partnership to a genuine 'contractual approach' through political dialogue.

As for the role of partnership in cooperation policy management, it was felt essential that civil society and the private sector be involved. There was also a discussion of the debt problem.

� How can financial and technical cooperation be improved ?

As usual, reference was made to the need to simplify and differentiate management of Lomé Convention instruments, particularly in the context of the programming process. As regards the role of non-state actors, a cautious approach was recommended. Finally, new instruments were called for to prevent conflict.

� Conclusions

This conference, coming after several others of the same type, was characterised essentially by private sector and NGO calls for greater participation in Community cooperation policy. Moreover, the need for 'politicisation' of the Lomé policy, shifting from purely financial and technical aid to a genuine cooperation contract, seems to have attracted the support of all participants. These questions are sure to figure in the 'Green Paper' on 'tome after 2000', which the European Commission plans to publish before the end of 1996.

Dominique David

On 6 and 7 June, the Belgian Par/iament hosted a UN seminar on 'me future of international development cooperation: new communication challenges' 'Democratising Democracy' was the succinct, journalistic way in which one of the speakers at the meeting summed up his solution to the problem of underdevelop meet. He was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former President of Haiti, who observed that democracy, as advocated by the developed world, and increasingly accepted by developing countries, does not prevent the latter's slide into even greater poverty. The Courier had the opportunity to interview Mr Aristide. We began by asking him whether his statement implied that democracy is failing in a world striving to 'globalise' it J-B.A.-The word democracy comes from the Greek words 'demos', meaning people and 'kratein', meaning to govern. In other words, it signifies government of the people, for the people by the people-but if we take a look at the world today, the impression we get is that not all so-called democratic governments are in fact what they purport to be. Hence the need to 'democratise democracy', so as to create a situation in which all citizens can help set governments on a course towards such a model.

Concepts usually generate conflict and, therefore, when speaking of revolution, democracy or globalisation, it is necessary to be au fait with the subject matter so as not to become involved in a dialogue of the deaf. In the specific case of globalisation, my opinion is that this has a tendency to make what is an already precarious situation even more unbalanced. Concepts cannot be applied everywhere without thought being given to their harmful consequences. This does not mean to say that we should give up completely. It's one thing to speak of the globalisation of peace, as if an ineluctable need existed to promote peace on a world scale, but I'm not sure that everyone would define the globalisation of peace in the same way as I do.

� Could we turn now to your own country, Haiti. How do you view the future of democracy there, bearing in mind the economic circumstances ? At the seminar, you mentioned several factors which demonstrate democracy's *agility.

-Democracy is indeed fragile. 1% of Haiti's population owns 48% of the country's wealth and it is estimated that about 65% of the working population is employed in agriculture as against 5.1% in the 'industrial' sector. But is this really the true picture ? Reality for most people is poverty-unacceptable and sub-human poverty. A man needs work to earn his daily crust by the sweat of his brow, but unemployment has reached catastrophic proportions. When people are unable to earn their living, there is little point in discussing the positive influence of democracy. What is needed is for those with a great deal of wealth and those with less wealth to talk to each other; a dialogue between the private and public sectors, so that we can head off futile conflicts and devote all our efforts to economic growth coupled with human development. I do believe that this is possible.

� Yet, the rich are so rich and the poor so poor. Is it not fantasy to think that the gulf which separates them, and their mutual mistrust, can simply be set aside so that genuine dialogue can take place ?

-This is one of the challenges we have faced ever since 1960 and, although we have not yet reaped the harvest of this process, we have to carry on. It's not too late. We just have to approach the subject logically and with all the facts to hand, and we must have the intelligence to be patient. If we continue with dialogue, we will achieve real results. Only the citizens of Haiti can play a part in Haiti's development-this is not a task for outsiders. We, on the other hand, have to be more receptive to international cooperation, while maintaining mutual respect and dignity. But what we also need is for our own people to act together in order to enhance our own growth. This is not to say that geopolitical reality can be disregarded. Other countries have to be taken into account, but, as a starting point, we have to consider Haiti's human and material resources.

� Thereisdialogueata world level, but there are rules to be applied. I am thinking, here, of free competition. Haiti has to play by the rules, just like any other country.

-Since we gained independence, our history has seen a succession of coups d'etat and people have been over-eager in brandishing weapons to solve economic, political or social problems. Now that democracy has been restored in Haiti, weapons are not the solution to our problems-I cannot stress this enough. What we need is for those with money to sit down and negotiate with those who have none: for the government to get people round the table and devise a common plan to accommodate all interested parties- looking at both the nation's interests and the interests of investors. I do believe that it is possible to achieve this. We have, in fact, already begun to prepare the ground. I am not basing my words, here, on pure theory, but am speaking from experience. In concrete terms, we have to transcend class and racial differences to recognise that Haitian men and women, regardless of their colour and the country they might live in outside Haiti, regardless of their nationality, even, are still part of Haiti's indigenous population. The way must be kept open for dignified and balanced cooperation.

� The other point you mentioned today was that there can be no development without the effective involvement of the population. Are you not leaving yourself open to accusations of having socialist or even communist tendencies ?

-As I have just said, we have to be scientific in our approach and check our facts over and over again. I fail to see how anyone can claim to be working towards peace without looking at poverty which is the greatest threat to social cohesion. Of course, there are those who would deny this assertion, and that is their right. However, rational analysis of the situation can help us alleviate poverty and promote security. It needs to be underlined that security is also one of the essential factors in economics. The UN Security Council is called in to prevent or resolve conflicts. To my mind, we should also be talking about an economic security council to deal with the economic realities. The deeper one plunges into poverty, the greater one's feelings of insecurity-the two always go hand in hand. And insecurity can crop up anywhere in the world. Nor is it a question of charity. It is a real, rational question which must sharpen our awareness, stimulate our common sense and set us on a course to protect the world by alleviating poverty. That, at least, is one approach.

At the same time, you have to recognise that politics is essentially a question of power while economics is influenced by interests. Everyone uses the means at their disposal to defend their personal interests and we know perfectly well that there are no free gifts. The so-called developed countries allocate just 0.3% of their GDP to development aid, yet we are losing our tropical forests at the rate of the area of a football pitch every second. In Haiti, forests now cover only a small area of the country. But in the final analysis, environmental catastrophe threatens us all, rich and poor alike, even if certain countries do not face specific ecological risks. We either deal with it as reasonable people, or we close our eyes to the 'cause and effect' realities.

� Yes, but are we reasonable people ?

-The crisis of ethics is indeed a reality and a great many values are now being called into question. These days, we have to love in order to prove we are not contradicting ourselves. If we believe in God, we might call this love 'God', just as we might call it 'justice'. It all depends on your philosophy, religion or beliefs. If I feel love, I cannot be indifferent to the situation of victims of injustice, both in Haiti and elsewhere. If a man is humiliated, crushed, exploited or marginalised, then 1, too, am humiliated, crushed and marginalised. It is love which makes us fight for justice everywhere. Either one is a demagogue revelling in big words or one is sincere and ready to die so that another might live-this brings immortality.

� One final question. You were speaking just now of insecurity and economics. Is there a link, here, with one of your most recent decisions, the abolition of Haiti's army ? Could you tell us how you were able to pull off this 'coup'?

- I am perfectly happy to answer such an important question and would like to be able to give a clear and direct reply. But given that the struggle is still going on, I don't think I should go into too much detail. A decision was made. The Haitian people opted to rid themselves of the army. Supporting their democratic wish, it was our job to help bring about this dissolution. The army, it is worth recalling, had about 7000 men, absorbed 40% of the national budget-and had killed many of our compatriots. We have had to be logical and patient in achieving this goal, bearing in mind that the guarantors of the agreement which led to my return had their own views, which were different from ours. We also needed courage and wisdom and, above all, the determination of the people. My motto has always been that it is better to fail with the people than to succeed without them, and in this we did not fail. Our task now is not to bask in our own glory but to continue the work of structuring the police force, to prevent it becoming another army. To achieve this, we have to make steady progress and use sound judgment.

Interview by Hegel Goutier

by Jean-Pierre Tilquin and Miguel Amado

This tiny country tucked away at the heart of Africa has, as is well known, been convulsed over the last three years by an acute socio-political crisis. The tragic consequences have included loss of human life, damage to the economic and social infrastructure, and a movement of refugees to neighbouring countries. Burundi, already one of the most densely populated nations in Africa, also has high population growth. It could be argued that it is only thanks to the hard work and perseverance of the farmers (admittedly, 90% of the population) that the country manages to keep going at all.

Agriculture in Burundi follows traditional lines and is based on a farming system divided between food crops for consumption by the farmer and his family, and cash crops (mainly coffee, tea and cotton). Although at the beginning of the decade the crops grown for food were sufficient to meet the population's needs, today demographic pressures are forcing farmers to increase food-crop production. It is these pressures that have prompted them to descend into the marshlands which cover approximately 110 000 hectares (8% of cultivable land in Burundi). These marshes are flooded during the rainy season and so allow rice to be cultivated.

Population growth has also meant that fields cannot be left fallow for long periods. This has resulted in more intensive use of marginal land and an increase in forest clearing. Such practices exacerbate erosion of cultivated areas. The loss of organic matter and nutrients leads to reduced soil fertility and lower yields. Although rainfall in Burundi is high, the soil is only moderately fertile, because of factors such as acidity, aluminium toxicity, and phosphorus immobilisation.

While 20% of land suitable for cultivation is currently given over to growing dry beans-a staple in the Burundi diet - various factors now point towards farming the low-lying marshlands, with a particular emphasis on rice. This is one way of increasing the useful agricultural surface area of the country.

The events of 1993 (democratic elections, followed by the assassination of President Ndadaye), have created a period of instability which has been highly damaging for the country's agriculture. Some people lost their property and livelihood, and are only now slowly re-establishing themselves. The environment has also suffered as a result of the sheer numbers of displaced people. They occupy areas, both urban and rural, which were completely unprepared for the flood of people. it is estimated that 50 000 hectares of forest have been destroyed as a result-with devastating consequences for the country's ecosystem. What is more, the rate of demographic growth has led to overfarming and to a reduction in the average surface area of farms (to 0.7 ha per household).

Rice-a crop for the future

Against this background, the prospect of farming low-lying marshland offers some hope for the people of Burundi. In fact, the marshy valleys have long been used to grow beans, maize and sweet potatoes during the long dry season for later consumption during the short dry season. This practice, which was environmentally sound, provided a regular harvest, but also ensured the preservation of the marshlands.

The practice of growing rice during the rainy season, followed by a crop of maize and beans during the dry season, is a form of integrated agriculture. It should be economically viable and environmentally sustainable while ensuring product quality, delivering a good yield, limiting any risks involved and allowing a high degree of social integration. These are the criteria which need to be examined in determining whether high-altitude rice cultivation in Burundi succeeds or fails.

Rice crops have been grown in this region, on the shores of Lake Tanganyika and in the Ruzizi valley (altitude 800 m), for more than 200 years, having been introduced by successive migrations of people travelling along the old slave route from Zanzibar. Certain varieties, known as 'pandabilima' (which in Swahili means 'he who climbs the mountain') can be grown on land up to a height of 1300 metres. They cannot, however, be planted on the higher central plateau because low temperatures at night render them completely infertile.

It is not surprising that the new scheme to grow rice at high altitudes was greeted with interest. Indeed, it became almost a craze among farmers -to the extent that in 1990, rice crops covered more than 20 000 ha of Burundi. The area planted with rice fell subsequently, and in some regions the crop disappeared altogether. This was due largely to the appearance of the fungal 'rice blast disease', which can wipe out an entire crop, and to inadequate planning and misguided husbandry. The extensive planting of only one variety left the crop particularly vulnerable and once the disease did take hold, it was virtually impossible to eradicate. Needless to say, in a country where access to pesticides is non-existent, the introduction of a new crop cannot be based on a single variety; if it is to establish itself successfully, varietal diversification is vital. We should point out here that attempts were made in 1984 to improve varietal diversification

in the framework of the EU's Scientific and Technical Programme run by DG XII of the Commission. At that time, it was necessary to familiarise farmers with the techniques for growing the new crop and this aspect of the programme was funded by the EDF, in particular through three integrated projects. These related to agriculture and pastoral forestry and were initiated during 198889 in three provinces of Burundi.

Without going into the technical details of the programme, it suffices to say that growing rice at high altitude in the tropics differs from rice-growing in temperate regions. The low night-time temperatures characteristic of high altitudes mean that the crop is subject to constant stress. In temperate regions, the stress caused by cold weather is a problem only at the beginning and end of the growing cycle. As for selection methods, rice varieties have been produced that are resistant to rice blast disease - which remains the main problem. Also, by mixing the varieties grown, the farmers have created a wide diversity which offers a stable basis for a sustainable crop.

Transformation of an ecosystem

From the viewpoint of development aid specialists, turning marshland into cultivable land means draining it (digging a ditch and fitting pipes). But this leaves the land open to erosion, causes silting in rivers and ultimately leading to desertification. By changing water levels in a region and disturbing the thermal equilibrium, marshlands cease to be marshlands. The method may have been justifiable before rice growing became possible. Indeed, it was employed in the natural marshlands of Buyenzi by some experts who specialised in upland rice. But it also resulted in large-scale destruction of one ricevariety-Yunnan 3-by rice blast disease in 1990.

Development projects which set themselves spectacular objectives can involve major alterations to the landscape. More often than not, these need to be rectified later. Thus, when it was decided to cultivate vast expanses of papyrus, the plants were moderately successful only thanks to constant artificial assistance. Put simply, the land could not sustain the crop on its own. In the process, the marshes were turned into floating peat bogs.

The option chosen here was to adapt the small valleys for rice cultivation and teach the farmers the relevant techniques. Together with their families, they have eagerly embarked on the work needed to prepare the terrain for cultivation, although there are still some land tenure issues that need resolving. (Some people have refused to commit themselves to marshland reclamation projects as long as the land does not belong to them). It should be stressed that growing rice along a strip of water is an option which is in harmony with environmental needs. It promotes percolation of the water, thereby restoring underground water levels and preventing pollutants from being washed down towards the Nile or Zaire basins. It is therefore in keeping with global strategies for conserving resources and ensuring sustainable development.

In the marshlands, farmers traditionally plant beans and maize in banked-up beds during the dry season (from June to November). By skilfully selecting and growing different bean varieties, the farmer can stagger his crops and thereby ensure a continuous harvest from September until the time the maize is harvested. The marshes are then left fallow during the heavy rains which reach their peak in April. A rice variety which can be harvested in six months could thus be fitted in during this perriod with out disturbing the traditional hill-farming work schedule.

Since farmers on the high plateaux had not traditionally grown rice, it was necessary to teach them the techniques needed to produce a successful crop. They were also informed of the benefits that improvements such as dykes, water supply pipes and drainage pipes could have on crop productivity. They have since applied this knowledge in their cultivation. During the dry season, without disrupting the infrastructures on which their rice cultivation is based, they have rebuilt banked-up beds and grown the traditional bean and maize crop. The system has been in place for about ten years and no drop in yield has been recorded. The yield averages 4.5 t/ha for rice, 1 t/ha for beans and 0.4 t/ha for maize-figures which are quite remarkable when compared with the yields of crops grown on the hills in acid soil with increasing levels of aluminium toxicity.

By alternating two different farming systems, the problem of weeds -and therefore hoeing-and of pests is greatly limited. The extensive mixing of the soil that takes place accelerates the recycling of biogenic material-and the marshlands stay as marshlands!

Manageable land development

There are three main types of marshy valley, each requiring specific programmes. The first consists of valleys lying above 1400 m with a rainfall in excess of 1500 mm. These areas are characterised by a clay soil, are constantly fed with water (with a high iron content) from the mountains, and are often very rich in organic matter. They require drainage using ditches and filtration channels, with changes of gradient so that the mountain water tables can be tapped and the water levels controlled. This is important to prevent a build-up of ferrous toxicity in the soil, which is extremely harmful to rice. A farming system involving paddy fields and banked-up beds can be accommodated perfectly in these types of valleys. Then there are the valleys lying between 800 and 1400 m with a rainfall of between 1100 and 1500 mm. These are known as 'dambos' in Swahili, and they extend from Northern Kenya right down to Southern Zimbabwe. Strewn with giant termite nests, the land here is well-suited to rice cultivation as long as water levels are carefully controlled. All the available water needs to be harnessed via filtration canals dug into the hillside. These allow the paddies to be irrigated speedily and, during the dry season, they can also be used to irrigate between the rows of ridgeplanted crops. It would, however, be very difficult to irrigate the entire valley during the dry season and so it is pointless digging a drainage ditch. The third and final type consists of small alluvial plains tucked away between the hills and stretching along the escarpments. Here, the level of soil fertility is determined by the heavy erosion resulting from farming on burnt land, and the practice of setting fire to the hills in order to 'regenerate' pastures. To grow rice in such locations, a filtration canal needs to be dug into the hillside, into which water then collects from the water table. The paddy fields also need to be terraced. These alluvial plains lend themselves perfectly to a farming system in which paddy fields are alternated with banked-up beds. All these land-adaptation schemes can be easily implemented and maintained by the farmers themselves.

A sociological revolution

Although rice grows quickly, it is highly labour-intensive. Thus, when

the young rice plants need to be planted out-which happens to coincide with the end-of-year school holidays-the whole family takes part. What is more, rice has become extremely important in sociological terms: reserved in days gone by for special occasions, it now forms part of the nation's staple diet, being mixed together with beans and dressed with palm oil and tomato sauce. The rice harvest is also a time for merrymaking and festivities which go on for the best part of a week.

Rice cultivation has also engendered a vital sense of solidarity among farmers as far as sharing water is concerned, and rice-growing cooperatives have been a runaway success. These enable farming operations to be synchronised and running costs to be reduced, in particular by reducing the number of bird scarers needed. The crop, furthermore, can be harvested when fully ripe. On individual plots, farmers usually only allow the rice to mature to 75% before harvest for fear of theft. Finally, the cooperative helps to ensure that infrastructures such as drains and canals are properly maintained and that water supply installations are treated with respect. Each cooperative is run by a representative appointed by the group of farmers. These supervisors are then responsible for organising all operations: choosing and storing seed for the following season's crops, getting information about new varieties, consulting each other and pointing out any problems they may have to those in charge of research and advisory services. The area allotted to each cooperative depends on the number of households in the group and also takes into account the area available, with 10 ares per family being the usual maximum for planted-up paddy fields. Cooperatives may range in size from 5 to 25 families.

Cooperatives like this are just the beginning. Networks of rural organisations, in which the farmers club together to buy equipment and fertilisers, need to be developed on a larger scale and they could provide a springboard for the development of the secondary sector, which is vital to the development of the country as a whole.

We would do well to recall that the cassava mills which have been so successful in Burundi and which still run today without any 'technical assistance' had equally humble beginnings.

The future

It must be acknowledged that the people who migrated to this 'wild frontier' of rice cultivation in Burundi also introduced into these regions diseases such as bilharzia and malaria (the mosquitoes carrying the parasite were transported in the luggage of people travelling from the capital to the provinces). Despite this, rice cultivation at high altitude has proved a veritable lifesaver for Burundi. In the year that the FAO plans to stage a summit on famine, it is appropriate to highlight the important role of rice-growing in the food production strategy of this country.

Until recently, Burundi ensured that it had enough to feed its people through a delicate balancing act between growing food crops, leaving land fallow and rearing livestock which produced manure. At present, however, increased agricultural production is only possible by increasing the surface area of the country under cultivation-at the expense of fallow land and livestock farming. Such a move risks reducing soil fertility and could lead to the substitution of crops of high nutritional value, such as beans, with higher yield crops such as cassava or sweet potatoes which suck the subsoil dry of minerals and nutrients.

In short, traditional farming methods in Burundi are arguably now out of balance and the situation is getting worse. This may, indeed, be a root cause of the ethnic crisis. A systematic policy of re-establishing marshlands and organising rural communities around high-altitude rice cultivation would allow the country to look ahead with optimism to the next 20 years. Suitable varieties are currently available and the altitudes at which rice can be grown have been pushed back in Burundi as far as 1700 m. What is now needed is the funds!

J-P.T. & M.A.

A view from UNESCO.

The article which follows is an abridged version of a text compiled by Carlos Amaldo, who heads UNESCO's research into communication and the free flow of information. Mr Arnaldo highlights some of the main aspects of the UN agency's support for the development of a free press in the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions.

The resolution passed by the ACP/KU Joint Assembly in March 1996 in Windhoek, Namibia, reflected the spirit of many of UNESCO's communication programmes in these regions. Echoing the principal tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the resolution declares: 'freedom of expression is a precondition for holding free and fair elections'; 'the monopoly of information media is a barrier to the development of democracy,'; 'there is a need to create a climate in which all part)" can participate fully in political life.' It further holds: 'communication media must not only inform the electorate in an impartial and objective manner' but also; 'freedom of expression and the existence of free communications media are vital preconditions for the development of a democratic society.'

The resolution was timely, responding to a need to remind political leaders, as well as civic society, of the relation between free communication media and truly democratic practices. Just five years ago, on 3 May 1991,

African journalists and media adopted the Windhoek Declaration at the UN/ UNESCO seminar on promoting an independent and pluralistic African press. Likewise, journalists and media practitioners of each major region adopted the Declarations of Alma Ata (October 1992), Santiago (May 1994) and Sana'a (January 1996), all of which affirmed the unwavering belief of professional communicators in freedom of expression, press freedom, independence and pluralism of the media, and the contribution of such freedoms to democratic processes. At their 28th General Conference, UNESCO Member States further declared that, 'press freedom is an essential component of any democracy.' All these declarations contain action programmes to strengthen press freedom in these regions.

Africa

Turning to look at some practical initiatives, a media project entitled 'Independent Press in Africa', which was put in place after the signing of the Windhoek declaration, soon attracted the interest of a number of donors (Italy, USA, France). Under this project, the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) organised four sets of courses for journalists in 1994. In April 1995, IPDC arranged a multi-theme workshop for 33 English-speaking journalists and editors from Central and West Africa on marketing, distribution techniques, managing mass media enterprises in Africa, new communication technologies, journalism and ethical issues.

There are now plans afoot to study the situation of the press in Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros, and to publish several handbooks about press enterprises. Efforts will also be made to attract increased donor contributions so that the successes achieved by these initial training activities can be strengthened and shared with other regions.

A further example of positive action in support of the media is the work of MISA (the Media Institute of Southern Africa-featured in more detail in the following article). This organisation has been receiving UNESCO support since 1994 under a funding arrangement with the Danish International Development Agency. The project seeks to strengthen links among the region's independent media so as to enhance the free flow of information. It also aims to boost cooperation and information-sharing with similar groups in developing and developed countries worldwide, to strengthen the ability of the region's independent media to stand on its own feet and to improve professional standards.

MlSA, which was set up in 1992, has been monitoring and safeguarding press freedom in the region, facilitated by an electronic network for distribution of information on press freedom issues. It has mounted seminars and training workshops for professional journalists on computer-aided design, strategic financial management, journalism ethics and advertising management. MISA's campaigning material includes a bi-monthly magazine, Free Press: the Media Magazine of Southern Africa and a booklet, So this is Democray, which is a compilation of its 'action alerts' curing 1994 and 1995.

Another UNESCO initiative is the 'Communication and Good Governance in West and Central African Countries' project, supported by Germany. This aims to strengthen the human and technical capacity of the media in these regions so that they can make a contribution to good governance. The three year project is to be implemented in 10 countries - Benin, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Sao Tome & Principe and Togo.

Together with other institutions such as legislatures, the judiciary and civic organisations, media bodies like MISA have a useful role to play. They can enhance transparency and accountability by systematic analysis and reporting of government programmes, policies and pledges, and by encouraging public discussions which help people to make informed decisions about public issues and about how their leaders discharge the power vested in them. Fulfilment of these functions requires access to the media, and qualified, well-trained practitioners who can effectively use the media for information, education and communication on good governance issues.

Caribbean

Turning our attention now to the Caribbean, the question of media freedom recently came to the fore in Trinidad and Tobago when 13 editors and journalists on The Guardian lost their jobs following publication of a number of controversial articles (some reports said they 'constructively resigned'). The events cast a shadow over the famous Carnival. Indeed, as one journalist put it, the Carnival quickly ceded to the 'sacrificial rites' of Holy Week. Six of the paper's youngest reporters were among those who lost their jobs-but out of the furore, a new newspaper was born.

A 'Comparative Study of Media Laws in the CARICOM countries' by Ainsley Sahai, commissioned earlier by UNESCO, became a reference in the debates that followed. The study highlighted that all Caribbean countries guaranteed freedom of expression in their national constitutions. Indeed, Trinidad and Tobago's constitution explicitly guarantees press freedom as well. The Media Association of Trinidad and Tobago (MATT) organised two meetings. The first of these, on 10 April 1996, was a public forum on issues of press freedom. Although a full cross-section of society was not present, and not all the issues at stake were fully debated, it was nevertheless a start. Those who took the floor came from many sectors of society -women, the unemployed, workers, community organisations and at least three different religious groups. About a quarter of those who contributed spoke as individuals. While many criticised the press for errors in reporting, all confirmed the need to uphold a free press vis-a-vis both political pressures and economic and financial interests.

The public gave strong support to MATT and demanded that the forum be replicated in other parts of the country. It was the first time that the public had been given the opportunity to speak out on these issues. It was not so much the content of the discussion which counted, but the very fact that the event took place, bringing the media closer to its 'customers'. The meeting gave the public an opportunity to put over their own perceptions of press freedom, impartial reporting and the strengthening of democratic processes.

Two days later, with support from UNESCO, the Media Association staged a journalists' symposium, moderated by George John, consulting editor at The Guardian. David de Caires, publisher of Guyana's Stabroek News was invited by MATT as an external consultant. Drawing on past and more recent examples of uneasy relations between a free press and governments, Mr de Caires concluded with a headlinehitting statement; the relations of the press with government should not be too cosy, the press must maintain its adversarial position.

Many journalists took the floor to stress Trinidad and Tobago's constitutional guarantees for both freedom of expression and press freedom. They also stressed the need to safeguard editorial independence, not only in the printed press, but also in broadcasting, and urged the repeal of 'antiquated' libel laws-a point also made in the Sahai study. The preparation of a Freedom of Information Act was strongly urged to ensure access to public information.

These events appear to have strengthened the resolve of the jobless journalists. They grouped together to set up a new weekly newspaper, called The Independent. The new publication focuses on investigative articles, comment and reviews. In addition, a monthly called The Formatt was launched by MATT to disseminate specialised news on press freedom issues and to provide print support for future public fore. Both newspapers brought out their first editions in early May amidst the celebrations of World Press Freedom Day.

Pacific

In the Pacific, issues of freedom of expression and press freedom are no less salient, although a key issue for practitioners there is the modernisation of infrastructures. This is needed to ensure that this vast island region does not find itself in the slow lane of the information highway.

The computerisation of radio newsrooms, in places such as the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Tonga, is a priority. The Cook Islands already has a fully computerised newspaper operation. Indeed, this is the first newspaper in the Pacific with the capacity to transmit photographs from various parts of the country to the newsroom electronically by phone.

Considerable concern has been expressed about the inadequacy of national television programming. There is a need for the people of the Pacific to see themselves and their culture, and not just the imported fare distributed by most international TV services. With UNESCO support, women media producers from seven island countries were able to meet to work out ways of cooperating on a series of television documentaries that they themselves produced and exchanged within the region. Preparations are now under way for the annual evaluation and awarding of prizes at the end of 1996.

C.A.A.

by David Nthengwe

The Media Institute of Southern Africa

Officially launched in September 1992, the role of the Media Institute of Southern Africa is primarily that of coordinator, facilitator and communicator in the promotion of media freedom and diversity, (as envisaged in the 1991 Windhoek Declaration). MISA operates in 11 of the 1 2 SADC countries and is currently investigating setting up a chapter in the twelfth-Mauritius- which joined the Community 1995.

The chapters are serviced by a regional secretariat based in the Namibian capital, Windhoek. The secretariat is accountable to a policy-making governing council of elected representatives from each national chapter, while funding for MISA and its projects is channeled through the MISA Education and Production Trust, overseen by a board of independent trustees. The organisation is currently almost entirely donor-funded, with UNESCO, NORAD, SIDA, the KU, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, IBIS, and the Australian and German governments being the main contributors. Other income is generated through the sale of subscriptions to MISA publications and services.

The Institute's main work is in the field of advocacy; highlighting violations of media freedom and free expression, and exploring ways of ensuring that these fundamental freedoms become entrenched throughout Southern Africa. In 1994, MISA became a member of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) network in a bid to increase international awareness of media freedom violations in Southern Africa. Membership of IFEX has enabled MISA to distribute as well as receive information on media freedom issues in a quick and relatively cheap way via the Internet.

'Action alerts'

In 1994 and 1995, MISA issued via IFEX and its own electronic mail network, the MISANET (see below), more than 190 'action alerts' relating to media freedom infringements in Southern Africa, and effective campaigns against some of these violations have resulted. In August 1994, Lesotho journalist, Rabuka Chalatse, was shot by soldiers while covering a demonstration. An alert issued by MISA triggered a swift response, and within 24 hours, funds had been raised to pay for emergency treatment which saved the young journalist's leg. In November 1995, Angolan freelance journalist, Mario Paiva, had his life threatened by people who, it was alleged, were state security agents. MlSA's alert prompted protest from throughout the world, and resulted in several governments offering Paiva sanctuary in their embassies in Angola. The threat against the journalist was subsequently lifted.

MlSA's advocacy work has also shown that democratisation does not necessarily result in guaranteed media freedom and free expression. In Zambia, for example, which had a multi-party election in 1991, arcane laws inherited from previous regimes have been used against the private media in particular, and free expression, in general. As this article was being written, Fred M'membe, the Editor-in-Chief of Zambia's privately-owned daily 'The Post', and two of his colleagues, were starting an indefinite prison term for contempt of Parliament. The sentence was passed not by a court of law, but by the Speaker, under legislation inherited from British colonial rule. Their 'crime' was to comment on criticism made in Parliament of a Supreme Court decision which declared unconstitutional, laws requiring anyone wishing to stage a demonstration to obtain police permission first.

Five months prior to his arrest, M'membe received the MISA Press Freedom Award, which is presented annually to individuals or institutions considered to have made an outstanding contribution to the advancement of media freedom in Southern Africa. M'membe was the third recipient of the award.

Free flow of information essential

As the Windhoek Declaration points out, 'the establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press' is essential to economic development, as well as for the growth of democracy. Accordingly, MISA argues that the free flow of information is vital to the development process. Effective communication within SADC-a 'development community'- has been hampered by the region's poor postal and telecommunications services. MISA considers that these logistical barriers to the free flow of information are a form of censorship. In a bid to break through the information voids which have kept Southern African media workers and their audiences isolated from each other for so long, it has made particular use of advances in information technology, including, most notably, the Internet.

Over the past two years, MISA has been linking member organisations up to electronic mail (e-mail). This allows members throughout the region to exchange news, photographs and other information. To date, 25 MISA member organisations are linked to this network, called the MISANET, although further growth has been hampered by members' unfamiliarity with e-mail, and the lack of local technicians to train people and provide user support. Nonetheless, computerised communications have proved to be an appropriate technology, and development of the MISANET remains a top priority. By making some services available to non-MISA subscribers, MISA also intends to generate income and thus reduce its current dependency on donor funding.

Focus on training

The coordination of training and material support to independent media is another area where MISA looks to develop media freedom and diversity. The region's independent media sometimes operates in politically and economically hostile environments. Its survival-and thus the sustenance and growth of media diversity-hinges on these organisations becoming highly professional, well-managed concerns.

Working through training institutions based primarily in the region, MISA coordinates workshops and other training programmes aimed at improving the skills of media workers, particularly in the fields of management and finance. Workshops in strategic and financial management, project management, advertising, marketing, sales and subscription management, ethics, subediting, and computerised design were staged during 1994 and 1995. For 1996, training is scheduled in economic reporting, project management, photography, advertising sales, circulation and sales management, computer-aided design, developing world and financial and strategic management. Instruction will also be provided to media workers without formal training. Meanwhile, research is to be carried out into setting up a media ombudsman for Southern Africa, printing press initiatives, media training needs, and the difficulties faced by women media workers in the region. The last-mentioned is in line with MlSA's policy of encouraging gender awareness and equality within the Southern African media.

Private and community-based media organisations face constant problems securing adequate finance. As businesses, they often do not qualify for donor support, while banks are reluctant to lend them money. Therefore, MISA is looking to set up of a Media Development Fund to which independent media can apply for loans, credit guarantees and grants. A study is currently being conducted into the feasibility of such a fund, which MISA hopes to have up-andrunning by early 1997.

Broadcasting in Southern Africa is still largely state-controlled. Moves by some of the region's governments to 'deregulate' broadcasting have been erratic, and many private broadcasting licenses granted in the process have gone to organisations or individuals closely linked to the authorities. MISA is now drawing up a policy aimed at seeking the effective liberalisation of broadcasting legislation covering public, private and community broadcasting throughout the region.

As part of this process, MISA will, this year, stage a conference on broadcasting and community media, to coincide with its Annual General Meeting-which has become one of the largest gatherings of media workers on the African continent.

D.N.

by Thomas M. Neufing

Volunteers have become a major component in international development efforts. They make up a significant proportion of the total human resources available for development cooperation (up to a fifth of the skilled international personnel serving in developing countries). In the early days, volunteer service was strongly influenced by the idea of oneway technical assistance. Specialists, mainly from the North, served in developing nations where their expertise was desperately needed but not yet found among local citizens. Much has changed since.

After the US Peace Corps, the UN Volunteers Programme (UNV) ranks as the second largest volunteer-sendina agency with some 4000 professionals in the field every year. Its universality and internationality is reflected in the high number of UNV specialists (74%) who come from developing countries. The scope and size of the international volunteer contribution to development cooperation (notably areas such as HIV/AIDS and the environment), has increased significantly over the years as a result of the changing development challenge. The re-thinking of the role of technical cooperation is equally central to the volunteer debate and this has led to much greater flexibility in the ways in which volunteer services are provided. The important role volunteers can play in peace building efforts with a long-term development dimension, complementary to humanitarian relief, is increasingly being recognised.

Working with rather than for people

With the UNV's 25th anniversary, and the relocation of its headquarters to Bonn this summer, it is an appropriate time both to assess and to acknowledge the contribution made by these volunteers. Since the programme began in 1971, some 14 000 professionals have dedicated a period of their lives to serve as a UNV. The programme is administered by UNDP, and is therefore intimately linked to its structures, particularly in the field. Regarding community-based initiatives, the comparative advantage of UNVs is that of working with rather than for people over an extended period, thus facilitating their initiatives. The experience of many development agencies shows that in promoting socio-economic change at the village level, the type of person needed is one who-through long-term commitment and sensitivity -can learn as much from local partners as offer advice to them.

International volunteers are engaged mainly in rural development tasks. Those working through specialised NGOs such as the Red Cross, and Medecins Sans Frontieres have proved to be highly effective agents, supporting governments faced with disaster situations. In the case of UNV, the value of using volunteer specialists from other developing nations, as a way of encouraging technical cooperation amongst developing countries, is particularly recognised. Most volunteers- perhaps two-thirds - serve in least developed and small island countries. And about three-quarters serve in rural areas, working mostly in programmes of agricultural and community development, health, education and the supply of basic services. Since the end of the Cold War, a growing number have been deployed in emergency relief, refugee and rehabilitation programmes. UNVs make up 10% of the UN's civilian component in Cambodia; 4096 of the field staff of the World Food Programme and almost 100% of outreach workers attached to the UN Mission in Guatemala. UNVs are increasingly involved in human rights promotion, the organisation of elections and conflict resolution.

There is a consensus among the main international humanitarian and development actors that their programmes should be mutually supportive. For example, development efforts must respond to humanitarian crises by remaining on the scene and supporting immediate needs, as well as aiding in the prevention of crises which are known to be looming. Emergency humanitarian assistance should also pave the way for longer term development by viewing the immediacy of the moment through the lens of future sustainable rehabilitation. Both sets of activities should, ideally, be launched and implemented in tandem with local bodies.

External assistance efforts must include strengthening local capacity to cope with problems. Empowerment strategies which inform, educate and facilitate the people's own vision of peaceful and sustainable living environments (including respect for human rights) are fundamental to the future of communities coping in the aftermath of crisis.

Relief, rehabilitation and development?

The UNV programme has been active in exploring the efficacy of volunteer support to communities in crisis in order to bridge the gap between immediate needs and longer term developmental goals. In 1994, the UNV held its 4th Special Consultation, entitled, Between Crisis and Development - Volunteer Roles and UNV's Contribution. At this event, donor governments, UN agencies and cooperating partners from civil society had an indepth discussion of the issues surrounding volunteer efforts, and the complementary nature of emergency interventions and follow-up measures. The participants reconfirmed the need for local capacity building. They also affirmed the usefulness of the UN Volunteer contribution in crisis prevention, emergency rehabilitation and 'building bridges' to sustainable development. The work of UNVs in preventive action and promoting post-conflict development was highlighted. There has been a significant increase in demand for specialist volunteer services in all types of crisis. These may be economic, natural or man-made, but they all have in common the need to provide essential relief and rehabilitation services for basic survival (to refugees and resident populations). In many countries, disasters and internal strife have put so much pressure on essential public services that the longterm capacity of the people to recover may be threatened. Governments in developing countries and donors both believe it is fully justified to use volunteer specialists to help provide such services during the adjustment period.

'Mixed' teams

The contribution of both international and national volunteers is often essential to link immediate relief efforts to future long-term development. National volunteers-people working in their own countries within the UN framework-complement the international approach by providing the key grassroots perspective. UN Volunteers who speak local languages, live and work in remote communities, are familiar with community structures and are known to local leaders, play a key part in facilitating preventive action and providing follow-up in the aftermath of a crisis. UNV specialists are well-placed to build effective partnerships with national and local actors. In the last two years, some 2000 UN Volunteers have worked in various parts of the world in prevention and preparedness, peacekeeping, electoral support, human rights, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Burundi offers an example of an initiative designed to stem a crisis through local capacity-building. The UNV is financing a project there which supports the mediation and dialogue efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) through the recruitment of UNV peace advisers and conflict resolution facilitators. This project is being run successfully out of the SRSG's office, extending public awareness of the reconciliation process. It includes use of the mass media to promote understanding, and brings local actors together to work for peaceful solutions.

The tasks undertaken by UN volunteers all fit into the spectrum which has 'crisis' et one end end 'development' at the other. The work, moreover, is undertaken in partnership-with civil society (NGOs and community-based organisations), government departments, UN agencies and regional international organisations (such as the KU).

Through efforts that aim to link relief, rehabilitation and development, new productive partnerships are emerging to enhance coherence, coordination and complementarily.

The growth of professionalism

30 years ago, the typical profile of an international volunteer was that of a generalist graduate from an industrialised country seeking first-time experience abroad before settling down to a career. Over time, the governments of developing countries made clear their need for practical and often specialised skills aimed at giving them the ability to manage their own programmes. They increasingly expressed impatience at hosting untrained volunteers. Professionalism became the key word. Unfortunately, the word 'volunteer' is still a source of confusion: it is often equated with 'amateur'. This is a perception that now needs to be corrected. The personnel sent out by most agencies that supply volunteers are likely to be in their thirties, with post-graduate qualifications and several years' practical experience in their fields. The typical UNV specialist is an example par excel/ence of this trend: 39 years of age, holding a Master's degree and with more than ten years of experience in a particular discipline.

It was not just the dedication, but also the professionalism of the hundreds of UN Volunteers serving in Mozambique that impressed Aldo Ajello, the former UN Special Representative in Mozambique (now EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region). 'If I were to run another mission,' he said, 'I would ask immediately for volunteers.' In terms of monitoring-which was vital in building up the trust and confidence needed to ensure the election results were accepted-'UNV electoral officers were our only real presence and they proved to be extremely professional.' ~ T.N.

Study by the World Wide Fund for Nature

by David Reed

On 29 May, David Reed of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) was in Brussels to present the results of a study undertaken by the WWF, with the support of the European Commission, the longterm consequences of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on the environment and the use of nature/ resources. Conclusions were drawn from nine country case studies from Cameroon, Mall Tanzania, Zambia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Venezuela, Vietnam and Pakistan. We publish here an abridged version of Mr Reed's general presentation.

SAPs, often implemented at the instigation of the international financial institutions, have responded to the pervasive economic problems of the 1980s and to profound changes in the economy in recent decades. The programmes have generally been successful in improving macroeconomic indicators in developing countries. The marketorientation of economies has been increased through liberalised trade and capital flows, privatisation, reductions in regulation and price setting, and cuts in government budgets and programmes. For most developing countries, these changes were essential to economic recovery and adjustment to the new global marketplace.

Sustainable development in the social, economic, and environmental sense, has, however, been ignored in SAPs. Many reform programmes have been accompanied by increases in poverty and unemployment, worsening income distribution, and the collapse of social services, environmental protection and state institutional capacities. These immediate costs of adjustment inhibit countries' long-term ability to expand productivity and employment opportunities, as natural resources are exploited indiscriminately to meet short-term needs.

Environmental impacts

The environmental effects of structural adjustment vary from country to country depending on the specific components of the reform package, the structure of the economy, and the implementation process. The WWF's country case studies reveal particular mechanisms through which structural adjustment has altered resource-use patterns. Some more general patterns also emerge from the studies. Everywhere, cuts in government institutions and funding have reduced the state's capacity to facilitate the transition process, to compensate for market failures, and to provide for long-term and social sustainability.

Many reforms associated with structural adjustment have the potential to improve both environmental and economic outcomes. However, the failure to implement complementary environmental policies or strengthen institutions and regulations, has created a very mixed environmental record. Increases in poverty, greater production incentives, and the loss of government regulatory capacity, have all aggravated patterns of poor resource use.

Extractive and agricultural economies generally increased production in response to greater exposure to global markets. Without proper policies in place, this increase has put a strain on fragile ecosystems. Environmental pressures include increased land degradation and deforestation for agriculture, livestock and timber production; increased production of non-renewables without long-term investment of the proceeds or environmental safeguards; and increased pollution and damage to the ecosystem from unregulated tourism.

The burden of fiscal retrenchment and price changes under structural adjustment have fallen most heavily on the poor, particularly women. The strong association between poverty and environmental degradation has been revealed, as efforts to maintain livelihoods have led to deforestation, land degradation, overhunting and other pressures on endangered species, as well as the unmanaged extraction of nonrenewable resources. Increasing poverty and unemployment associated with adjustment has also added to population pressures in urban areas with insufficient infrastructure exacerbating problems of pollution, disease and congestion.

The implications of disregarding the environmental and social impact of adjustment are examined in the various case studies. Structural adjustment has been sustained by the promise that market-orientation and export-led - growth will raise living standards. Evidence from the studies, however, strongly suggests that long-term productive capacity is being destroyed by short-term exploitation of natural resources. Not only environmental but also economic and social sustainability are threatened by the loss of environmental goods and services. Drawing down natural capital has been encouraged by government policies that promote exports and open resources up to international markets. And the process is accelerated by the growing population of poor and unemployed who rely on natural resources for survival.

Recommendations

Following its study, the WWF offers a series of recommendations to reduce the environmental costs of structural adjustment and economic integration, and to reorient structural adjustment aims towards sustainable development. Most urgently, environmental issues must be integrated into structural economic reforms - environmental assessments must become part of the programmes. A strategic vision of the role that natural resources and environmental goods and services could play in the transformation of developing economies is essential to designing appropriate strategies. Efforts to industrialise economies must include consideration of the environmental implications. Social services and environmental institutions must be maintained during the adjustment process to prevent increases in poverty and environmental degradation that have both short-term and long-term consequences for development. Essential services include credit and marketing support to small farmers, income-generating opportunities for women, food-assistance programmes, and promotion of distributional equity. The state's role in providing services which neither the private sector nor civil society can provide, must be maintained.

Given the great variety in economic structures and in the capacity of markets and civil society among developing countries, adjustment strategies and government roles must be tailored to each case. Everywhere, countries must implement national institutional reforms for environmental management. Civil society must be strengthened to allow participation in the adjustment process. International financial institutions promoting and designing SAPs must reform their policies and approaches to implementation in the light of the clear evidence that macroeconomic reforms are having a profound effect on the environment and on the possibilities for sustainable development. Continuing failure to correct these problems on a national level accentuates the concern for addressing issues of sustainability on a global level.

D.R.

Dak'Art 96

The first World Festival of Negro Art, held in 1966, was essentially a political exercise. In the post-independence period, it was felt necessary to show the world that the people of Africa (both the continent and the diaspora), had a rich culture which had long been suppressed. The festival - which has never been repeated-is viewed with a great deal of nostalgia by supporters of modern African art and black intellectuals. The better, brighter future, which seemed at the time to be just over the horizon, never quite lived up to expectation. Even before financing problems had surfaced, the festival's fate had already been sealed by petty political rivalries and a greedy pursuit of the limelight. Years later, attempts to relaunch the event met with a lukewarm reception. It was already the beginning of the end as far as ideologies were concerned. In complete contrast, Dak'Art 96 (Dakar, 915 May 1996) set its sights firmly on the market place, nowadays the yardstick by which all success is measured. Its goals were simple: to break into the art market and overcome the generally held prejudice that contemporary African art lacks modernity.

An international market for African art does exist, but it concerns itself solely with ancient art- and Africa itself profits little from such trade. Indeed, it would be more accurate to speak of plundering than of trade. The seminar, organised last year by the Terveuren Museum in Brussels on the looting of African works of art, revealed the true extent of the phenomenon. Despite the fact that pirated works fetch considerable sums on the black market, contemporary African artists are faced with a 'Catch-22' situation. Major galleries in Europe, America and Japan do not exhibit their work because African art is ignored by the leading art periodicals; and their work never appears in these publications because it is never exhibited. One reason for the fact that African art is not put on show is that virtually no funds are allocated by international institutions to sponsor exhibitions by the artists in question.

Many third-world governments do not dare, are unwilling or are unable to include culture on their list of priorities within international cooperation agreements. One exception is Burkina Faso which now boasts a cinema industry as a result. Senegal is trying to follow in its footsteps. But there are not many places in Africa where artists are promoted for the quality of their creative output. The majority of initiatives have, in fact, been on a voluntary basis. The magazine Revue Noire is one of the most significant examples of this approach. A group of aficionados of contemporary African art - indeed with a passion for art pure and simple, whether African or European-decided to try and break the vicious circle. They looked at two options: the establishment of an art gallery of worldwide renown or of an equally prestigious arts publication, and came down in favour of the latter. Thus Revue Noire was born. However, its success was generally given very slim odds: it was seen as too glossy, too expensive and too intellectual. The sub-text here of course, is that a publication about African art had no right to be glossy, expensive or intellectual, especially since the money could have been used for something far more 'useful' to the development of these countries.

Others, such as Marie-Claire Mwanza from l'Espace Alizes in Brussels, have attacked the problem from a different angle-by exhibiting contemporary African art. Prior to her initiative, there was not a single gallery in Brussels that specialised in this sector of the market, and there are still none that figure on the shopping lists of the world's great collectors. Whatever the price set for a contemporary African work, it is generally perceived as being too high. The contrast with the prices demanded for works by even the youngest European or American artists, even for their very first exhibitions, speaks volumes. African art is too expensive in relation to what exactly ? The answer is in relation to the status accorded to it, which is of course determined by the art world. In other words, a big fat zero if one considers the fact that African art is never exhibited.

Thanks to Revue Noire, African art has been brought to the major galleries of the Western world. Similar projects have been launched or are in the process of being launched in various countries of the West, such as the magazine NKA in Brooklyn, for example. Exhibition organisers, museums, galleries and those looking to stage art festivals now know on whose door to knock, and the last few months have proved extremely promising. The Guggenheim Museum in New York is currently hosting a major exhibition of African art, and Africa 95, held in London, was swiftly followed by Copenhagen 96. The Guggenheim Museum, moreover, is in a completely different league to the Museum of African and Oceanic Art in Paris or the Museum of Central Africa in Tervueren, Belgium (formerly the Colonial Museum)-it is one of the world's most prestigious temples of modern art. What is more, London's Africa 95, which was so disparaged by African art specialists, who considered it nothing more than a meeting place for traders, did, whether we like it or not, act as a significant catalyst. And what about pirated works of art, such as those plundered from the Niger Valley ? These have found a 'home' in public as well as private collections, pointing to a real need to 'clean out the Augean stables'.

A few African artists are beginning to get themselves known within 'the market', but there are still not enough of them. It was with great foresight that the organisers of Dak'Art placed these artists at the top of their invitation list. Another shrewd move was to invite the art market's arbiters of taste to select those African artists who should present solo exhibitions, and to ask celebrated art critics and collectors to form part of the international panel of judges.

It is probably true to say that Africa has rarely known such a dynamic period of creativity which places it at the forefront of global aesthetic trends. The aim of the Biennial Festival was to underline this fact beyond any doubt. Among those artists who are currently in a position to break into the market, the Senegalese sculptor, Ousmane Sow, probably heads the list. Paradoxically, however, Ousmane Sow's work was not presented at Dakar although he himself was there, his tall, striking figure standing out from the crowd. Despite the fact that he lent his support to Dak'Art 96 and that the opening gala was partly dedicated to him with the magnificent film of Beatrice Soule, Ousmane Sow resolutely refused to display his own work. He has no wish to take part in gatherings of 'African artists'. He is an artist and he is African, but he is not an 'African artist'. 'A Japanese artist is a contemporary artist in this universal world', he argues, 'so why should I allow myself to be pigeon-holed in a ghetto ?' No matter how satisfied and pleased champions of contemporary African art may be with the organisation behind the Biennial Festival, they cannot deny that Ousmane Sow has a point. Having said this, there is no contradiction here, but rather a complementary vision. Sow's stance and the idea behind Dak'Art are part of a two-pronged attack, to borrow a military term. The organisers of the Biennial and Sow himself doubtless saw it in this way, and decided to join forces.

Each time Beatrice Soule tackles the work of an artist, she explores it in a very unusual way, reinventing the arts documentary. Her films are reminiscent of the music of Nino Rota in Fe//ini's films, Rota subjugating himself to the service of the director's work, sublimating his own originality through this extreme humility. It is impossible to picture the images of Federico Fellini without Rota's haunting music. Beatrice Soule saw in Sow's work a love affair between an artist and his sculpture, coming up with the idea of placing Sow's sculptures in the savannah and imagining the intimate interaction between Africa's natural world, which is at the heart of the artist's inspiration, and his works, which the natural world is able to absorb back into itself. The result of this juxtaposition is that the physical work of art is eclipsed by sheer creative force and spirit. The genius behind the work becomes the work, merges with it and is reincarnated in it. The one thing that Soule did not film was Ousmane Sow himself, her images concentrating solely on the creative act. It would be illusory to attempt to explain a Beatrice Soule film, especially this film. When she unveils how the artist tames physical matter, reinventing materials in order to create a work of art, technique simply recedes into the background, becoming blurred and intangible. Whereas others would have adopted a scientific or factual approach, her camera perceives the abstract aspects of the piece-and its gestation. The film was due to be broadcast on the international FrancoGerman arts channel Arte.

If Ousmane Sow's sculptures are characterised by their gigantic proportions, then those of Georges Adeagbo, a Beninois artist whose name is also beginning to be heard in the commercial art establishment, are characterised by their 'fugacity'. Adeagbo's artistic constructions are as fleeting as puffs of smoke, like voodoo symbols scratched out in the sand. His art is symbolic and ephemeral. Once one of his works has been exhibited, all that remains of it is a hollow shell which he has to reinvent over and over again. Adeagbo constructs ideas, using a host of assorted materials which he painstakingly selects over months, even years. Yet despite the meticulous care with which they are put together, as far as the artist is concerned, the materials per se are of no importance. He could convey exactly the same idea using other elements. An Adeagbo piece is not merely a pile of objects. It is neither conceptual art, nor scrap art. It consists rather of 'installations' which rise and spread outwards. Sometimes, he uses specially constructed sculptures. At other times he employs everyday objects- shoes, saucepans, stones, spectacles or footballs. He also works with written material; manuscripts, parchment, pieces of newspaper and books, portraying the written word as both a creative force and a deceptive screen. Adeagbo himself is a man of few words. Perpetually crouched on the ground, he constructs, modifies, touches and observes his creations. Why should these constructions remind us so much of paintings? They are as much a pile of objects as a painting is an accumulation of layers of paint. It is by forgetting the paint that we are able to admire the picture and it is by looking beyond the materials used by Adeagbo that his work truly reveals itself. Indeed, it is a sign of his genius as an artist that the materials never intrude upon our contemplation of his work. In Dakar, Adeagbo's work was shown in the AIDS exhibition organised by Revue Noire.

Another artist who took part in the AIDS exhibition, and whose art could well be the impetus behind the new universal aesthetic, the avant-garde (if such a concept has a meaning), is Pascale Marthine Tayou from Cameroon. He was given the honour of presenting one of the five solo exhibitions. Tayou was sponsored by Yakuyi Kawagushi, the curator of the Setagaya Museum in Tokyo, who exhibited his work at the forum organised within the overall framework of the exhibition. While the term 'installation' may best describe the works of Georges Adeagbo's, Tayou's work falls unquestionably under the heading of sculpture. This is despite the fact that the two artists use virtually identical materials. Tayou sculpts from wood, covering his pieces with all manner of manufactured and salvaged objects such as shoes, nails, plastic bags and enormous condoms, or with natural objects such as bits of roots and stones. He then paints the arrangement. The work is dense, unyielding and mesmerising, often etching itself into the onlooker's mind. His sculpture lacks heavy ornamentation, yet its starkness has a rich quality, the theme encompassed by a jumble of material standing out clearly, like the outline of a silhouette. Take his work 'Fight against AIDS'. The piece consists of a wooden frame in the shape of figure-of-eight, with each horizontal line doubled, defining a key element in a tragic body with bulging eyes and a Pere Ubu belly. In contrast to this suffocatingly tragic figure, the brightly-coloured shoes of a Harlequin with a faded costume offer a comical note.

There were other creators who could well ruffle a few feathers in the art market that ultimately makes or breaks an artist: Tamsir Dia of Cote d'lvoire (whose screaming figures are reminiscent of Munch), Cheikh Niass of Senegal, Mathilde Moro of Cote d'lvoire and Abdoulaye Konate of Mali. The last mentioned was honoured with the highest award of the festival.

A decision was taken that Dak'Art 96 should encompass other areas of creativity, such as music, design and fashion, in addition to the visual arts. At the gala evening held to inaugurate the Festival, there was a fashion show choreographed in the manner of a ballet. The staging of this can only be described as mawkish. The audience were treated neither to a real performance, nor to a good fashion show. The second fashion spot, which was supposed to present an overview of African design, was also quite pitiful. If the event's organisers decide to keep these parallel areas of creativity in the Festival, then their decision will be solely thanks to the success of the International Design Exhibition. Apart from two or three 'exotic' pieces, this was generally of a very high standard.

The European Community's choice in awarding the prize for creativity to a designer, Vincent Amian Namien from the Cote d'lvoire, was particularly revealing. This artist strips everything down to its bare essentials, creating a line that is so purified as to leave only the quintessence of form. Thus, he creates a chair that is nothing more than a perfect metal triangle, with four boards and four metal wires-and yet offers perfect comfort.

Claire Kane, a fashion designer of Franco-Senegalese descent, had the verve to go it alone and show her collection at the prestigious Salon of Design. Her clothes are characterised by the rejection of all superfluous detail, achieving a fluid line that stylises movement. Following an aesthetic code that has been decanted from the melting pot of the collective costume heritage of the entire continent, Claire Kane is directly involved in the creation of her designs, from the weaving of the cloth to the last finishing touches. In fact, she admits that her true passion is fabric rather than fashion, her favourite material being woven pagne. She often uses silk-screen printing to introduce pattern. She then adds words to the patterns in her designs and, abracadabra, one would think that this is the way it has always been done in Africa. A subtle modernity, combining both past and future, seems to be a recurring motif in African creativity. International artists, still few in number, travel from Dakar to be dressed by her.

If, in the future, the Festival's organisers decide to concentrate solety on the visual arts, this would come as no surprise. On the other hand, it would also make sense to continue to include design and fashion. A country's cultural heritage should be considered one of its raw materials and a source of economic wealth, and unimaginative accountants may have to resign themselves to this fact. Herein lies a possible answer to the question: 'why hold a Biennial Festival of Contemporary African Art?'

Hegei Goutier

by Robert Rowe

Many ways of raising money to fight AlDS have been tried, but one of the most unusual must surely be the approach taken by an official of the European Commission. Robert Rowe, who until last year was an assistant editor on The Courier, put on a oneman show in Brussels and then rook it to the other side of the world to raise money for a voluntary organisation working on AIDS prevention and care in Malaysia. Here is his story of fighting the virus with the power of the theatre.

'By the year 2000, South-East Asia will be host to the majority of the world's AIDS cases.' So runs a stark prediction from the World Health Organisation, quoted in a recent paper from a grouping of NGOs affiliated to the Malaysian AIDS Foundation. It goes on to predict that 'the region faces a potential HIV spread of titanic proportions.' In Thailand, a country with a large population and a sad reputation for prostitution, the HIV threat was recognised relatively early and effective public awareness campaigns have successfully reversed the rise in the incidence of infection. But in neighbouring Malaysia, where stricter religious and social attitudes have inhibited wide public discussion of the disease and its methods of transmission, over 13000 people were HIV-positive at the last count-and that is just the figure derived from the small percentage of the population who have been tested. Activists say the true number is certainly higher and it is growing every day.

The first cases of HIV in Malaysia were found among intravenous drug users and sex workers, and one of the earliest organisations to begin working with people engaged in these high-risk activities was Pink Triangle. This is a voluntary, non-profit-making body which started up in 1987 by setting up AIDS prevention and support programmes for and with the general public and the gay community. Its name, in fact, refers to the pink triangle badge which men sent to concentration camps in Nazi Germany for homosexuality were made to wear. The group has always depended heavily on volunteers to plan and carry out its programmes, which now also involve running a support group for people with HIV or AIDS and a street outreach programme and drop-in centre providing AIDS information, basic medical care, temporary shelter and food for sex workers, injecting drug users and transsexuals. The centre can also provide legal referrals for members of these groups summonsed to appear in court. For the general public, talks, workshops and poster and photo exhibitions are held in schools, hospitals, factories, youth and corporate organisations and other NGOs. Pink Triangle trains its volunteers, too, to provide counselling and information about AIDS and sexuality to anyone who calls up on a confidential telephone line.

The work is serious and vital, but the atmosphere is far from gloomy in Pink Triangle's premises in a lively part of the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur. Though funding comes from several sources at home and abroad, including the European Union, the organisation still has to generate a lot of its own money, and one successful method they have used is to put on imaginative events where fund-raising can be combined with an opportunity to raise public awareness. Last December, for example, they marked the week surrounding World AIDS Day with a string of shows, dance parties, talk-ins and street activities called Pinkfest '95. In venues all over the town, and on television and radio, well-known personalities joined a hundred of Pink Triangle's own speakers and performers to provide education without moralising. The aim was to personalise the issue of AIDS by showing how anyone could be at risk, but at the same time dealing in facts, not fear. Thousands of attractively designed and very frank leaflets and posters put across the virus-busting message in catchy graphics and pithy phrases in several languages.

I happened to be in Kuala Lumpur around New Year and saw a video of some of the Pinkfest highlights which set me thinking how admirable an impression of solidarity and self-help the anti-AIDS struggle in Malaysia conveys, and to wondering whether, back in Brussels, it might not be possible for us in Europe to do something to help. It particularly impressed and touched me that while Pink Triangle delivers its message to every single member of Malaysian society, it makes quite clear, even by its name, that it has a special care for some of that society's most downtrodden members, people for whom no one else had ever ventured to speak. Public silence, opprobrium and ridicule make it especially hard to get the safe-sex message through to gay men, especially the young, to transsexuals and sex workers, and as long as there is no cure the only way of containing the spread of infection is by education- and by changing social attitudes. The many women whose husbands or partners are careless about infection also stand to benefit from greater openness and more factual information. But organising all this takes money.

It happens that among the multinational English-speaking expatriate community in Brussels there is a thriving amateur theatre scene-in fact they say that if two British people found themselves on an otherwise deserted island, one would immediately put on a play for the other, and the same seems to hold true of the Irish and the North Americans. However, it was less certain that anyone apart from me would want to exert themselves, for the many weeks required to stage a production, on behalf of an AIDS charity in a remote Asian country, so l decided to go ahead by myself and perform a one-man comedy. The play was Brief Lives; it has nothing whatever to do with AIDS, but in its day it was a huge success in London and New York. Adapted in the 1960s by the British actor Patrick Garland from the dusty old memoirs of a real historical figure, John Aubrey, it depicts a day in the life of this 1 7th-century English scientist, historian and wit. As he potters about, an extremely old man, in a garret full of manuscripts and curios, he reminisces about his contemporaries in hilarious and touching vignettes, the potted biographies which give the play its name. Aubrey died in penury, but the picture he gives of a vanished age is now reckoned to be the equal of the record we find in the diary of the better-known Samuel Pepys.

It is also a great deal funnier, and when I showed the script to various friends I was astounded and moved to discover how many of them wanted to be involved in the project. Eventually we put together a team headed by the director, Anne Wilkinson, a music impresario married to a coal expert from the European Commission, with production, design, stage management, lighting, sound effects, costume, music and offstage voices-not to mention publicity and box office-provided by other friends from the European institutions or the private sector. The five performances were given in June in a small theatre just adapted from a pottery workshop, and altogether the Brussels showing made a profit of some 110 000 Belgian francs.

We had expected just to send this donation to Pink Triangle through the post, but to our immense pleasure they said they would like to see not just the money but, if possible, the play too. By ingenious compression the designer, Burt Baum, managed to cut the essentials of the set down to three sheets painted to give a three-dimensional effect, we put the voices and music on cassette, rolled up the costume tightly and worked out that the whole play, thus reduced, could be got into one suitcase. There is a little theatre company in the Pacific ACP state of Vanuatu called Wan Smol (One Small) Bag which actually gave me this idea. So off I went to Kuala Lumpur with this bag, and did the play another five times there.

The staging in Malaysia was done by an adventurous outfit called Instant Cafe Theatre. This young company has a reputation for pushing forward the boundaries of public discussion with topical plays and supports Pink Triangle's aims and work. Brief Lives was well outside their usual repertoire, as well as being spoken in the English of 300 years ago. My worry was that bringing such a Western and Eurocentric entertainment might be resented as cultural imperialism in a country with three great and fascinating cultures of its own, Malay, Chinese and Indian, each with its own style of drama. But it turned out there was a local tradition of amateur dramatics in English, particularly Shakespeare, and that English is the usual lingua franca for speakers of different Asian languages. What went down unexpectedly well was the depiction of an old man nearing death and reviewing the best moments of his life; as the character puts it in the play, 'When a boy, I did always love to converse with old men, as living histories,' and Maiaysians have a particular regard and affection for the elderly.

I came away from Kuala Lumpur with many charming memories: the unfailing, sweet-natured enthusiasm of the audience; the relief on the first night as I stood on stage in a floor-length costume of three layers, designed to suggest London in midwinter rather than to cope with the equatorial heat of the Malay peninsula, and realised that the stage was air conditioned. The night when this air conditioning blew out a vital candle on the stage, and a man in the front row lent me his highly un-17th-century lighter to get my clay pipe going. The Chinese friend who gave me a genuine antique opium pipe to add to John Aubrey's collection of exotic curios. The delicious succession of Asian chicken dishes which the stage manager produced for me to eat on stage, cooked in very un-English coconut milk or glazed with rice wine. The work permit which specified I could perform as an artiste but must not 'sit out' or dance with the audience! The theatre's resident singer asking if she could add the play's Elizabethan theme song, with lute accompaniment, to her repertoire.

Taking this play to another continent was a fascinating cultural experience for me as a European, and I hope for the audiences too it was something more than just a painless way of being relieved of money in a deserving cause. At any rate the theatre asked if they could have another play soon, one in which Malaysian actors could be incorporated as well. As for Pink Triangle, some of its leading lights were packing their bags to go to Vancouver for this year's International AIDS Conference, but before they left it was a pleasure to hand over the proceeds of the whole venture and to hear that the organisation will use the money to develop a drop-in centre for people approaching them in person for the first time. Some first-timers are understandably timid about coming to the unfamiliar (and clearly signposted) premises for help or information, and a private space where they can talk in confidence is something Pink Triangle has always wanted to provide but could never find the funds for, as the project or programme money they get from their regular donors is invariably tied to what outsiders might think were more urgent priorities. It is not only the headline grabbing schemes which have useful effects: a quietly welcoming space where someone can be himself or herself may do more to dispel an individual's fear and ignorance than publicly visible campaigning, especially where religious and social pressures against certain types of nonconformity are strong. In fighting HIV/AIDS, we must try whatever works. And empowerment must begin with the self. It was a great privilege to be welcomed in like any other volunteer wanting to help bring about a necessary change.

R.R.

Materials, techniques and knowledge at the service of new architectural applications

by Hugo Houben and Hubert Guilland.

A major building material

The importance - both in quantity and quality- of unbaked earth constructions in the world is very little known. Believed to be of ancient origin, (it is associated with the early civilisations of the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Indus and Huang He), nowadays, earth is not usually regarded as a major building material. This is despite the fact that it continues to leave an undeniable and distinctive imprint on the architectural landscapes, both rural and urban, of many countries. Unbaked earth is still, in fact, a major building material, being used extensively by people to erect homes and other buildings. Although sites of human occupation have seen constant regeneration with the passage of time, unbaked earth construction has persisted. Excavated from the soil itself, and moulded by the hand of man (or trampled by beasts of burden), the result is a building material which is used in all forms of construction-from simple huts and modest homes, to farm buildings, large houses, urban blocks, religious edifices, castles and palaces. The skills employed are based on knowledge acquired and refined over a long period of time.

A contemporary building material

While the use of earth in so called 'advanced' countries has declined in the 40 years since the end of the Second World War, in the developing countries it has continued unabated. In the former, the industrialisation of construction and other sweeping changes have rendered obsolete ancient techniques based on the use of local skills and materials, and on mutual help within communities. In the latter, various factors have dictated the continuing use of locally available solutions, materials and knowledge. These include shortages of processed materials (which are costly in both foreign currency and imported energy terms), the widening of the development 'gap', the accumulation of debt contracted within the international monetary system and the survival of local life-styles in which people are accustomed to coming to get her for mutual help for survival. In these countries, which have no industrial means, and which are to be found in various latitudes across the world, earth remains the main-if not the only- building material. Do these circumstances mean that it is a poor material, fashioned using outmoded techniques and unsuitable for promoting the development which is so necessary? The answer to this question is a clear 'no'. On the contrary, the materials and techniques involved are generally of a high standard. They can ensure true architectural quality, allowing communities to continue creating their private or public living environments, and to integrate their buildings into a coherent framework of self-generated development which makes the most of the resources available, both human and material. In fact, scientific and architectural research into earth as a building material, and on related building techniques, has made considerable progress in recent decades. Combined with investments made by industrialists and construction companies, the result is that we now have a wide range of properly mastered production procedures and technical solutions available. These offer great flexibility in meeting a wide range of possible applications.

Making a mark on world architecture

Recent global surveys, although partial (covering about 30% of the world's housing), have given us an indication of how extensively earth is used in construction. In developing countries alone, 50% of the rural population and 20% of those living in urban areas are believed to be concerned. The figures, which are drawn from the combined data of statistical surveys in various areas, and from bibliographical information, almost certainly underestimate the true position. They show, for example, that 60% of the housing in Peru is in moulded bricks or rammed earth. 83% of the houses in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, are made of earth. More than 70%of India's housing stock is constructed out of moulded earth bricks or using successive layers of earth, and these buildings provide shelter for nearly six hundred million people. In France, many rural dwellings are built from unbaked earth and one finds, for instance, that in the Dauphine region, up to 90% of the buildings in certain villages are made out of rammed 'pise' earth. Finally, in California, there were estimated to be almost 200 000 'adobe' (sun-dried earth brick) dwellings by 1980 and the use of this material was growing at the rate of 30% a year.

Closer examination reveals that the whole world bears the indelible stamp of earthen architecture. Earth is used in Africa-in humble shelters built on leased land and in the great granaries of the continent. It is found in the palaces of the Hausa emirs of Nigeria, the ksours and kasbahs of Morocco and the mosques of Mali. In the Middle East, you come auoss it in the tightly-packed neighbourhoods of Ispahan and Iran, the fortified dwellings of Najran in Saudi Arabia, the multi-storey earth blocks of Shibam and the valley of the Hadramaut in Yemen. In Europe, there are the mouded brick farms of Aquitaine and the baroque and neo-classical castles of the Saone valley. And bringing in other parts of the world, we might mention the pueblos of the New Mexico Indians, and the houses built by the Hakkas in the Chinese province of Fujian, laid out in their characteristic concentric circles. The use of unbaked earth in building may be seen as a vestige of past history, but it is actually a living framework for history in the making.

Realistic uses for the future

Confronted with the energy crisis of the 1970s, oil-dependent industrialised countries were forced to look again at tried and tested technical solutions which were now proving to be too 'energy-greedy'. The building sector did not escape this reappraisal and the search began for ways of reducing energy consumption both at source (covering the production and use of building materials) and further down the production chain (maintenance). Research on biomass and solar energy ran in parallel with experiments to update traditional materials and to attempt to rationalise the production process. Earth again became a focus of interest, with government institutions supporting a considerable amount of new research and experimentation. This covered applications in both the industrialised world and in developing countries, research for the latter being undertaken in the context of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. With the threat to the ecological balance posed by pollution, degradation and the plundering of natural areas, this interest in developing materials and techniques that are inherently friendly to the environment has not lessened. In many places, people are becoming increasingly involved in controlling and managing their living environment. The field has been opened up by qualitative research, a new awareness of the available options and an increase in leisure time. With techniques now at hand that are easy to use and economical, a greater measure of (partial or complete) selfhelp building is now possible. The USA, Australia and Germany all encourage new forms of intervention in building which give greater responsibility to the occupier in the creation of his living environment. Viewed from this perspective, earth as a building material has definite advantages and plays an important role.

In developing countries, burdened by debt and confronted by an urgent need to build on a scale unprecedented in history, imported materials, techniques and energy are largely inaccessible to the majority of people, and their use may contribute to promoting 'bad' development. Building with earth emerges as an efficient shortterm way of producing houses or public buildings such as schools, which are both economical and of high quality (being culturally and climatically suitable). Decision-makers in these countries are well aware of this and have mobilised 'upstream' feasibility studies in their education and public housing programmes. The research covers local resources and knowledge, and the use of labour intensive techniques that generate employment and enable the population gradually to become 'monetarised'. The days of costly experimentation, often with no practical result, are now over. A new confidence in the resources that are available must be encouraged. There needs to be an increase in building completions and those who built them need more training. Today, this is happening in Mexico (850 earthen houses recently built in the state of Zacatecas) and in Burkina Faso (6000 school classrooms constructed by 1995.) No fewer than forty million homes will have to be built between now and the year 2000 for the urban population of Africa alone.

Studies show that for most of the people involved, there is no choice but to employ local materials, most often earth. One can thus predict that at least 20% of urban and pert-urban housing in African countries (about eight million units), will be built in earth over the next ten years, at a rate of eight hundred thousand units per year. If demand from rural areas is added to this, one gets some idea of the scale of the task facing decision-makers and builders. The use of earth and other locally available materials is unavoidable, and should be encouraged.

Environmental advantages

It is particularly important to enumerate the many advantages of building in unbaked earth from the point of view of the environment. This issue, one of the contemporary problems facing society, is increasingly moving centre-stage, and in the future, it is sure to play a greater part in political, economic, social and cultural strategies linked to the planning and improvement of the quality of life. Here we refer to the concept of the environment in the widest sense of the word, ecological, economic, technical, health-wise and psychological, cultural and human.

From the point of view of the ecological environment

In terms of pollution and degradation, unbaked earth offers a highly positive picture:

- It does not contribute to the deforestation which results, for example, from the use of organic resources for firing baked earth materials.

- It does not consume any nonrenewable energy (oil, gas, etc.) at source for the processing and production of materials, or further down the production line in their application. This is in sharp contrast to the production of cement, lime and other conventional binding materials, and steel.

- By exploiting strata on construction sites, it allows a considerable saving in energy for the transport of materials.

- It does not contribute to a degradation of the landscape as does the extraction of minerals and ores which hollows out hillsides and creates open cast sites. A great deal of the earth excavated in the course of large public works (notably roads and motorways) can be recycled and used in building (allowing very easy decentralised distribution).

- It does not contribute to the diminution of resources of aggregates such as gravel and sand, excavated either from quarries or from water courses, in insular sites or lagoons. The latter can endanger the ecological balance of these natural environments.

- It uses very little water which is essential for the life of the people.

- It produces no industrial or chemical waste and has the additional advantage of being almost entirely recyclable.

From the point of view of the economic environment

- It is often comparable in cost with, or indeed more economic than competing technologies and requires no major financial mobilisation for its generally light production infrastructure.

- It guarantees rapid amortisement thresholds for bankable investments thanks to its low infrastructure requirements for usable production.

- It contribution to local flexibility, being readily susceptible to a decentralised approach.

- Throughout the production process, it creates employment and monetary added-value which can be injected for development purposes into other sectors of the economy.

- By allowing savings in energy and foreign currency, it contributes at the macro and micro economic levels of the building sector, to a considerable reduction in developing countries' debt and to the balance of payments.

From the point of view of the technical environment

- It has thermophysical and hydric properties (good conductivity, energy retention capacity, thermal differential, delayed temperature differences etc.) which help ensure comfortable temperatures:

- It normally only requires simple production and application tools (moulds, presses, light shuttering, normal masonry tools, etc.) which are widely accessible to masons and self-help builders.

From the point of view of health and the psychological environment

- Not only non-polluting in its use, it also guarantees the absence of harmful effects in the context of daily life (no gaseous emissions or other toxic chemical components, radioactive emissions etc.)

- It contributes to psychological wellbeing by the architectural exploitation of its inherent characteristics; these include the surface texture, colour, form and luminosity of the material. It thus makes an active contribution to the beauty of the living environment.

From the point of view of the cultural and human environment

-It maintains the traditional architecture heritage of the area in question through the use of local materials and thus plays a part in the respect for, as well as the survival and updating of, cultural, architectural and urban environments.

- It allows local populations to take charge of the production of their built environment and thus contributes to the expression of the democratic rights of all to control their living environment.

The future of earth on the move

In her work entitled 'A Fate Worse than Debt' (Penguin Books, 1988), the famous political commentator, Susan George, analysed the debt situation of developing countries and attempted to determine the basis for a positive resolution of the problem. Her approach focused in particular on solutions involving repayment in creative values or 'in kind' rather than in strictly monetary means. At the end of her analysis, she put forward eleven potential solutions to allow this repayment in kind and to launch a coherent approach for the development of less advanced societies. One of these recommendations was that it would be necessary to develop 'the study and survey (and if necessary the improvement) of local building techniques, in particular earth architecture ('pise' or 'banco').' Ms George argued that new buildings, particularly public ones, should be constructed using these techniques.

It is clear that various solutions are being considered for the future: one in which building with earth, using a wide range of local techniques, will have a new technological, social, cultural, ecological, economic and political role of paramount importance.

Various methods of utilisation

The technical, constructional and architectural possibilities of earth are very extensive. The study of popular traditions and of traditional knowledge throughout the world has enabled some 18 different methods of utilisation of the material to be identified, each in itself capable of being applied in a wide variety of ways. This wide construction potential has enabled the building of modest shelters, village houses, urban blocks, religious edifices and palaces. This is not to say that other traditional materials do not have an important role, but the sheer diversity and flexibility of earthen architecture probably cannot be equalled.

As was indicated earlier, the use of earth as a building material has given rise to numerous applications using a wide variety of production and construction techniques. Some of these techniques are still used in traditional construction many countries, some have been abandoned, while others have only recently been the subject of developmental experimentation. It is worth noting that there is a register of the principal techniques, mainly associated with processes using moulds, shuttering and direct shaping. The six most widely used techniques are: 'adobe', 'rammed earth', 'straw clay', 'wattle and daub', 'cob' and 'compressed blocks'.

Of these six, three (wattle and daub, straw clay, and cob), are highly traditional, while the others (adobe, rammed earth and compressed earth blocks) have recently been the subject of spectacular evolution linked to the modernisation of production machinery and methods of application.

Plea for African solidarity

Thank you sincerely for your report on the second plenary of the Global Coalition for Africa which appeared in the March-April 1996 edition. As a 'displaced' Liberian, I would like to comment on some of the issues reported in the article.

First, I hope that Africans recognise and appreciate all that former President Jimmy Carter has done and continues to do for our beloved continent.

Second, I support the view of Ms Johnson-Sirleaf and President Afwerki of Eritrea that we, as Africans, must invest in ourselves and in productive endeavours in our own countries. However, given the number of civil wars, that have resulted in displacement of our peoples and migration of the labour force, it is imperative that we also begin to think of and recognise each other as Africans first - and only then as members of whatever ethnic group we belong to. As a Liberian with professional qualifications who relocated to Ghana in 1992, I met with opposition and resentment because of my nationality and sex. I subsequently went to the Caribbean where my acceptance as an African was easier.

When there is a population movement, the psychological impact associated with feelings of rejection and intimidation is severe. Sub-Saharan Africa will never develop or reach its fullest potential until we begin to think and act as a united, yet diverse group of people.

I agree that it is important to develop our homelands first, but in the case of Liberia, Burundi or Rwanda, where no one seems to understand the concept of peace or the idea of having a future, it is crucial that the displaced be respected and accepted as fellow Africans. It would be even better if we were afforded the opportunity to integrate and assimilate into society.

Ciata A. Bishop, Grand Cayman.

What about Guinea-Bissau ?

I am a student from Guinea-Bissau reading international law and political science at the Social Science University in Toulouse. I have also been a faithful Courier reader for more than seven years. In the March-April issue of 1996, you published an article on fisheries by Anthony Acheampong entitled 'A vital food source in West Africa'. You gave the figures for fish production in 16 West African countries-but did not mention my native country! I should point out that Guinea-Bissau consumes and exports a great deal of fish, and the product is an important source of foreign exchange to the country.

F.J. Alves d'Almada, Toulouse, France.

Media and democracy in Southern Africa

I refer to the article with the above title by Francis Caas which appeared in issue no. 154 of The Courier (November-December). I enjoyed reading the text which examined the emergence of a free press due to the advent of political liberalisation in the Southern African region. However, I wish to make a correction as to what I think is a misrepresentation of fact. The author said, and I quote: 'The installation of a democratic regime in 1994 (in Malawi) enabled the MBC to begin broadcasting in all languages spoken in the country'. This is not actually correct although the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, apart from broadcasting in English and Chechewa, has since introduced Tumbuka on the radio. I felt it was important to put the record straight on this.

Disher G.DJ. Pindani Lecturer in Public Administration, Chancellor College, Zomba, Malawi.

Corrigenda

In issue no 157, a number of 'author' footnotes were inadvertently omitted.

Pascal Dotchevi, author of 'Togo: the victory of the taxi. bikes' (p.11) is a journalist on Kpakpa Desenchante, a satirical weekly published in Lomé

Piritta Sorsa, author of 'Banking and securities' (p.13) works at the IMF office in Geneva.

Yves Delafon, author of 'Developing consultancy work in the ACP countries' (p.15) is the director of a consultancy and President of the Federation of External Trade Associations in Provence/ Cote d'Azur.

N'Gone Fall, author of 'Fashion; Out of Africa.. the breath of inspiration' (p.53) is a journalist.

Also in issue 157, some errors appeared in the article entitled 'Sparks fly in Namibia'.

In the introductory section it was stated that secret harlots were held on resolutions relating to Nigeria, Niger and Sudan. This should have read Nigeria, Niger and Equatorial Guinea; a resolution on Sudan was passed by normal, open vote procedure.

Under the heading 'The future of Lomé' the ACP Generai Rapporteur vvas refered to as Mr Firmin, which is the forename. The General Rapporteur's surname is Mr Jean-Louis.

In the fifth paragraph under the same heading, there was a reference to Helena Torres Couto. This should have read Mr Jose Manuel Torres Couto.

L'Afrique est-elle protectionniste- Les chemins buissonniers de la liberation exterieure

(Is Africa protectionist ? Greater economic freedom via the maze)

by Beatrice Hibou. Karthala Publications (22-24, boulevard Arago, F-75013 Paris). 1996. 334 pp. ISBN 286537-633-8.

This volume offers a clearsighted analysis of the foreign trade policies of African states, fraud, smuggling and the way in which the franc zone operates, giving a definitive, reformulated account of structural adjustment.

In her approach, the author is critical of both the liberal political economy and the new trends (the 'new political economy' end the neoinstitutionalist trends) which perpetuate the division between the economy and society. She refers to K Polanyi for whom Man's social relationships include economics and in whose opinion the economic system is managed as a function of non-economic motives.

From this starting point, Beatrice Hibou demonstrates the part played by the unexpected and the unintentional in economic policies as they currently exist, revealing that coherence in foreign-trade policies on the part of African countries is not an economic priority but a socio-political one. In this connection, she shows that structural adjustment programmes have been unsuccessful in making any real impact on protectionist practices, at least in terms of their political and historical bases.

After an overview of (legal or illegal) foreign-trade practices in contemporary Africa, protectionism is clearly alive and well, although much less widely applied and effective than about a decade ago. The reduction in the State's legal powers has meant increased freedom for 'informal networks', various types of dispensation, and an increase in fraud and smuggling.

On the basis of Jean-Francois Bayart's opinion, dating from 1989, the author suggests that the explanation is to be found in the specific nature of Africa's economic history, which is one of independent means, a lack of production and management of dependency without the way in which it operates being affected.

Dominique David

The Reality of Aid

Independent review of international aid. Pub.: J. Randel and T. German. Earthscan Publications Ltd. (120, Pentonville Road, UK London N1 9JN). 1996. 244 pp. ISBN 1 85383 292 8.

The Reality of Aid (now an annual publication) compiled by two NGOs; Eurostep and ICVA, aims to highlight the extent to which donor aid helps developing nations, looking beyond the official publications of governments, banks and inter-governmental bodies. It contains a useful critique of the European Union's various aid policies and the respective bilateral policies of each of its 15 member states, as well as those of other Western nations like Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States. This year's review highlights, in particular, the need to mount more projects to alleviate poverty, despite aid commitments becoming more scarce.

It says, for example, 'Too much aid is being squandered by governments on projects which have more to do with commercial and political advantage than poverty eradication. Rigorous evaluation needs to identify those programmes which can make an impact -and aid must increasingly be directed only to these areas.

International aid to developing nations has fallen off over the years. In 1994, members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee-21 of the world's richest countries-allowed their aid to fall to just 0.3 % of GNP, the lowest level for more than 20 years. The review stresses the need for donors to address in particular; policy coherence (environment, agriculture and consumption policies are all linked to poverty), the effectiveness of aid, the failure thus far to invest in people and the fact that the amount of assistance going to health and education is stagnating.

The review also features analytical case studies of various donor activities in selected developing nations (India, Fiji, Cambodia, Peru, Zimbabwe) and looks at Western assistance to post communist countries in transition.

A chapter on the European Union's current development policies, edited by Mirjam van Reisen, a Brussels-based Eurostep researcher, criticises the lack of coherence of EU aid with its Member States bilateral programmes-an issue which is likely to come more to the fore as other European nations join the Union in the next millennium. Ms van Reisen also claims that there are too few staff running the EU's development policies and suggests, in particular, that there is a lack of expertise in the social and poverty areas. She stresses the importance for the EU's political leaders of giving more political clout to the EU's development policies at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which is currently engaged in revising the EU's treaties.

Debra Percival

Trafficking of women

European Commissioner for immigration policy and legal affairs, Anita Gradin, will set to work with fellow Commissioners over the coming months to draw up a European Union action programme to clamp down on the trafficking of women which she describes as, 'the modern slave trade'. This comes hot on the heels of the Vienna European conference on trafficking of women, held on June 10 and 11, which was co-hosted by the European Commission, the Austrian government and the International Organisation for Migration.

Ms Gradin told journalists on June 12: 'I will put forward to the Council and the European Parliament a communication on the trafficking in women for sexual exploitation. This will cover migration policy, police and judicial cooperation, and social aspects to support and protect the victims. It will also consider European relations with the source countries, where the women are recruited.'

The Vienna conference highlighted the need for cooperation between Member States and third countrie from which women are lured into prostitution in Western Europe. Recommendations, which are expected to be part of the EU policy, include setting up central national units in each Member State to exchange information.

The Commissioner told the participants in Vienna: 'The slave trade in women is growing, a slave-trade that aims at sexual exploitation. No part of the world seems to be free from this degrading treatment of women. Women are bought and sold like cattle or commodities. They are deprived of their rights and their dignity. And the direction of the trade is the same all over-it is women from poor conditions that are forced into a deplorable life by men in richer countries.'

She cited a typical case of one woman from the Dominican Republic from the book 'Stolen Lives' by Sietske Altinks: 'One day I went to visit a friend who was going to discuss job opportunities in Europe. I went with her and met a schoolteacher who knew somebody called Juan who could get me a job in the Netherlands. When I went to see him, his associates told me that I would easily find employment in a beauty parlour.' She ended up in prostitution.

Ms Gradin continued: 'The consequences for the women are dreadful. Often, they find themselves deprived of their freedom to move and decide for themselves; they are often locked up and subjected to violence and sexual exploitation. And should they be able to free themselves, they are regarded as illegal residents and expelled.'

Debra Percival

Aid for development in the field of communication

A seminar was held under the auspices of the United Nations in the Belgian Parliament on 6 and 7 June, on 'the future of international development cooperation: new challenges for communication'.

The European Union was represented at the event, among others, by Colette Flesch and Steffen Smidt, the directors general respectively of DG X and DG VlII of the Commission. Mrs Flesch gave a presentation at the opening session in which she highlighted the various communication approaches adopted by the European Community in its efforts to counter what appears to be a growing lack of interest in development aid on the continent.

Mr Smidt, who spoke in the second session of the seminar, began his presentation with an anecdote, citing a text displayed at the entrance to a Federal building in Washington. This states: 'Taxes are what we pay to have a civilised society'. Paraphrasing this sentiment, the Director-General argued that, 'development assistance is what we pay to have a civilised European Union.' The question, he went on to pose, was whether we were paying enough ?

A number of the participants painted a discouraging picture of the situation facing the world's poorest countries in a world of advanced communications and increasing globalisation. Almost all were pessimistic about the impact of the socalled 'information super highways' on the least-developed nations.

One of the most striking interventions came from Mabbub Ul Haq, the former Finance Minister of Pakistan, who spoke just after Mr Smidt in the plenary meeting, as well as at one of the discussion workshops. Mr Ul Haq urged the creation of a UN Economic Security Council, arguing that the main risk of global conflagration lies in the disparity that exists between rich and poor, now that the dangers associated with the Cold War have receded. One of the most acute issues under discussion was the growing challenge to the received wisdom that technical assistance is essential for consolidating national capacities. The evidence of 40 years of technical assistance would suggest otherwise (with 95% of funds set aside for this purpose going to foreign experts). Indeed, it was argued that those countries receiving most technical assistance per capita, had 'benefited' least from the system.

In his second contribution, Mr Ul Haq painted a somewhat more encouraging picture, pointing out that the shaky 0.3% share of GNP allocated to development aid by the industrialised countries had achieved miracles in terms of increased life expectancy (up by 17 years) and the doubling of school enrolments in the countries of the South.

Hegel Goutier

Round one of the South Africa-EU talks

South Africa gave no immediate response to the European Union's proposals for a bilateral trade agreement at the first round of high level negotiations in Brussels on June 20. The talks were headed by Dr L. T Links who is South Africa's new Ambassador in Brussels and for the KU, by the Director General for Development, Steffen Smidt.

The most difficult subject to negotiate will be future terms of access for South Africa's farm produce. The European mandate, which was agreed by EU Member States on March 25, foresees the exclusion of 39% of South Africa's farm produce currently sold to the EU from the planned free trade area. Applying World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, the EU wants a scaled dismantling of barriers to trade in both farm and manufactured goods over a 10-year period, with a maximum of 12 years for a few highly sensitive items. But the EU has agreed to 'asymmetry' whereby, in some areas, it will open up its market to South Africa at a faster pace than vice versa.

Abdul Minty, deputy Director General at the Foreign Affairs Department in Pretoria, who is one of ,the chief negotiators, explained that South Africa had not yet responded to the terms because it is still consulting internally with the National Economic Development and Labour Council and with its partners of the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia and Lesotho).

During a recent visit to Brussels, South Africa's former agriculture minister, Dr Kraai van Niekerk and his deputy, Mrs Thoko Didiza, told reporters that as it stood, the EU's mandate was 'anti-developmental'. Dr van Niekerk said he would like to see citrus fruit, in particular, removed from the list of exclusions. He also sought to dispel the fears of some EU Member States who wish to omit a larger proportion of South Africa's farm produce from the FTA, for fear of competition with equivalent EU produce.

Dr van Niekerk stressed the 'complementary' nature of South Africa's farm production. He pointed out that his country's growing season was at the opposite time of year to that of the EU and noted that South Africa's output of farm produce could only increase by about 2%.

EU spokesman, Joao Vale de Almeida, said that progress had been made during the Brussels talks on aspects of South Africa's 'tome protocol'. This is aimed at giving South Africa certain benefits from the Lomé Convention- some eligibility for South African companies to tender for Lomé contracts and the partial extension of the Lomé rules of origin to South African exports. It was originally planned that the Lomé protocol should be implemented at the same time as a bilateral trade accord, (on January 1 1997). Mr Vale de Almeida spelt out that although it would not be technically and legally impossible for the Lomé protocol to come on stream without the bilateral pact, it would be more practical if the two could be implemented at the same time. A second round of talks is expected to take place in the autumn.

D.P

Echo Media Awards

On 29 June, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) launched a Television and Radio awards scheme to reward high-quality coverage of humanitarian affairs. Prizes will go to programmes produced or co-produced by independent production companies and/or broadcasting stations in the 15 EU countries which have been transmitted in a Member State on terrestrial or satellite television or radio between January 1 1995 and September 1 1996.

Judging by a panel made up of NGOs, environmentalists, politicians and the media will be in six categories:

People on the move-a television documentary on the humanitarian consequences of sudden or forced population movements;

In the minds of the people-a TV documentary on the psychological trauma in crisis situations;

Forgotten conflicts-TV coverage of a long-running crisis forgotten by the mainstream;

Vulnerable groups-TV coverage of the hazards encountered by women, children and the elderly in rebuilding their lives;

Broadcast commitment-to a radio or TV station for consistent, high-quality coverage of humanitarian issues;

Radio award-for the most incisive and analytical coverage of an emergency or humanitarian crisis.

Announcing the scheme, EC Commissioner, Emma Bonino, said: 'These awards give us an opportunity to acknowledge the vital role that broadcasters play in raising awareness of the issues at stake in imaginative, accurate and moving ways. They also serve to remind us of some of the basic European values such as solidarity and humanitarianism that have sometimes been eclipsed by barrages of headlines about mad cows and fish wars.'

Entries for this inaugural year must be submitted by September 19, 1996. Details can be obtained from: Mandy Duncan-Smith, Media Natura (UK), tel: (44 171) 240 4936 fax: (44171) 240 2291 E-mail: [email protected]

Posters featuring contemporary Bantu art

In the framework of its cooperation programme with the Commission, CICIBA (Centre international des civilisations bantu-B.P. 770-Libreville- Gabon) has recently launched a series of large format reproductions featuring contemporary Bantu art. Thirteen works have been chosen, displaying a representative selection of art forms-painting, sculpture, engraving and moulded leather. The posters, more than 5000 of which have been printed in quadrichromic colour, have a 40 x 60 format. They are also available as postcards.

The artists featured are Marcela Costa (Angola), Assouambo (Cameroon), Daikou (Central African Republic), Mouanga Nkodia (Congo), Abdou Moeou (Comoros), Pambou Boulaz (Gabon), Jose Menan (Equatorial Guinea), Protais Hakizimfura (Rwanda), Protasio Pina (Sao Tome & Principe), Silu Kinanga and Munyenz Tshibangu (Zaire) and Mulenga Chafilwa (Zambia).

CICIBA has also put together a similar series on ancient Bantu art. The fourth bi-annual exhibition of contemporary Bantu art, which has received some support from the European Commission, was due to be staged in Luanda (Angola) during July and August.

Links between technology and society

For more than 50 years, technological innovation has been regarded by many writers in the field as the motor of economic development.

Today, with rapid developments in the media sector and the emergence of 'information super-highways', the whole world is talking about the emergence of a new society dominated by 'smart' technology linked with research and creativity. This trend gives rise to many questions. Will the information be made available to all, and if so, when ? Will it lead to a change in North-South relations? Can we imagine what a world of 'tale-working', 'tale-education' and video on demand will be like ? What will the cost of all this be? Will biotechnology rescue the world or be the cause of its downfall ? What will the consequences be for the environment ? And in a globalised world, what standards and norms will be used ?

In short, what is the real nature of the relationship between technology and society; between science and humankind ?

Fifteen universities of the EEA (European Economic Area) from Oslo to the Basque country and from London to Athens (taking in Roskilde, Maastricht, Louvainla-Neuve, Namur, Strasbourg, Lausanne, Sienna, Bari, Madrid, Valencia and Lisbon), have come together to offer a multidisciplinary course focusing on these key questions. During the first term, classes in theory and seminars are offered (in the local language of the institution) by experts from the academic world and the public and private sectors. Visits are also planned to multinational companies and laboratories. For the second half of the course, the students gain a wider European dimension by 'changing' university (with grants from the Socrates programme). The bulk of their time at this stage will be spent preparing a research dissertation in English on a topic which fits in with the specialisation of the host institution.

For further information on the ESST

programme, contact:

Prof. E Lints (UCL-Belgium)

Tel. (32) 01047.82.60

Prof. T. Nguyen (FUNDP-Belgium)

Tel. (32) 081-72.49.09

Common foreign and security policy

Within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union has recently issued a number of statements, details of which are set out below:

Antipersonnel mines

Declaration of 13 May 1996

At the closure of the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the European Union recalls that it has, in recent years, redoubled its efforts to combat the severe consequences caused to civilians by the indiscriminate use of land mines, in particular anti-personnel mines.

The KU, which adopted joint action in May 1995 in order to reconfirm its commitment to the objective of an overall strengthening of Protocol 11 of the CCW, considers that the achievements of the Review Conference (such as the extension of the scope of Protocol II; the strengthening of restrictions on the use of mines; the new and immediate prohibitions regarding transfers; the provisions on technological cooperation and assistance; the regular review mechanism, etc), taken together, are significant steps forward, both in terms of the land mines protocol itself and of the development of international humanitarian law.

The KU, however, underlines that the resuits of the Review Conference fall short of its expectations and of some of the goals set out in its joint action. In particular, the EU should have liked an effective and binding verification mechanism and no periods of deferral of compliance, or at least much shorter ones.

The EU is convinced that the conclusion of this Review Conference is only the beginning of a challenging process which requires constant and widespread efforts and persistence in order to fully achieve its basic humanitarian objectives. The EU will continue to seek solutions to the problems caused by antipersonnel land mines and will strive towards the goal of their eventual elimination as stated in UN Resolution 50/70 (O). In the meantime, the Member States of the EU will seek early ratification of the amended Protocol II, as well as of the new Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons, and will take urgent steps to ensure their compliance with all the provisions of these two protocols pending their entry into force.

The EU will also continue to make active efforts with a view to achieving universal adherence to the CCW, since its objectives can only be effectively attained through implementation of its provisions by the widest number of states and parties to conflicts.

Furthermore, the EU recalls its determination to pursue its contribution to the international mine clearance efforts. The EU has already contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund, financing, in particular, projects in Angola and Mozambique as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. In addition, the EU will consider the possibility of conducting specific demining actions and will continue to seek to that effect the contribution of the WEU to the elaboration and implementation of such actions.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the EU (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta, as well as the EFTA country members of the EEA, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, align themselves with this statement.

The Great Lakes region and the situation in Burundi

Declaration of 24 June 1996

The EU's objectives and priorities with regard to the Great Lakes region are to secure peace, to consolidate the process of national reconciliation in the countries concerned, to facilitate a return to normal democratic life, in particular by restoring the rule of law, and to encourage economic and social recovery.

Aware as it is of the close links between the various political, economic and humanitarian problems in the region and of the serious risk of destabilisation which remains, the EU would emphasise the need for a comprehensive approach and a regional dimension in the search for lasting solutions to the crisis.

It considers that the presence of over a million and a half refugees in the region constitutes a major factor of destabilisation and that their return to their countries of origin in safety and with dignity is essential if peace is to be restored.

It appeals to the Heads of State who signed the Cairo and Tunis Declarations to comply with the undertakings they gave, so as in particular to stop trafficking in arms and the training of the various militia and armed groups which serve only to increase insecurity in the region. It would point to United Nations Resolution 1053 in this regard and also the measures in the plan of action adopted by the Bujumbura Conference (12 to 17 February 1995) for the prevention of subversive activities in countries of asylum. The EU also emphasises the importance of deploying United Nations observers in airports and at frontiers.

The EU is increasingly concerned at the deteriorating political and human rights situation in Burundi and at the increase in violence. The persistent clashes, spreading over different parts of the country, and the killings and atrocities committed against the civilian population could well involve Burundi in a spiral of permanent conflict.

The EU strongly condemns all recourse to violence, which will never bring about a solution to the country's problems, and appeals to all the factions in the country to begin negotiating a resolution of their differences and to agree on an immediate, general cessation of violence. It supports the initiatives taken by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity to restore peace, as well as former President Nyerere's current efforts in this area.

It fervently hopes that the talks taking place will result in a national dialogue open to all factions within the country. It also expresses its support for the ongoing efforts made by various bodies and eminent figures such as former Presidents Carter and Toure, and Archbishop Tutu.

The EU would point out that it too has taken initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis and recently appointed a special envoy for the Great Lakes region, Mr Aldo Ajello, to assist the current efforts of the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and other bodies and individuals, and specifically to lend support to the organisation of a regional conference under the joint aegis of the UN and the OAU to examine and resolve the deep-rooted causes of the crisis.

The EU remains convinced that such a conference must be convened as soon as possible.

The EU reiterates that it is prepared to assist with specific measures to promote peace and reconciliation in Burundi, in particular the organisation of a national dialogue, support for action to promote human rights and the restoring of the rule of law. It is furthermore willing to continue funding the presence of OAU observers and United Nations human rights observers in the country. It is also prepared to help with the economic and social recovery of Burundi as soon as political and security conditions allow rehabilitation programmes to be set up in the country.

Niger: progressive restoration of aid

Declaration of 28 June 1996

The European Union takes note of the fact that the regime in Niger has announced the results of the country's constitutional referendum and has lifted the state of emergency and the ban on political parties.

The EU takes the view that Niger has thus met the conditions set out by the Council on 13 May 1996 for the progressive restoration of cooperation. In the first instance, this will take the form of: -support for the electoral process; -aid for structural adjustment which, at present, needs to be focused exclusively on the most pressing needs in the social sectors.

The Council will continue to follow closely the situation in Niger, in particular as regards the preparation and conduct of the presidential and legislative elections.

Arusha summit on Burundi

Declaration of 5 July 1996

Recalling its declaration of 25 June 1996, the European Union congratulates President Mkapa on the organisation of the Arusha regional summit, which has produced constructive proposals on the conflict in Burundi. It expresses appreciation for the untiring efforts of former President Nyerere and reiterates its support for his peace initiative.

The EU encourages the region's Heads of State and the Organisation of African Unity to commit themselves resolutely to supporting and giving substance to the Arusha recommendations and to contribute to the restoration of security in Burundi.

The EU expects the President and the Prime Minister of Burundi to fulfil the undertakings they gave at the Summit to overcome the crisis in Burundi and, with the help of the countries of the region, to put an end to the violence which is destroying the people of Burundi.

The EU calls on all the political forces of Burundi to seek a political solution and to give a favourable reception to regional initiatives to restore peace to their country. It calls the attention of all the parties to the conflict in Burundi to the fact that it condemns all forms of violence and that it will not recognise a government that has taken power by force of arms. Only peace, a peace consolidated at regional level, can guarantee the security of all and lay the foundations for economic and social development.

The EU is prepared to support the realisation of the Arusha objectives with a view to restoring peace and security in Burundi. It reiterates its readiness to help Burundi in its economic and social recovery when political and security conditions make it possible to begin its rehabilitation.

The EU reiterates the need to convene the Conference on Peace, Security and Stability in the Great Lakes Region under the joint aegis of the United Nations and the OAU.

Burundi: support for the OAU Resolution

Declaration of 15 July 1996

Recalling its previous Declarations and Common Position on Burundi and, in particular, the Declarations of 25 June 1996 and 5 July 1996, the European Union warmly welcomes the Resolution on Burundi adopted by the Organisation of African Unity's Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Yaounde on 8 -10 July 1996.

The Union particularly welcomes the reaffirmation by the OAU of its support for the Mwanza Peace Talks under the facilitation of former President Nyerere and its encouragement to him to continue with his efforts based on and incorporating the principles of sustainable democracy and security for all the people of Burundi and an all-inclusive negotiation process. The Union reiterates its appreciation of the untiring efforts of former President Nyerere and its support for his peace initiative in this context.

The declaration in the Resolution of the OAU's full support for the outcome of the Arusha Summit of 25 June 1996, especially the acceptance of the request by the Government of Burundi for security assistance in order to complement and reinforce the Mwanza peace talks, as well as creating conducive security conditions for all parties to freely participate in the Mwanza process is also welcomed by the Union.

The EU reaffirms its willingness to support the realisation of the Arusha objectives with a view to restoring peace and security in Burundi. It remains ready to help Burundi in its economic and social recovery when political and security conditions make it possible to begin its rehabilitation.

The President of Haiti

The President of the Republic of Haiti, Rene Preval, visited the Commission on 11 June. He met with President Jacques Santer, Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro (responsible for relations with the ACP States) and Commissioner Emma Bonino (responsible for humanitarian aid).

President Preval thanked the European Union for all the support it had provided both for the restoration of democracy in Haiti and for the country's economic development. He spoke in particular of the discussions that are currently under way with the Bretton Woods institutions aimed at restoring Haiti's economy. The President indicated that an economic recovery programme would need balance of payments support to the tune of $119m during 1996, as well as assistance for a range of economic sectors amounting to a billion dollars over a three-year period.

For his part, Professor Pinheiro expressed satisfaction at being able to welcome the President at a time when the democratic process in Haiti was functioning normally and institutional consolidation was taking place. In a statement to the press, he said it was an appropriate moment 'to evaluate our cooperation and to strengthen it in a way that will contribute to economic and social development' in Haiti. He added that it was essential for the Haitian people to recognise that democracy was worthwhile. Professor Pinheiro also welcomed the normalisation of relations between Haiti and its neighbour, the Dominican Republic.

The President of the Dominican Republic

The newly-elected President of the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fernandez Reyna, had a working session at the Commission on 15 and 16 July.

This trip to Brussels was the President's first overseas visit in his new capacity, following his election on 30 June. Indeed, he had not yet formally assumed office at the time of his visit. His inauguration was due to take place on 16 August and the President-elect extended an invitation to the Commission to attend the ceremony. Mr Fernandez Reyna's subsequent itinerary included visits to Spain, France and the United States.

The Commission has recently approved the financing of the following projects under the budget line 'Human Rights and Democracy in the Developing Countries):

ACP countries

Guinea: ECU 120 000 for a project aimed at actively involving members of the National Assembly in the institution's functioning, and in the democratisation process taking place in the country.

Niger: ECU 72 000 for a human rights training programme in schools in both urban and rural areas.

Nigeria: ECU 118 000 for a human -rights training programme to be run in educational establishments and through itinerant projects in regions lacking education infrastructures.

Fiji: ECU 119 000 for a project to support a non-partisan, multi-ethnic civic forum, aimed at contributing to the achievement of a consensus among various social groups.

Non-ACP countries

Nepal: ECU 59 112 to safeguard texts which are essential to the preservation of Tibetan culture.

Nepal: ECU 30196 for the archiving of slides and photographs depicting art objects in order to preserve the culture and traditional techniques of Tibet.

Philippines: ECU 61 750 for a mission to identify the areas in which strategies for human rights and democracy could lead to positive and lasting changes.

Sri Lanka: ECU 84 314 for a programme of information in the field of promoting equal opportunities and non-discrimination

The Commission has recently decided to finance the following projects in developing countries affected by serious civil disturbances or natural disasters:

Angola: ECU 847 000 for an integrated programme covering the rehabilitation of agriculture and basic infrastructures, training in demining, hygiene and self sustaining development in Kipungo.

Angola: ECU 185 000 for the rehabilitation of basic infrastructures (water, health, education and housing) In the province of Luanda.

Eritrea: ECU 353 947 to support the rehabilitation and development of basic

health care services in the south-west of the country.

Eritrea: ECU 575 197 for the rehabilitation of water supplies and community development in the town of Hagaz.

Ethiopia: ECU 515.685 for the rehabilitation of primary care and water supplies in the Warder area.

Ethiopia: ECU 455 630 to help the rehabilitation of repatriated people and displaced persons in the Borena area.

Ethiopia: ECU 308 475 for the rehabilitation of health care and water supplies in the Hararghe area.

Mozambique: ECU 848 000 for a programme of support to upgrade medical infrastructures.

Mozambique: ECU 590 000 to consolidate the water sector and rehabilitate livestock infrastructures in Maputo and Gaza provinces.

Mozambique: ECU 500 000 for the second phase of a programme to help reestablish and reintegrate displaced people in Milange.

Rwanda: ECU 241 259 for a project designed to revitalise livestock producer groups, make available essential veterinary products and support cattle production in the landward prefecture of Kigali.

Rwanda: ECU 411 751 to provide professional training in primary health care.

Rwanda: ECU 805 475 for an environment rehabilitation project in the prefecture of Kibungo.

Rwanda: ECU 437 622 for the rehabilitation of primary schools in the southwest of the country.

Rwanda: ECU 94 650 to train laboratory technicians.

Somalia: ECU 626 439 for the rehabilitation of wells and water points in the Nugal region.

Zaire: ECU 423 687 for the creation of enterprises involved in making bricks and earth blocks in order to assist in the rehabilitation of rural habitats.

Zaire: ECU 1 491 117 for a tree-planting project around the Virungas National Park as part of a rehabilitation programme directed at Rwanda's immediate neighbours.

Haiti: ECU 213 536 for operational and methodological support for rural development projects.

Haiti: ECU 645 120 for technical assistance in the follow-up and evaluation of rehabilitation projects.

Haiti: ECU 551980 for a programme to rehabilitate schools and provide support for the education sector.

Following, where required, favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, the Commission has decided to provide grants and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to finance the following operations (grants unless otherwise stated). Major projects and programmes are highlighted.

Economic and social infrastructure

Malawi: ECU 1.9 million for the rehabilitation and construction of customs facilities.

Zambia: ECU 11 million for resurfacing and improvements to the runway at Lusaka international Airport.

Fiji ECU 1.8 million for the rebuilding of three bridges.

Trade promotion/ structural adjustment

Member states of SADC (Southern Africa), ECOWAS (West Africa) and ECOCAS (Central Africa): ECU 500 000 for a follow-up pilot project relating to industrial fore in different sectors.

Botswana: ECU 1.9 million for a tourism development programme.

Djibouti: ECU 4.1 million to support the 1996-97 structural adjustment programme.

Netherlands Antilles/Aruba: ECU 5 million for a tourism promotion programme.

Agriculture/ rural development

Madagascar: ECU 1.9 million to support professional organisations in the field of rural credit.

Swaziland: ECU 1.4 million to build a bridge at Maphobeni, to facilitate rural development in this area.

Swaziland: ECU 1.5 million to improve the storage and commercialisation of maize.

Health

Benin: ECU 700 000 to enhance the security of blood supplies in the Oueme, Mono and Atlantique departments.

Education/training

Botswana: ECU 15 million for a training programme directed at SMEs, independent operators and the unemployed.

Ethiopia: ECU 1.05 million for a programme designed to strengthen training and research capacity in the economic field.

Member states of IGAD (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda): ECU 1.9 million for a training programme for the commercialisation of cereals.

Environment

Lesotho: ECU 1.3 million for a community reforestation programme in the Lesotho Highlands.

Institutional support

Djibouti: ECU 250 000 to provide technical support for the computerisation of the National Bank's accounting system.

Niger: ECU 1.8 million to support the electoral process.

Kenya: ECU 1.7 million for an assistance programme for the National Authorising

Officer covering the management of funds allocated by the European Community.

Zambia: ECU 1.5 million for the first phase of a tourism development programme.

Cariforum countries-Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bahamas, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago): ECU 725 000 in technical assistance for the programming unit of the Cariforum General Secretariat.

Miscellaneous

All ACPs: ECU 5 million to strengthen fisheries management and biodiversity.

Ghana: ECU 1.5 million for a pilot project in the field of decentralised cooperation.

Kenya: ECU 12.5 million for a community development programme in the battle against poverty.

Somalia: ECU 47 million for the second rehabilitation programme. The focus will be on productive activities (livestock, agriculture and fisheries), the social sectors (health, water, sanitation systems and education), the private sector (revenue generation, job creation, SMEs), the public sector (training, establishment of institutions), demobilisation, and the integration of former combatants

Zambia: ECU 1.6 million for a programme to combat poverty including, in particular, the provision of credit to micro-enterprises.

Zaire: ECU 2 million to support the integration of displaced people in Kasai.

South Africa: A loan of ECU 56 million for Eskom, the public electricity company, for the modemisation of part of its electricity distribution network.

ACP countries

Angola: ECU 14 million for a global assistance programme covering food and medical aid, the distribution of equipment and demining operations.

Chad: ECU 500 000 for the distribution of essential food products and to meet the special nutritional needs of children in the north of the country.

Cote d'lvoire: ECU 340 000 to help combat cholera and yellow fever among refugees from Liberia.

Ghana: ECU 140 000 towards the setting up of a camp for 'boat people' arriving from Liberia.

Guinea: ECU 160000 for the distribution of food to refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Senegal: ECU 250 000 towards the fight against cholera, notably in the town of Touba.

Sierra Leone: ECU 4.2 million for food and emergency medical aid (to combat cholera) for people displaced by the civil war.

Somalia: ECU 1.5 million for a measles vaccination programme and for medical and food aid for victims of the internal conflict.

Southern Sudan: ECU 13 million to finance ECHO flights, and for food, medical aid and the provision of water supplies, for civilian victims of the conflict, notably in Khartoum and its environs and in the refugee camps in the north of Uganda.

Non - ACP countries

Nicaragua: ECU 1.5 million for medicines, essential provisions, drinking water supply equipment and training actions in the area of epidemic prevention.

Peru: ECU 800 000 for shelters and medical assistance to people in the process of reestablishing their homes having fled from the violence that has occurred over the past ten years.

Ex-Yugoslavia: ECU 102 million for various emergency operations. The breakdown of this aid, by country, is as follows: Bosnia-Herzegovina-ECU 77.45 million; Croatia-ECU 11.95 million; Serbia-Montenegro-ECU 12,6 million.

Russian Federation: ECU 900 000 for street children in St Petersburg and homeless people in Moscow.

Afghanistan: ECU 7 million for a coordinated aid programme covering public health measures, the provision of drinking water, hygiene and refuse collection. The aid will be directed both at the people of Kabul and at other provinces of the country.

Kirghizistan: ECU 3.6 million for the purchase and distribution of food.

Tadilkistan: ECU 8.9 million for a food and medical programme.

Bangladesh: ECU 300 000 to help victims of the tropical storm that struck in the middle of May.

Angola: 15 000 tonnes of cereals, 2000 tonnes of oils and 3000 tonnes of beans amounting to a total value of ECU 20.075 million.